

PLATO

HIPPARCHUS

or The Lover of Gain

ΙΠΠΑΡΧΟΣ ἢ ΦΙΛΟΚΕΡΔΗΣ

The Greek text of John Burnet

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with a new English translation and notes

THE COMPLETE DIALOGUE

225a–232c

Translation by Diotimos Editions

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INTRODUCTION

THE DIALOGUE

The *Hipparchus*, or *The Lover of Gain*, is a conversation between Socrates and an unnamed companion (*hetairos*) about what the love of gain is and who the lovers of gain are. It opens abruptly, with Socrates' "What, then, is the love of gain?" (225a), as though a conversation were already under way; no place or occasion is given, and no one else speaks. The title comes from Hipparchus, son of the Athenian tyrant Pisistratus, whose story Socrates tells in the middle of the argument (228b–229d). The dialogue fills pages 225 to 232 of the second volume of Stephanus' edition, by whose pages Plato is still cited, and twelve pages of Burnet's Oxford text.

The ancient arrangement of Plato's works by Thrasyllus, which Diogenes Laertius preserves (3.59), places it third in the fourth tetralogy, after the two *Alcibiades* and before the *Lovers*, with the subtitle "or The Lover of Gain", and classes it as "ethical"; Burnet's second volume prints the four in that order. Its authorship was doubted in antiquity: Aelian, writing about AD 200, retells its account of Hipparchus as Plato's, "if the *Hipparchus* is really Plato's" (*Historical Miscellany* 8.2). Most modern scholars do not think it his, though it has had defenders, and no date for it is certain. Its nearest companion among the works handed down under Plato's name is the *Minos*, likewise doubted, which also opens with a bare question from Socrates to an unnamed companion, "What is law for us?", sets beside it the point that law does not differ from law in being law, as gold does not differ from gold, and turns to a portrait of an ancient ruler.

THE QUESTION AND THE ANSWERS

The companion gives three answers, and Socrates tests each. The first is that lovers of gain are those "who think fit to gain from things worth nothing" (225a). Do they know that these things are worth nothing? If not, the companion is calling them senseless; but he means "unscrupulous and base, and no match for gain", men who know and "yet dare to love gain, out of shamelessness" (225a–

b). Socrates goes through the farmer, the horseman, the pilot, the general and the flute-player: none who knows that his plants, food, tackle, arms or instruments are worth nothing thinks he gains from them (225b–226c). So “in the way you say ... there is no one among men who is a lover of gain” (226d).

The second answer is that lovers of gain are those who, “out of insatiability, every time crave prodigiously even things quite small and worth little or nothing” (226d–e). Not knowingly, Socrates replies, for that was found impossible; so they are ignorant, and think that “things worth nothing are worth a great deal” (226e). He turns to gain itself. The lovers of gain love gain; gain is the opposite of loss; men are harmed by loss, so loss is bad; “Then gain is good” (226e–227a). But every man loves good things, so “In this way, in turn, all men appear to be lovers of gain” (227c).

The third answer is that the lover of gain is the man “who is in earnest about those things, and thinks fit to gain from them, from which decent men do not dare to gain” (227c–d). Socrates says they agreed “just now” that “to gain is to be benefited”, and that “everyone wishes for good things, and always”; so good men too wish to have all gains, “if indeed they are good things” (227d). The companion excepts the gains from which they are going to be harmed, that is, going to “suffer loss”: men suffer loss “both by loss and by base gain” (227e). But no decent and good thing is base, and gain, the opposite of loss, was agreed to be good; so the companion is “trying to deceive me”, Socrates says, and the companion answers that “it is you who are deceiving me, and I don’t know how you twist things up and down in the arguments” (228a).

