Diotimos Library · Plato Collection · Bilingual Edition
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English Page · Branch 11 of 19
Hipparchus · 229d–230b
Ancient Greek
p. 16ΕΤ. Κινδυνεύεις τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ οὐ φίλον με ἡγεῖσθαι ἤ, εἰ ἡγῇ φίλον, οὐ πείθεσθαι Ἱππάρχῳ· ἐγὼ γὰρ 229e ὅπως οὐ σὺ ἐμὲ ἐξαπατᾷς—οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅντινα μέντοι τρόπον— ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὥσπερ πεττεύων ἐθέλω σοι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀναθέσθαι ὅτι βούλει τῶν εἰρημένων, ἵνα μὴ οἴῃ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι. πότερον γὰρ τοῦτό σοι ἀναθῶμαι, ὡς οὐχὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν πάντες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι;
ΕΤ. Μή μοί γε.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ ὡς τὸ ζημιοῦσθαι καὶ ἡ ζημία οὐ κακόν;
ΕΤ. Μή μοί γε.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ ὡς οὐ τῇ ζημίᾳ καὶ τῷ ζημιοῦσθαι τὸ κέρδος καὶ τὸ κερδαίνειν ἐναντίον;
230aΕΤ. Μηδὲ τοῦτο.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐναντίον ὂν τῷ κακῷ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστι τὸ κερδαίνειν;
ΕΤ. Οὔτι πᾶν γε· τουτί μοι ἀνάθου.
ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ ἄρα σοι, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦ κέρδους τὸ μέν τι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δέ τι κακόν.
ΕΤ. Ἔμοιγε.
ΣΩ. Ἀνατίθεμαι τοίνυν σοὶ τοῦτο· ἔστω γὰρ δὴ κέρδος τι ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕτερον κέρδος τι κακόν. κέρδος δέ γε οὐδὲν μᾶλλόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ κακόν· ἦ γάρ;
ΕΤ. Πῶς με ἐρωτᾷς;
ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ φράσω. σιτίον ἐστίν τι ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν;
230bΕΤ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Ἆρ’ οὖν μᾶλλόν τι αὐτῶν ἐστι τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου σιτίον, ἢ ὁμοίως τοῦτό γε, σιτία, ἐστὸν ἀμφότερα καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, κατὰ τὸ σιτίον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ᾗ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακόν;
ΕΤ. Ναί.
Hipparchus
p. 17Comp. It looks, then, Socrates, as though either you do not think me a friend, or, if you think me a friend, you do not obey Hipparchus. For I cannot be persuaded 229e that it is not you who are deceiving me—in what way, though, I do not know—in the arguments.1
Soc. Well, but just as when playing draughts, I am willing to take back for you, in the arguments, whatever you wish of what has been said, so that you may not think you are being deceived.2 Shall I take this back for you, then, and say that men do not all desire good things?
Comp. Not for me, no.
Soc. Well, that suffering loss, and loss, are not bad?
Comp. Not for me, no.
Soc. Well, that gain and gaining are not the opposite of loss and suffering loss?
Comp. 230a Not that either.
Soc. Well, that gaining, being the opposite of the bad thing, is not good?
Comp. Not all of it, at any rate. Take that back for me.
Soc. Then, it seems, some gain seems to you to be good and some bad.
Comp. To me, yes.
Soc. Then I take this back for you. For let there be some gain that is good, and another gain that is bad. But the good one of them is no more gain, at any rate, than the bad; isn’t that so?
Comp. How do you mean the question?
Soc. I’ll tell you. Is there food that is good and food that is bad?
Comp. 230b Yes.
Soc. Then is one of them any more food than the other, or are both, in this at least, equally food, and in this respect, as far as being food goes, does the one differ from the other not at all, but only in that one of them is good and the other bad?
Comp. Yes.
Socrates
Reading Hipparchus · Hipparchus · 229d–230b
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Socrates and an unnamed companion examine the love of gain, the difference between gain and loss, and whether everyone desires what is good. This complete revised edition presents the dialogue, 225a–232c, across twelve Greek–English page pairs, with an introduction, Key Words of the Dialogue, an outline, glossary, critical apparatus, and translator’s notes. The dialogue is transmitted among Plato’s works; its authorship remains disputed.
Historical Text and Translation
The Greek follows John Burnet’s Platonis Opera, volume II (Oxford, 1901; second edition, 1910), in a later impression printed by John Johnson. The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library transcription and checked against the supplied printed pages. Burnet’s lineation, verse quotations, editorial signs, and critical apparatus are retained. The supplied PDF preserves the complete printed layout.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared and revised this independent English translation directly from the Greek, preserving the argument’s distinctions, consistent key terms, and Socrates’ humor. Each English dialogue page translates the Greek page opposite it. All 26 translator’s notes accompany their passages. The introduction and Key Words of the Dialogue precede the text; the Outline, Editorial Note, Glossary of Key Terms, and Note on this Edition follow it. Introductory and concluding matter reflows for the screen.
Rights
The ancient Greek work and Burnet’s printed edition are in the public domain. The Perseus digital Greek transcription and its modifications are attributed to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, and reused under CC BY-SA 4.0. The independent English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are © 2026 Diotimos Editions.