Lysis

Key Words of the Dialogue

Each entry says what the word meant in Athens, what the dialogue does with it, and how it is rendered. The Glossary at the back lists the renderings with the places where they occur.

Friend (philos)

Philos was the ordinary word for a friend, and also for anything or anyone dear; in Homer and the early poets it could mean one’s own, and in the plural it meant one’s family and allies. It is said both of the one who loves and of the one who is loved, and the neuter, philon, is said of things. The dialogue’s question is “what the friend is” (223b), and its argument turns again and again on the word’s two directions: at 212a–213c both are first friends if one of them loves, then neither unless both love, then the friend is the one who is loved, then the one who loves; at 216c–218c it is “what is neither good nor bad”, a friend of the good, and at 219c–220b the “first friend” for whose sake the others are friends. The English renders philos “friend” throughout, of people, of things and of the neuter, and never “dear”, as settled with the publisher, so that the reader sees the same word tried each time; the note at its first occurrence (206a) says so. Where the Greek has the dative, the English has “a friend to” someone, and where it has the genitive, “a friend of” someone, and the two are kept apart (213a, 213b). The cost is a few sentences that are strange in English, as when Solon’s children are “friends” (212e) or “the beautiful is a friend” (216c); the notes say what the Greek means there.

Love, be in love (philein; erōs, eran)

Philein, the verb of philos, meant to love in the widest sense: parents love their children, men love wine and horses, and it is also the word for a kiss. Erōs was the love of a lover, desire for a beautiful person, and eran “to be in love”. Hippothales is “in love” from the start (204b), and the verb first appears with the parents who “love” Lysis (207d); its argument then uses philein throughout. The noun erōs, used of Hippothales’ love at the start (204b–e), returns only at the end, where “love and friendship and desire” are found to be of what is akin (221e). The English renders philein “love” every time, and keeps the noun “love” for erōs and “be in love” for eran, so that the two families can be told apart (the note at 207d says so). Socrates is “altogether like one in love” (erōtikōs) toward the acquiring of friends (211e).

Friendship (philia)

Philia was friendship, affection, and the bond between kin, allies and partners. In the dialogue it is the relation whose ground is sought: the two boys’ “friendship” (207c), “true friendship” (214d), the friendship of the most unlike (215d), “its friendship for the good” (217e), and the “friendships, as they are called” that end in the first friend (220b). The English renders it “friendship” every time, and never uses the noun “love” for it.

Companion (hetairos)

Hetairos was a comrade, a member of one’s circle or club, and, of a teacher’s circle, a disciple. The English renders it “companion”, and never “friend”, so that “friend” is always philos. Miccus is “a companion” of Socrates (204a); Lysis is Menexenus’ “closest companion of all” (206d); Socrates would sooner “acquire a companion than Darius’ gold” and calls himself “a friend of companions” (philetairos, 211e); Menexenus is “my friend and companion” (213b); and at 216a, it seems, the listener to whom Socrates tells the story is addressed as “my companion”.

Darling, lover, beloved (ta paidika; erastēs; erōmenos)

In the language of Athenian courtship an older erastēs, a “lover”, courted a boy, his erōmenos, “beloved”, or, in the everyday word, his paidika, his “darling”. Hippothales is Lysis’ lover; he asks “what talk one could hold, or what one could do, to become a friend to one’s darling” (206c), and Socrates’ lesson is “how one should talk to one’s darling” (210e). The English renders erastēs “lover”, erōmenos “beloved” and ta paidika “darling” every time (205a, 206a, 222a). The conclusion that “the genuine lover” must “be loved by his darling” (222a) is drawn in these words, while Hippothales listens.

Like, unlike (homoios, anomoios)

Homoios meant “like”, “similar”, and also “equal”. The poets say that “the god brings like to like” (214a), and “the wisest men”, “who talk and write about nature and the whole”, say “that like must always be a friend to like” (214b); Socrates shows that the wicked cannot be friends, however like they are (214b–c), and that what is like, insofar as it is like, has nothing to give what is like it (214e–215a), while the good, insofar as they are good, are sufficient for themselves and need nothing (215a–b). The opposite view, that “like is most hostile to like” (215c), fails too, and at the end the akin, granted to be “something different from what is like” (222c), falls back into the arguments about like and the good that were thrown out (222c–d). The English renders homoios “like” and anomoios “unlike” throughout (the superlative is “most alike”, 215d); where the Greek speaks of persons, it says “one who is like” or “those who are like” (214e–215a, 222e), and of things “like … to like”. Eoike, “resembles” (216c, 220e), is kept apart from it; “like” in a comparison (“like fathers and guides of wisdom”, 214a; “like a hunter”, 218c) renders hōsper, which is “as it were” at 219d.

Opposite (enantios)

Enantios meant “opposite”, “contrary”, and of persons “hostile”. The man Socrates once heard held that “the most opposite is most a friend to the most opposite”, the dry desiring the wet and the cold the hot (215e); the masters of contradiction will ask whether “enmity is not most opposite to friendship” (216a–b). The English renders it “opposite”, and the noun enantiotēs “oppositeness” (216b).

Good, bad, neither (agathos, kakos; ponēros)

Agathos was “good” in every sense, of men, of things and of conduct, and kakos “bad” in all the same senses. The argument of 216c–221d rests on three kinds, “the good, the bad, and what is neither good nor bad” (216d), and the English keeps these three phrases word for word, in the order the Greek gives them (“neither good nor bad”, “neither bad nor good”; with “not yet” at 218b, “not yet either good or bad”). Ponēros, “wicked”, is used of the men who do wrong (214b–c) and is kept apart from kakos.

