Lysis

“Now look into what I am saying. For I say that some things are themselves of the same sort as whatever is present to them, and some are not. As, if someone were willing to smear anything whatever with some color, what was smeared on is present, I take it, to the thing smeared.” — “Very much so.” — “Then is the thing smeared, at that time, also of the same sort in color as what is on it?”¹ — 217d “I don’t follow,” he said. — “Well, like this,” I said. “If someone smeared your hair, which is fair, with white lead, would it then be white, or appear so?” — “It would appear so,” he said. — “And yet whiteness would be present to it.” — “Yes.” — “But all the same it would be no whit the more white yet, but, though whiteness is present, it is neither white at all nor black.” — “True.” — “But when, my friend, old age brings this same color upon it, then it has become of the same sort as what is present: by the presence of white, 217e white.” — “Of course.” — “This, then, is what I am asking now: whether whatever has something present to it will be of the same sort as what is present; or whether, if it is present in a certain way, it will be, and if not, not?” — “That way rather,” he said. — “Then what is neither bad nor good, too, is sometimes not yet bad when bad is present, and sometimes it has already become such.” — “Very much so.” — “Then when it is not yet bad although bad is present, that presence makes it desire good; but the one that makes it bad robs it at once of its desire and of its friendship for the good. For it is no longer 218a neither bad nor good, but bad; and bad was not a friend to good.”² — “No, it was not.” — “For this reason, then, we would say that those too who are already wise no longer love wisdom,³ whether these are gods or men; nor again do those love wisdom who have ignorance in such a way as to be bad; for no one bad and unlearned loves wisdom. There remain, then, those who have this bad thing, ignorance, but are not yet, through it, without judgment or