THE ARGUMENT’S MAIN STRETCH

Socrates replies with a story. He would not deceive the companion, for he obeys “a good and wise man”: Hipparchus, “the eldest and wisest of Pisistratus’ sons”, who brought Homer’s epics to Athens and made the rhapsodes recite them in order at the Panathenaea, sent a fifty-oared ship for Anacreon, kept Simonides about him, and, to educate the country people, set up Herms along the roads inscribed with his own sayings in verse, so that the Athenians would think them wiser than the inscriptions at Delphi (228b–e). One says “This is Hipparchus’ memorial: go your way with just thoughts”, another “This is Hipparchus’ memorial: do not deceive a friend” (229a–b). Socrates adds that the Athenians lived “nearly as in the reign of Cronus” except in the three years of Hippias’

tyranny after Hipparchus' death, and that, as the more cultivated tell it, Hipparchus was killed not over Harmodius' sister but because Aristogeiton, who had educated Harmodius, "thought Hipparchus his opponent", and a young man whom Harmodius loved, after keeping company with Hipparchus, despised them both (229b–d).

The companion is not won over: either Socrates does not think him a friend, or he does not obey Hipparchus (229d–e). So Socrates offers, "just as when playing draughts", to take back whatever the companion wishes of what has been said (229e). The companion takes back the claim that all gaining is good: some gain is good and some bad (230a). But, Socrates asks, is good gain any more gain than bad? Good food and bad food are "equally food"; so with drink, and a decent man is no more a man than a base one; so "why ever do you call both of them gain? What do you see in both that is the same?" (230a–231a). He offers an answer himself: gain is "every possession that one acquires either without spending anything, or by spending less and getting more" (231a). A man who feasts at no cost and acquires a disease has acquired no gain, and one who acquires health has; so gain is not "to acquire any possession whatever", and "Gain appears good, and loss bad" once more (231b–c). The companion is "at a loss what to say", and tries again: he means spending less gold or silver and getting more (231c). But a man who spends half a weight of gold and gets twice the weight in silver has got more and lost; so "gain must have this belonging to it as well: worth" (231d). What is of worth is gainful; what is of worth is worth possessing, what is worth possessing is beneficial, and what is beneficial is good; so "for the third or fourth time", what is gainful is good (231e–232a).

THE ENDING

Socrates reminds the companion how the argument began: he "disputed with me, holding that good men do not wish to gain all gains, but of gains the good ones, and not the base" (232a). Socrates asks whether the argument has not now "compelled us to agree that all gains, both small and great, are good", and the companion grants it: "It has compelled, yes, Socrates—me, at any rate—rather than persuaded" (232b). Decent men wish for all good things; base men, by the companion's own account, love gains small and great; so "all men would be lovers of gain, both the decent and the base", and whoever reproaches another with the love of gain "is himself, in fact, such a man" (232b–c). There the dialogue stops.

Four things in this dialogue are likely to trouble a first-time reader, and they are best stated plainly.

First, it may not be Plato's. Aelian's doubt is shared by most modern scholars, though the dialogue has had defenders; this edition calls it Plato's only in the sense that the tradition handed it down among his works.

Second, the argument proves its conclusion by moves that are not all sound, and the companion says as much. At 227d Socrates says that they "agreed just now that to gain is to be benefited", though nothing so worded was agreed (see the note there). Gain is shown to be good from its being the opposite of loss, which is bad (227a), as though the opposite of a bad thing must be good. On one reading, the word "gain" serves both for the gaining and for the thing gained, and "good" both for what benefits and for what is decent, and the conclusion that every man is a lover of gain depends on letting the meanings run together. The companion's own verdict on the argument is that it has "compelled ... rather than persuaded" him (232b). Whether the dialogue means its reader to find these faults, as an exercise, or makes them unawares, is a question it leaves open.