Akin, alien (oikeios, allotrios)

Oikeios meant “of one’s household”, one’s own, kin, and so proper or natural to something; allotrios “belonging to others”, “foreign”. At 210c anything “more akin to us” than our father and mother will get in our way in the things in which we do not acquire sense, and if Lysis becomes wise “everyone will be a friend to you and everyone akin to you” (210d). At the end the word nearly becomes the answer: “it is of what is akin, it seems, that love and friendship and desire are in fact”, and the boys are “by nature in some way akin to each other” (221e); but the akin, granted to be different from the like, falls back into the arguments about like and the good (222c–d). The English renders oikeios “akin” every time. At 210c allotrios is “strangers” of persons, and the things in which we do not acquire sense “will belong to others”; it is “alien” of the bad, where the good is said to be akin to everything (222c).

Desire (epithymein, epithymia)

Epithymein was “to desire”, to set one’s heart on something, of food and drink as of honors and persons. Lysis’ parents prevent him from doing what he desires (207e–208e); Socrates has “in fact desired a certain possession”, friends, ever since he was a boy (211d–e); the opposite desires its opposite (215e); and at the end desire is offered as “the cause of friendship” (221d), and then “what desires desires what it lacks” (221d–e). The English renders the verb and the noun “desire” throughout, and keeps the verb “want” for boulesthai.

Useful, useless; benefit (chrēsimos, achrēstos; ōphelia, ōphelimos)

Chrēsimos was “useful”, achrēstos “useless”; ōphelia was “benefit” or “help”, and ōphelimos “beneficial”. At 210c–d friendship is tied to usefulness: no one loves anyone “insofar as he is useless”, and Lysis, once wise, will be “useful and good”. The good, needing no benefit, would have no use for each other (214e–215b), and the good itself, if the bad went away, would be “in no way useful to us, but have become useless” (220c). The English renders chrēsimos “useful”, achrēstos “useless”, chreia “use”, and the ōphel- words “benefit” and “beneficial” throughout. Socrates calls himself “paltry and useless” in all but the one thing given him by a god, “to be able to know quickly one who is in love and one who is beloved” (204b–c).

For the sake of, because of (heneka; dia)

Heneka meant “for the sake of”, the end for which a thing is done or loved; dia with the accusative meant “because of”, its cause. From 218d the argument turns on the difference. The friend is a friend “for the sake of something and because of something” (218d), the sick man a friend of the doctor “because of disease and for the sake of health” (218e), and at 219b the friend is a friend of the friend “for the sake of the friend, because of the enemy”. The things that are friends for the sake of another friend must come at last to “that which is first friend” (219c–d), and the good, it is asked, may be loved “because of the bad” (220b–d). The English keeps “for the sake of” for heneka every time, and “because of” for dia with the accusative throughout 218d–221d, where the argument turns on the difference; at 220e the Greek itself shifts to “for the sake of an enemy”, and the note there says so.

Understand (phronein; aphrōn)

Phronein was “to think”, “to have understanding”, “to be sensible”; phronimos was “understanding” or “sensible”, and aphrōn “without understanding”, “foolish”. The talk with Lysis turns on it: he is entrusted with what he understands, and will be entrusted with everything once he is believed to “understand better” than the one who entrusts it (209c–210b). The play at 210d, that one cannot “think highly of oneself” (mega phronein) in things in which one “does not yet understand”, and that one who is “without understanding” is not “proud” (megalophrōn), is in the words, and the note there says so. The English renders phronein “understand” throughout, and keeps nous, “sense” (210b), apart.

Cherish (agapan)

Agapan meant “to be fond of”, “to be content with”, “to welcome”. It appears where the argument asks what one needs: things that have no aid to give each other cannot “be cherished by each other” (215a), whoever is not in need of anything “would not cherish anything either” (215b), the one who does not know “must cherish the one who knows and love him” (215d), and “we cherished and loved the good” because of the bad (220d). The English renders it “cherish” every time, and never “love”.

Love wisdom (philosophein; philosophos; philosophia)

Philosophos was a lover of wisdom, a philosopher, and philosophein was “to pursue wisdom”; the words were formed, like the other phil- compounds, from philos and the thing loved. At 212d the philosophoi stand last in a list of “friends of” horses, quails, dogs, wine and exercise, and are “friends of wisdom”, unless “wisdom loves them back”; at 213d Socrates is pleased with Lysis’ philosophia, his “philosophy”; and at 218a–b those who “love wisdom” are neither the wise nor the bad and unlearned, but those who still believe that they do not know what they do not know. The English renders the compound “friends of wisdom”, the verb “love wisdom”, and the noun “philosophy”, with notes at each place.

Beautiful (kalos)

Kalos was “beautiful”, “fine”, “noble”, said of persons, of things and of acts; kalos kagathos, “beautiful and good”, was the Athenian phrase for a gentleman, and Lysis is worthy to be called both (207a). At 216c Socrates recalls the old proverb that “the beautiful is a friend”, and says that “the good is beautiful” (216d); his new proposal is that what is neither good nor bad is “a friend of the beautiful and good” (216d). The English renders kalos “beautiful” of persons and of the beautiful that the proverb calls a friend, and “fine” of other things (205e).