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Plato

Lysis

Ancient Greek with an independent English translation.

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LysisLysis · 220c–221b

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Lysis · 220c–221b

Ancient Greek

p. 48

δὲ κακὸν ἐκποδὼν ἀπέλθοι καὶ μηδενὸς ἐφάπτοιτο μήτε σώματος μήτε ψυχῆς μήτε τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ δή φαμεν αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ οὔτε κακὰ εἶναι οὔτε ἀγαθά, ἆρα τότε οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμῖν χρήσιμον εἴη τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ’ ἄχρηστον ἂν γεγονὸς εἴη; εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἡμᾶς ἔτι βλάπτοι, οὐδὲν ἂν οὐδεμιᾶς 220d ὠφελίας δεοίμεθα, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἂν τότε γένοιτο κατάδηλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ κακὸν τἀγαθὸν ἠγαπῶμεν καὶ ἐφιλοῦμεν, ὡς φάρμακον ὂν τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακὸν νόσημα· νοσήματος δὲ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν δεῖ φαρμάκου. ἆρ’ οὕτω πέφυκέ τε καὶ φιλεῖται τἀγαθὸν διὰ τὸ κακὸν ὑφ’ ἡμῶν, τῶν μεταξὺ ὄντων τοῦ κακοῦ τε καὶ τἀγαθοῦ, αὐτὸ δ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα οὐδεμίαν χρείαν ἔχει;—Ἔοικεν, ἦ δ’ ὅς, οὕτως ἔχειν. —Τὸ ἄρα φίλον ἡμῖν ἐκεῖνο, εἰς ὃ ἐτελεύτα πάντα τὰ ἄλλα 220e —ἕνεκα ἑτέρου φίλου φίλα ἔφαμεν εἶναι ἐκεῖνα—οὐδὲν [δὲ] τούτοις ἔοικεν. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ φίλου ἕνεκα φίλα κέκληται, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὄντι φίλον πᾶν τοὐναντίον τούτου φαίνεται πεφυκός· φίλον γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀνεφάνη ὂν ἐχθροῦ ἕνεκα, εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐχθρὸν ἀπέλθοι, οὐκέτι, ὡς ἔοικ’, ἔσθ’ ἡμῖν φίλον.—Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὥς γε νῦν λέγεται.—Πότερον, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, πρὸς Διός, ἐὰν τὸ κακὸν ἀπόληται, οὐδὲ πεινῆν ἔτι ἔσται οὐδὲ 221a διψῆν οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων; ἢ πείνη μὲν ἔσται, ἐάνπερ ἄνθρωποί τε καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα ᾖ, οὐ μέντοι βλαβερά γε; καὶ δίψα δὴ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιθυμίαι, ἀλλ’ οὐ κακαί, ἅτε τοῦ κακοῦ ἀπολωλότος; ἢ γελοῖον τὸ ἐρώτημα, ὅτι ποτ’ ἔσται τότε ἢ μὴ ἔσται; τίς γὰρ οἶδεν; ἀλλ’ οὖν τόδε γ’ ἴσμεν, ὅτι καὶ νῦν ἔστιν πεινῶντα βλάπτεσθαι, ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ὠφελεῖσθαι. ἦ γάρ;—Πάνυ γε.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ διψῶντα καὶ 221b τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων πάντων ἐπιθυμοῦντα ἔστιν ἐνίοτε μὲν ὠφελίμως ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἐνίοτε δὲ βλαβερῶς, ἐνίοτε δὲ μηδέτερα;—Σφόδρα γε.—Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν ἀπολλύηται τὰ κακά, ἅ γε μὴ τυγχάνει ὄντα κακά, τί προσήκει τοῖς κακοῖς συν-

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Lysis

p. 49

and the bad went away, out of the way, and touched nothing, neither body nor soul nor the other things that we say are in themselves neither bad nor good, would the good then be in no way useful to us, but have become useless? For if nothing harmed us any longer, we would in no way 220d be in need of any benefit, and so it would then become plain that it was because of the bad that we cherished and loved the good, the good being a remedy for the bad, and the bad an illness; and where there is no illness there is no need of a remedy. Is the good by nature such that it is loved by us, who are in between the bad and the good, because of the bad, while for its own sake it has no use?” — “It seems,” he said, “to be so.” — “Then that which is a friend to us, in which all the other things ended — 220e those, we said, were friends for the sake of another friend — in no way resembles them. For those are called friends for the sake of a friend, but what is really a friend appears to be by nature the very opposite of this; for it has come to light as a friend to us for the sake of an enemy,1 and if the enemy were to go away, it is no longer, it seems, a friend to us.” — “I think not,” he said, “at least as it is now being put.” — “In the name of Zeus,” I said, “if the bad perishes, will there no longer be any hungering either, or 221a thirsting, or anything else of the sort? Or will there be hunger, if indeed there are men and the other animals, but not harmful hunger? And thirst, and the other desires, but not bad ones, since the bad will have perished? Or is the question laughable, what will be then and what will not? For who knows? But this at least we know: that even now it is possible for one who is hungry to be harmed, and also to be benefited. Isn’t that so?” — “Very much so.” — “Then is it also possible for one who is thirsty, and 221b who desires all the other things of that sort, to desire sometimes beneficially, sometimes harmfully, and sometimes neither?” — “Very much so.” — “Then if the bad things perish, what reason is there for things that are not in fact bad to perish along with the bad?”

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About This Reading Edition

The complete Lysis, 203a–223b: Socrates questions Lysis and Menexenus about friendship, love, desire, and what is akin, as Hippothales listens. Burnet’s Greek faces a new Diotimos Editions English translation, with an introduction, key words, outline, glossary, critical apparatus, and linked translator notes.

Historical Text and Translation

Greek: Plato, Lysis, in John Burnet, Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford, 1903; second impression, corrected, January 1909, printed by Horace Hart). The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library transcription and checked against photographs of this impression by the supplied edition; Burnet’s lineation and critical apparatus are retained. The digital Greek transcription and its modifications are attributed to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, under CC BY-SA 4.0. English translation and editorial matter: Diotimos Editions, 2026.

About Diotimos Editions

This historical edition credits Diotimos Editions as its English translator.

Rights

The ancient Greek work and Burnet’s printed edition are in the public domain. The Perseus digital Greek transcription and its modifications are reused under CC BY-SA 4.0. The new English translation and editorial matter are credited to Diotimos Editions, 2026; no open license is stated in the supplied edition.