Third, its history is not the historians'. Thucydides insists, against what most Athenians believed, that Hippias was the eldest son of Pisistratus and the ruler (1.20.2, 6.54.2, 6.55), and tells how Hipparchus was killed over a love affair and the insult to Harmodius' sister (6.54–59); the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* gives the love to a younger brother, Thessalus (18.2). The *Hipparchus* makes Hipparchus the eldest and wisest of the sons, the tyranny last only three years, and the murder the work of rivals in wisdom (228b, 229b–d), and no surviving source independent of it tells the story so; Aelian, who repeats it, names the dialogue as his source. Whether Socrates' praise of a tyrant as "a fine and good man" (228c) is meant straight or with irony, the dialogue does not say. Some of it is confirmed: a Herm inscribed in Hipparchus' manner survives, found at Koropi in Attica, whose verse gives its place as "midway between Kephale and the town" (IG I³ 1023).

Fourth, the lover of gain was a figure of reproach, and the dialogue knows it. The companion's first answer calls him "unscrupulous and base" (225a–b), and in the *Republic* Plato calls the appetitive part of the soul "money-loving" and "gain-loving", and names a kind of man, beside the lover of wisdom and the lover of victory,

after it (9.581a–c). The *Hipparchus* ends by making everyone such a man.

THE MANNER

The comedy is of the argument and of the persons. The companion answers at first like a man with a grievance, and Socrates tells him so (“as though someone had done you some wrong”, 225b). Socrates asks who knows the worth of plants “in what time and clime they are worth planting”, a rhyme in the Greek too, so that “we too may throw in some of those wise sayings with which the men who are clever at lawsuits speak finely” (225c). He calls the companion “my wonderful friend” (226d) and “my sweetest friend” (227d) as he corners him, and “most courageous of all men” (232a) when he will not give in. When the companion accuses him of deceiving, he cries “Speak auspiciously!” and appeals to a tyrant who set up his verses on the roads, “plotting in turn to educate those in the country” (228b–d), and whose verse “do not deceive a friend” is his answer to the charge (229b). Simonides, whom Hipparchus kept about him, “persuading him with large fees and gifts” (228c), was a byword for the love of money: in Aristophanes the aged Sophocles is said to be turning into Simonides, since for gain he “would put to sea even on a wicker mat” (*Peace* 695–699), and Aelian, retelling this passage, adds that no one will deny he loved money (*Historical Miscellany* 8.2). The draughts game, in which a move is taken back on request (229e–230a), turns the companion’s complaint into a courtesy. And the last sentence turns the dialogue’s question against its asker: the one who reproaches another as a lover of gain is one himself. The translation tries to keep all of this and to add nothing; where the English cannot carry a joke, a note says what it was.

ON READING THIS EDITION

Each left-hand page is a page of Burnet’s Oxford text, line for line, with his apparatus at the foot; each right-hand page translates it, with the Stephanus section letters in the margin so that any passage can be found on both sides. A word in angle brackets < > in the Greek is not in the manuscripts and has been supplied by a scholar’s conjecture; it is translated. A word in square brackets [] is one Burnet thought spurious; it is not translated. The two verses of Hipparchus quoted at 229a–b are set as verse on both pages, and the Delphic sayings at 228e stand in quotation marks, as in

Burnet. The Key Words of the Dialogue, which follow, explain the words on which the argument turns and how they are rendered. At the back, the Outline gives the argument's joints by Stephanus page, the Editorial Note sets out the conventions of both pages and explains the abbreviations of the apparatus, the Glossary lists the renderings for reference, and the Note on this Edition says how the volume was made and where a reader should be careful.

A NOTE ON THE PERSONS

The dialogue establishes little about the companion. He is younger than Socrates ("an older man by now, when you are so young", 225d–226a), an Athenian ("A fellow citizen of mine and yours", 228b), and Socrates calls him his friend (229b). Of Socrates it says only that he is the older man and an Athenian, and that he obeys Hipparchus' inscription, or says he does.

The rest comes from other sources. Pisistratus was tyrant of Athens, with interruptions, from about 561 BC until his death about 528. His sons Hippias and Hipparchus held power after him; Hipparchus was killed by Harmodius and Aristogeiton at the Panathenaea of 514, and Hippias was driven out four years later and went over to the Persians. The two killers were honoured at Athens as tyrant-slayers. Anacreon of Teos and Simonides of Ceos were lyric poets of the later sixth century; Simonides, the younger, lived until about 468; the *Constitution of the Athenians* also makes Hipparchus the one who sent for them (18.1). The rhapsodes were professional reciters of epic, and the Panathenaea the festival of Athena at Athens, at which they competed.

