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Ancient Greek Page · Branch 22 of 34
Lysis · 216d–217c
Ancient Greek
p. 38οἴει;—Ἔγωγε.—Λέγω τοίνυν ἀπομαντευόμενος, τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον εἶναι τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν· πρὸς ἃ δὲ λέγων μαντεύομαι, ἄκουσον. δοκεῖ μοι ὡσπερεὶ τρία ἄττα εἶναι γένη, τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακόν, τὸ δ’ οὔτ’ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν· τί δὲ σοί;—Καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη.—Καὶ οὔτε τἀγαθὸν τἀγαθῷ οὔτε τὸ κακὸν τῷ κακῷ οὔτε τἀγαθὸν τῷ 216e κακῷ φίλον εἶναι, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ὁ ἔμπροσθεν λόγος ἐᾷ· λείπεται δή, εἴπερ τῴ τί ἐστιν φίλον, τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν φίλον εἶναι ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ τοῦ τοιούτου οἷον αὐτό ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἄν που τῷ κακῷ φίλον ἄν τι γένοιτο.— Ἀληθῆ.—Οὐδὲ μὴν τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἔφαμεν ἄρτι· ἦ γάρ;—Ναί.—Οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται τῷ μήτε ἀγαθῷ μήτε κακῷ τὸ τοιοῦτον φίλον οἷον αὐτό.—Οὐ φαίνεται.—Τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἄρα 217a τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν μόνῳ μόνον συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι φίλον.—Ἀνάγκη, ὡς ἔοικεν.
Ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ καλῶς, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ παῖδες, ὑφηγεῖται ἡμῖν τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον; εἰ γοῦν θέλοιμεν ἐννοῆσαι τὸ ὑγιαῖνον σῶμα, οὐδὲν ἰατρικῆς δεῖται οὐδὲ ὠφελίας· ἱκανῶς γὰρ ἔχει, ὥστε ὑγιαίνων οὐδεὶς ἰατρῷ φίλος διὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν. ἦ γάρ; —Οὐδείς.—Ἀλλ’ ὁ κάμνων οἶμαι διὰ τὴν νόσον.—Πῶς γὰρ 217b οὔ;—Νόσος μὲν δὴ κακόν, ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἀγαθόν. —Ναί.—Σῶμα δέ γέ που κατὰ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν.—Οὕτως.—Ἀναγκάζεται δέ γε σῶμα διὰ νόσον ἰατρικὴν ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν.—Δοκεῖ μοι.—Τὸ μήτε κακὸν ἄρα μήτ’ ἀγαθὸν φίλον γίγνεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διὰ κακοῦ παρουσίαν.—Ἔοικεν.—Δῆλον δέ γε ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι αὐτὸ κακὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ οὗ ἔχει. οὐ γὰρ δή γε κακὸν γεγονὸς 217c ἔτι ἄν τι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ [οὗ] ἐπιθυμοῖ καὶ φίλον εἴη· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἔφαμεν κακὸν ἀγαθῷ φίλον εἶναι.—Ἀδύνατον γάρ.—
Lysis
p. 39you think so?” — “I do.” — “Then I say, divining, that what is neither good nor bad is a friend of the beautiful and good; and hear what I am speaking of when I divine it. It seems to me that there are, as it were, some three kinds: the good, the bad, and what is neither good nor bad. And to you?” — “To me too,” he said. — “And that neither the good to the good, nor the bad to the bad, nor the good to the 216e bad is a friend, as the argument before does not let it be so either. It remains, then, if anything is a friend to anything, that what is neither good nor bad is a friend either of the good or of what is of the same sort as itself. For nothing, I take it, could become a friend to the bad.” — “True.” — “Nor, indeed, like to like, we said just now. Isn’t that so?” — “Yes.” — “Then to what is neither good nor bad, what is of the same sort as itself will not be a friend.” — “Apparently not.” — “Then it is to the good 217a alone, it turns out, that what is neither good nor bad, and it alone, becomes a friend.” — “Necessarily, it seems.”
“Then is what we are now saying, boys,” I said, “actually leading us well? At any rate, if we were willing to think of the healthy body, it is in no need of medicine or of benefit; for it is in a sufficient state, so that no one who is healthy is a friend to a doctor because of his health. Isn’t that so?” — “No one is.” — “But the sick man is, I think, because of his disease.” — “Of course.” — 217b “Disease, now, is bad, and medicine beneficial and good.” — “Yes.” — “And a body, I take it, insofar as it is a body, is neither good nor bad.” — “So it is.” — “But a body is compelled, because of disease, to welcome and love medicine.” — “It seems so to me.” — “Then what is neither bad nor good becomes a friend of the good because of the presence of bad.” — “It seems so.” — “And plainly before it has itself become bad through the bad that it has. For indeed, once it has become bad, it 217c would no longer desire anything of the good, or be a friend;1 for, we said, it is impossible for bad to be a friend to good.” — “Yes, it is impossible.” —
Socrates
Reading Lysis · Lysis · 216d–217c
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
The complete Lysis, 203a–223b: Socrates questions Lysis and Menexenus about friendship, love, desire, and what is akin, as Hippothales listens. Burnet’s Greek faces a new Diotimos Editions English translation, with an introduction, key words, outline, glossary, critical apparatus, and linked translator notes.
Historical Text and Translation
Greek: Plato, Lysis, in John Burnet, Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford, 1903; second impression, corrected, January 1909, printed by Horace Hart). The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library transcription and checked against photographs of this impression by the supplied edition; Burnet’s lineation and critical apparatus are retained. The digital Greek transcription and its modifications are attributed to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, under CC BY-SA 4.0. English translation and editorial matter: Diotimos Editions, 2026.
About Diotimos Editions
This historical edition credits Diotimos Editions as its English translator.
Rights
The ancient Greek work and Burnet’s printed edition are in the public domain. The Perseus digital Greek transcription and its modifications are reused under CC BY-SA 4.0. The new English translation and editorial matter are credited to Diotimos Editions, 2026; no open license is stated in the supplied edition.
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