Lysis

Name: Lysis
Author: Plato

Ancient Greek with an independent English translation.

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LysisLysis · 214b–215a

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Lysis · 214b–215a

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Ancient Greek

p. 32

Ἴσως, ἔφη.—Ἴσως, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, τὸ ἥμισυ αὐτοῦ, ἴσως δὲ καὶ πᾶν, ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς οὐ συνίεμεν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡμῖν ὅ γε πονηρὸς 214c τῷ πονηρῷ, ὅσῳ ἂν ἐγγυτέρω προσίῃ καὶ μᾶλλον ὁμιλῇ, τοσούτῳ ἐχθίων γίγνεσθαι. ἀδικεῖ γάρ· ἀδικοῦντας δὲ καὶ ἀδικουμένους ἀδύνατόν που φίλους εἶναι. οὐχ οὕτως;—Ναί, ἦ δ’ ὅς.—Ταύτῃ μὲν ἂν τοίνυν τοῦ λεγομένου τὸ ἥμισυ οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἴη, εἴπερ οἱ πονηροὶ ἀλλήλοις ὅμοιοι.—Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.—Ἀλλά μοι δοκοῦσιν λέγειν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ὁμοίους εἶναι ἀλλήλοις καὶ φίλους, τοὺς δὲ κακούς, ὅπερ καὶ λέγεται περὶ αὐτῶν, μηδέποτε ὁμοίους μηδ’ αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς εἶναι, ἀλλ’ 214d ἐμπλήκτους τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους· ὃ δὲ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἀνόμοιον εἴη καὶ διάφορον, σχολῇ γέ τῳ ἄλλῳ ὅμοιον ἢ φίλον γένοιτ’ ἄν. ἢ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως;—Ἔμοιγ’, ἔφη.—Τοῦτο τοίνυν αἰνίττονται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οἱ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον λέγοντες, ὡς ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνος μόνῳ φίλος, ὁ δὲ κακὸς οὔτε ἀγαθῷ οὔτε κακῷ οὐδέποτε εἰς ἀληθῆ φιλίαν ἔρχεται. συνδοκεῖ σοι;—Κατένευσεν.— Ἔχομεν ἄρα ἤδη τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ φίλοι· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμῖν 214e σημαίνει ὅτι οἳ ἂν ὦσιν ἀγαθοί.—Πάνυ γε, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.

Καὶ ἐμοί, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. καίτοι δυσχεραίνω τί γε ἐν αὐτῷ· φέρε οὖν, ὦ πρὸς Διός, ἴδωμεν τί καὶ ὑποπτεύω. ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ καθ’ ὅσον ὅμοιος φίλος, καὶ ἔστιν χρήσιμος ὁ τοιοῦτος τῷ τοιούτῳ; μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδε· ὁτιοῦν ὅμοιον ὁτῳοῦν ὁμοίῳ τίνα ὠφελίαν ἔχειν ἢ τίνα βλάβην ἂν ποιῆσαι δύναιτο, ὃ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ; ἢ τί ἂν παθεῖν, ὃ μὴ καὶ ὑφ’ 215a αὑτοῦ πάθοι; τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα πῶς ἂν ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων ἀγαπηθείη, μηδεμίαν ἐπικουρίαν ἀλλήλοις ἔχοντα; ἔστιν ὅπως;—Οὐκ ἔστιν.—Ὃ δὲ μὴ ἀγαπῷτο, πῶς φίλον;—Οὐδαμῶς.—Ἀλλὰ δὴ ὁ μὲν ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ οὐ φίλος· ὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ

Lysis

p. 33

“Perhaps,” he said. — “Perhaps,” I said, “half of it, and perhaps even all of it, but we don’t grasp it. For it seems to us that the wicked man, 214c the nearer he comes to the wicked man and the more he has to do with him, the more of an enemy he becomes; for he does wrong; and those who do wrong and those who are wronged cannot, I take it, be friends. Isn’t that so?” — “Yes,” he said. — “In this way, then, half of what is said would not be true, if the wicked are like one another.” — “What you say is true.” — “But they seem to me to mean that the good are like one another and are friends, and that the bad, as is said of them too, are never like one another, not even like themselves, but 214d capricious and unaccountable; and what is unlike itself and at odds with itself would hardly become like anything else or a friend to it. Or don’t you think so too?” — “I do,” he said. — “This, then, is the riddle they speak, it seems to me, my companion, those who say that like is a friend to like: that the good man alone is a friend to the good man alone, while the bad man never comes into true friendship with either a good man or a bad one. Does it seem so to you too?” — He nodded. — “So now we have it, who friends are; for the argument 214e indicates to us that they are whoever are good.” — “Very much so,” he said, “it seems.”

“To me too,” I said. “And yet there is something in it that troubles me. Come then, in the name of Zeus, let us see just what I suspect. Is one who is like a friend to one who is like, insofar as he is like, and is such a man useful to such a man? Or rather, put it this way: what benefit could anything whatever that is like have for anything whatever that is like it, or what harm could it do it, that it could not also have for itself, or do to itself? Or what could it suffer that it would not also 215a suffer from itself? Such things, then, how could they be cherished by each other, having no aid to give each other? Is there any way?” — “There is not.” — “And what is not cherished, how can it be a friend?” — “In no way.” — “Well then, one who is like is not a friend to one who is like; but the good man, to the good man,

About This Reading Edition

The complete Lysis, 203a–223b: Socrates questions Lysis and Menexenus about friendship, love, desire, and what is akin, as Hippothales listens. Burnet’s Greek faces a new Diotimos Editions English translation, with an introduction, key words, outline, glossary, critical apparatus, and linked translator notes.

Historical Text and Translation

Greek: Plato, Lysis, in John Burnet, Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford, 1903; second impression, corrected, January 1909, printed by Horace Hart). The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library transcription and checked against photographs of this impression by the supplied edition; Burnet’s lineation and critical apparatus are retained. The digital Greek transcription and its modifications are attributed to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, under CC BY-SA 4.0. English translation and editorial matter: Diotimos Editions, 2026.

About Diotimos Editions

This historical edition credits Diotimos Editions as its English translator.

Rights

The ancient Greek work and Burnet’s printed edition are in the public domain. The Perseus digital Greek transcription and its modifications are reused under CC BY-SA 4.0. The new English translation and editorial matter are credited to Diotimos Editions, 2026; no open license is stated in the supplied edition.