KEY WORDS OF THE DIALOGUE

These notes are for orientation, not reference: each explains a word the argument leans on, what it meant in the Athens of Socrates, and what the dialogue does with it. The Glossary at the back lists the renderings with the places where they matter.

GAIN, LOVER OF GAIN (KERDOS, KERDAINEIN; PHILOKerdēs, TO PHILOKERDES)

Kerdos is gain or profit of any kind, from trade, from wages, from a trick; *kerdainein* is to make it. *Philokerdēs*, “loving gain”, was in everyday speech a reproach: the grasping man, the man who will take a profit where a decent man would not. The dialogue asks what the love of gain is (225a) and ends by finding that, by the companion’s own argument, “all men would be lovers of gain, both the decent and the base” (232c). To make that conclusion visible, the family has one English word throughout: *kerdos* and *kerdainein* are “gain”, *philokerdēs* “lover of gain”, *to philokerdes* “the love of gain”, *philokerdein* “love gain”, *kerdaleos* “gainful” (230d, 231e, 232a) and *akerdēs* “without gain” (231e). The argument turns on the word’s two sides, the gaining and the thing gained: “gain and gaining” are named together at 229e, and Socrates’ definition, “every possession that one acquires either without spending anything, or by spending less and getting more” (231a), makes gain a possession, so that the argument can ask which possessions are gain.

LOSS, SUFFER LOSS (ZĒMIA, ZĒMIOUSTHAI)

Zēmia is loss, damage, and also a penalty or fine; *zēmiousthai* is to suffer it. It is the opposite of gain throughout, and the argument’s first proof that gain is good runs through it: men are harmed by loss, so loss is bad, and gain, its opposite, is good (226e–227a). At 227e the companion’s “going to be harmed” is taken as “going to suffer loss”, and men are said to suffer loss “both by loss and by base gain”. It is rendered “loss” and “suffer loss” throughout. “At a loss” at 231c renders another word, *aporein*, “be perplexed”.

WORTH, THINK FIT (AXIOS, AXIA, AXIOUN; ANAXIOS)

Axios is “worth”, weighing as much as something; *axia* is worth or value; *axioun* is to think something fit or right, to claim. The companion’s first answer joins them: the lovers of gain are those who “think fit to gain from things worth nothing” (225a), and Socrates asks whether *axioun* means anything other than “thinking that one ought to gain” (225d). From 225b to 226c the farmer’s plant, the horse’s food and the craftsmen’s tools are all “worth nothing”, and at 231d worth returns as what gain must have: silver weighs more than gold but is not of more worth, so “gain must have this belonging to it as well: worth”. “Then what is of worth is gainful, whether it is small or great, and what is of no worth is without gain”; and what is of worth is “worth possessing” (231e). *Axios* is “worth” throughout and *anaxios* “of no worth”; *axioun* is “think fit”, as in the *Alcibiades I*.

DECENT AND BASE (CHRĒSTOS, PONĒROS)

Chrēstos, from *chrēsthai*, “use”, is useful, serviceable, and of men honest, respectable, decent; *ponēros*, from *ponos*, “toil”, is wretched, worthless, and of men base or wicked. They are the moral pair, beside the general pair *agathos* and *kakos*, “good” and “bad”. The companion’s first answer calls the lovers of gain “base” (225b) and his third sets them against “decent men” (227d); then “base gain” (227e) and “decent gain” (230c) bring the pair into the argument, and Socrates sets it beside the other: “does any decent and good thing seem to you to be base?” (227e). The English keeps the two pairs apart, so that the reader can watch the argument pass from the decent to the good. Even drink, “the wet nourishment of the body”, is “decent or base” (230e–231a), and there the pair is kept, a little stiffly, so that the analogy can be followed; food is “good” and “bad” (230a, 230e).

