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Plato

Lysis

Ancient Greek with an independent English translation.

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LysisLysis · 215a–215e

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Lysis · 215a–215e

Ancient Greek

p. 34

καθ’ ὅσον ἀγαθός, οὐ καθ’ ὅσον ὅμοιος, φίλος ἂν εἴη;—Ἴσως. —Τί δέ; οὐχ ὁ ἀγαθός, καθ’ ὅσον ἀγαθός, κατὰ τοσοῦτον ἱκανὸς ἂν εἴη αὑτῷ;—Ναί.—Ὁ δέ γε ἱκανὸς οὐδενὸς δεόμενος κατὰ τὴν ἱκανότητα.—Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—Ὁ δὲ μή του 215b δεόμενος οὐδέ τι ἀγαπῴη ἄν.—Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.—Ὃ δὲ μὴ ἀγαπῴη, οὐδ’ ἂν φιλοῖ.—Οὐ δῆτα.—Ὁ δὲ μὴ φιλῶν γε οὐ φίλος.—Οὐ φαίνεται.—Πῶς οὖν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἡμῖν φίλοι ἔσονται τὴν ἀρχήν, οἳ μήτε ἀπόντες ποθεινοὶ ἀλλήλοις—ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χωρὶς ὄντες—μήτε παρόντες χρείαν αὑτῶν ἔχουσιν; τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους τίς μηχανὴ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι ἀλλήλους;—Οὐδεμία, ἔφη.—Φίλοι 215c δέ γε οὐκ ἂν εἶεν μὴ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούμενοι ἑαυτούς.— Ἀληθῆ.

Ἄθρει δή, ὦ Λύσι, πῇ παρακρουόμεθα. ἆρά γε ὅλῳ τινὶ ἐξαπατώμεθα;—Πῶς δή; ἔφη.—Ἤδη ποτέ του ἤκουσα λέγοντος, καὶ ἄρτι ἀναμιμνῄσκομαι, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς πολεμιώτατοι εἶεν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον ἐπήγετο μάρτυρα, λέγων ὡς ἄρα—

καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ215dκαὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ,

καὶ τἆλλα δὴ πάντα οὕτως ἔφη ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι μάλιστα τὰ ὁμοιότατα ⟨πρὸς⟩ ἄλληλα φθόνου τε καὶ φιλονικίας καὶ ἔχθρας ἐμπίμπλασθαι, τὰ δ’ ἀνομοιότατα φιλίας· τὸν γὰρ πένητα τῷ πλουσίῳ ἀναγκάζεσθαι φίλον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀσθενῆ τῷ ἰσχυρῷ τῆς ἐπικουρίας ἕνεκα, καὶ τὸν κάμνοντα τῷ ἰατρῷ, καὶ πάντα δὴ τὸν μὴ εἰδότα ἀγαπᾶν τὸν εἰδότα καὶ φιλεῖν. 215e καὶ δὴ καὶ ἔτι ἐπεξῄει τῷ λόγῳ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον, λέγων ὡς ἄρα παντὸς δέοι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον εἶναι, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον εἴη τούτου· τὸ γὰρ ἐναντιώτατον τῷ ἐναντιωτάτῳ εἶναι μάλιστα φίλον. ἐπιθυμεῖν γὰρ τοῦ

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Lysis

p. 35

insofar as he is good, not insofar as he is like, would he be a friend?” — “Perhaps.” — “What then? Would not the good man, insofar as he is good, be to that extent sufficient for himself?” — “Yes.” — “And the sufficient man is in need of nothing, by reason of his sufficiency.” — “Of course.” — “And whoever is not 215b in need of anything would not cherish anything either.” — “No, he would not.” — “And what he did not cherish he would not love either.” — “Certainly not.” — “And the one who does not love is not a friend.” — “Apparently not.” — “How then will the good be friends to the good for us at all, who neither are missed by each other when apart, since even separated they are sufficient for themselves, nor have any use for each other when together? What means is there for such people to set great store by each other?” — “None,” he said. — “Friends, 215c though, they would not be, if they did not set great store by each other.” — “True.”

“Look now, Lysis, where we are being led astray. Are we perhaps deceived in the whole of it?” — “How so?” he said. — “I once heard someone say, and I am just now reminded of it, that like is most hostile to like, and the good are to the good; and indeed he even brought in Hesiod as a witness, saying, as he would have it,

And potter is angry with potter, and singer with singer, 215d and beggar with beggar;1

and all other things, he said, must in the same way, those most alike most of all, be filled with envy and rivalry and enmity toward each other, and those most unlike with friendship; for the poor man is compelled to be a friend to the rich, and the weak to the strong, for the sake of aid, and the sick man to the doctor, and everyone who does not know must cherish the one who knows and love him. 215e And indeed he went further still in his argument, in more magnificent style, saying, as he would have it, that like is as far as can be from being a friend to like, but the very opposite of this is the case; for the most opposite is most a friend to the most opposite. For each thing, he said, desires

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About This Reading Edition

The complete Lysis, 203a–223b: Socrates questions Lysis and Menexenus about friendship, love, desire, and what is akin, as Hippothales listens. Burnet’s Greek faces a new Diotimos Editions English translation, with an introduction, key words, outline, glossary, critical apparatus, and linked translator notes.

Historical Text and Translation

Greek: Plato, Lysis, in John Burnet, Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford, 1903; second impression, corrected, January 1909, printed by Horace Hart). The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library transcription and checked against photographs of this impression by the supplied edition; Burnet’s lineation and critical apparatus are retained. The digital Greek transcription and its modifications are attributed to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, under CC BY-SA 4.0. English translation and editorial matter: Diotimos Editions, 2026.

About Diotimos Editions

This historical edition credits Diotimos Editions as its English translator.

Rights

The ancient Greek work and Burnet’s printed edition are in the public domain. The Perseus digital Greek transcription and its modifications are reused under CC BY-SA 4.0. The new English translation and editorial matter are credited to Diotimos Editions, 2026; no open license is stated in the supplied edition.