GOOD AND BAD, BENEFIT AND HARM (AGATHOS, KAKOS; ŌPHELEISTHAI, ŌPHELMIMOS; BLAPTETHAI)

Agathos and *kakos* are the widest words of praise and blame: good of its kind, good for someone, good morally. The dialogue uses the second sense most: what benefits is good, what harms bad. Loss is bad because “men are harmed by loss” (227a); gain is good; “to gain is to be benefited” (227d); and at the end what is of worth is “worth possessing”, the beneficial is good, and so the gainful

is good (231e–232a). *Kakos* is “bad”, never “evil”; *ōphelēisthai* is “be benefited”, *ōphelimos* “beneficial” and *anōphelēs* “of no benefit”; *blaptēsthai* is “be harmed”.

KNOW, BE IGNORANT, SENSELESS (GIGNŌSKEIN; AGNOEIN; ANOĒTOS)

The first definition stands or falls on knowledge: do the lovers of gain know that what they gain from is worth nothing, or not (225a)? If not, the companion is calling them “senseless” (*anoētos*); if so, the crafts show that no one who knows his things are worth nothing thinks he gains from them (225b–226c); and of the men of the companion’s second answer, who crave even things worth nothing, Socrates concludes, “if not knowing it, plainly being ignorant of it” (226e). *Gignōskein* is “know”, *agnoein* “be ignorant”, as in the *Alcibiades I* and *II*, and *anoētos* “senseless”. *Epistēmōn*, “knowing”, “expert”, is rendered “has knowledge of” (225c).

DECEIVE (EXAPATAN)

The charge of deception runs through the dialogue. Socrates warns the companion not to “try to deceive me” by answering what he does not think (225d), and says the same when the companion contradicts himself (228a); the companion turns it back: “it is you who are deceiving me” (228a). Socrates’ answer is the saying on Hipparchus’ Herm, “do not deceive a friend” (229b), and the companion’s retort that he cannot be persuaded that Socrates is not deceiving him (229d–e) leads to the offer to take back a move. *Exapatan* is “deceive” throughout.

OBEY, PERSUADE, COMPEL (PEITHESTHAI, PEITHEIN; ANANKAZEIN)

Peithein is to persuade; its middle and passive *peithesthai* is both to be persuaded and to obey. The dialogue plays on both: Socrates “would certainly not be acting well” if he did not obey “a good and wise man” (228b), and the companion answers that either Socrates does not think him a friend or he does not “obey Hipparchus”, for the companion “cannot be persuaded” that Socrates is not deceiving him (229d–e). At the end the argument has “compelled” him “rather than persuaded” (232b), and Socrates allows that it “might also persuade you”. “Obey”, “persuade” and “compel” are kept throughout.

AGREE, TAKE BACK (HOMOLOGEIN; ANATITHESTHAI)

Homologeîn, “agree”, marks each step the companion grants: “And gain we agreed was good?” (227c), “we agreed just now” (227d, 228a). Its opposite is *anatithesthai*, the word in the board game *petteia* for taking back a move: Socrates, “just as when playing draughts”, offers to “take back” any of the agreed steps, and at the companion’s request Socrates takes back the claim that all gaining is good (229e–230a). The game makes the argument a contest with rules, and the taking back a favour. *Homologeîn* is “agree”, *sympphanai* “concur” (232b), *anatithesthai* “take back”.

WISDOM, EDUCATE (SOPHIA, SOPHOS; PAIDEUEIN)

Hipparchus is praised for wisdom: “the eldest and wisest of Pisistratus’ sons”, who displayed “fine works of wisdom”, would not “begrudge wisdom to anyone”, and set up his sayings so that the Athenians would think them wiser than “those wise inscriptions at Delphi” (228b–e). He wished “to educate the citizens”, and “plotting in turn to educate those in the country”, set up his Herms (228c–d); in Socrates’ story Aristogeiton “prided himself on having educated a man, and thought Hipparchus his opponent” (229c). The ironies of a tyrant’s son who rules by educating, in a dialogue that allows Athens a tyranny only in his brother’s three years (229b), are the reader’s to weigh. *Sophia* and *sophos* are “wisdom” and “wise”, *paideuein* “educate”, as elsewhere in the series.

POSSESSION, ACQUIRE, SPEND (KTĒMA, KTASTHAI, KEKTĒSTHAI; ANALISKEIN)

The last part of the argument is about acquiring. Socrates proposes that gain is “every possession that one acquires either without spending anything, or by spending less and getting more” (231a); a man who acquires a disease at a feast has not gained (231b); and what is of worth is “worth possessing” (231e). *Ktēma* is “possession”, *ktasthai* “acquire”, its perfect *kektēsthai* “possess”, *analiskein* “spend” and *lambanein* “get”.

FOOD, DRINK, NOURISHMENT (SITION, POTON, TROPHĒ)

Socrates’ analogy for good and bad gain: good food and bad food are “equally food”, as both are “dry nourishment of the body”, and drink is “the wet nourishment of the body, whether decent or base” (230a–231a). *Sition* is “food”, *poton* “drink” and *trophē* “nourish-

ment”; *sition* was “food” also for the horse’s food at 226a–b, so that one word runs through.

ΙΠΠΑΡΧΟΣ ἡ ΦΙΛΟΚΕΡΔΗΣ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ

St. II
p. 225

ΣΩ. Τί γὰρ τὸ φιλοκερδές; τί ποτέ ἐστιν, καὶ τίνες οἱ a
φιλοκερδεῖς;

ΕΤ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκοῦσιν οἷ ἂν κερδαίνειν ἀξιῶσιν ἀπὸ
τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν γινώσκοντες ὅτι οὐδενός 5
ἐστὶν ἄξια, ἢ ἀγνοοῦντες; εἰ γὰρ ἀγνοοῦντες, ἀνοήτους
λέγεις τοὺς φιλοκερδεῖς.

ΕΤ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἀνοήτους λέγω, ἀλλὰ πανούργους καὶ
πονηροὺς καὶ ἥττους τοῦ κέρδους, γινώσκοντας ὅτι οὐδενός b
ἄξιά ἐστιν ἀφ' ὧν τολμῶσι κερδαίνειν, ὅμως τολμᾶν φιλο-
κερδεῖν δι' ἀναισχυντίαν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τοιόνδε λέγεις τὸν φιλοκερδῆ, οἷον ἐὰν
φυτεύων γεωργὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ γινώσκων ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιον 5
τὸ φυτόν, ἀξιοῖ ἀπὸ τούτου ἐκτραφέντος κερδαίνειν; ἄρα
τοιούτον αὐτὸν λέγεις;

ΕΤ. Ἀπὸ παντός ὃ γε φιλοκερδής, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἴεται
δεῖν κερδαίνειν.

ΣΩ. Μή μοι οὕτως εἰκῇ, ὥσπερ τι ἡδικημένος ὑπὸ τινος, 10
ἀλλὰ προσέχων ἐμοὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀπόκριναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ c
ἀρχῆς πάλιν ἡρώτων· οὐχὶ ὁμολογεῖς τὸν φιλοκερδῆ ἐπι-
στήμονα εἶναι περὶ τῆς ἀξίας τούτου ὅθεν κερδαίνειν ἀξιοῖ;

a 3 ἀξιῶσιν B: ἀξιώσουσιν T b 5 γεωργὸς T: γεωργικὸς B

soc. What, then, is the love of gain? What is it, after all, and who are the lovers of gain?¹ 225

comp. To me they seem to be those who think fit to gain from things worth nothing.²

soc. Do they seem to you, then, to know that these are worth nothing, or to be ignorant of it? For if they are ignorant, it is senseless men you are calling lovers of gain.

comp. No, I don't call them senseless; I call them unscrupulous and base, and no match for gain, men who know that the things from which they dare to gain are worth nothing, and yet dare to love gain, out of shamelessness. b

soc. Then is the lover of gain you mean someone like this: if a farmer, planting, and knowing that the plant is worth nothing, thinks fit to gain from it when it has grown? Is that the kind of man you mean?

comp. The lover of gain, at any rate, Socrates, thinks he ought to gain from everything.

soc. Don't answer me so at random, as though someone had done you some wrong, but pay attention to me and answer, just as if I were asking again from the beginning: don't you agree that the lover of gain has knowledge of the worth of that from which he thinks fit to gain? c

1. The dialogue opens abruptly, with *gar*, "then", as though a conversation were already under way; the companion is not named. *Philokerdēs*, from *philein*, "love", and *kerdos*, "gain", was in everyday speech a reproach, "greedy"; it is "lover of gain" throughout, and to *philokerdes* "the love of gain", so that the English can follow the argument when it makes every man a lover of gain (227c).

2. A play the English cannot keep: they "think fit" (*axiōsin*) to gain from things "worth" (*axiōn*) nothing. *Axioun* is "think fit" and *axios* "worth" throughout.

ΕΤ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἐπιστήμων περὶ φυτῶν τῆς ἀξίας, ἐν ὁποία 5
ἀξια φυτευθῆναι καὶ ὥρα καὶ χώρα; ἵνα τι καὶ ἡμεῖς τῶν
σοφῶν ῥημάτων ἐμβάλωμεν, ὧν οἱ δεξιοὶ περὶ τὰς δίκας
καλλιεποῦνται.

ΕΤ. Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι γεωργόν. d

ΣΩ. Τὸ οὖν ἀξιούν κερδαίνειν ἄλλο τι λέγεις ἢ οἶσθαι
δεῖν κερδαίνειν;

ΕΤ. Τοῦτο λέγω.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν με ἐπιχείρει ἐξαπατᾶν, ἄνδρα πρεσβύ- 5
τερον ἤδη οὕτω νέος ὢν, ἀποκρινόμενος ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἃ οὐδ' 226
αὐτὸς οἶει, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς εἰπέ· ἄρ' ἔστιν ὄντινα οἶει
γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα γιγνώμενον, καὶ γινώσκοντα ὅτι οὐδενὸς
ἄξιον φυτεύει τὸ φυτόν, οἶσθαι ἀπὸ τούτου κερδαίνειν;

ΕΤ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. 5

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἵππικὸν ἄνδρα γινώσκοντα ὅτι οὐδενὸς
ἀξια σιτία τῷ ἵππῳ παρέχει, ἀγνοεῖν αὐτὸν οἶει ὅτι τὸν
ἵππον διαφθείρει;

ΕΤ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα οἶεταί γε ἀπὸ τούτων κερδαίνειν τῶν b
σιτίων τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων.

ΕΤ. Οὐχί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; κυβερνήτην μηδενὸς ἀξια ἰστία καὶ πηδάλια
τῇ νηὶ παρεσκευασμένον ἀγνοεῖν οἶει ὅτι ζημιωθήσεται καὶ 5
κινδυνεύσει καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπολέσθαι καὶ τὴν ναῦν ἀπολέσαι
καὶ ἃ ἂν ἄγῃ πάντα;

ΕΤ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα οἶεταί γε κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν σκευῶν τῶν c
μηδενὸς ἀξίων.

c6 ἀξια b: ἀξία B: ἀξία T ὥρα καὶ χώρα B: χώρα καὶ ὥρα T c7 ἐμβάλωμεν
ὢν recc.: ἐμβάλλομενων BW: ἐμβάλλωμεν ὢν T d2 τὸ... ἀξιούν Etwall (ed.
Oxon. 1771): τὸν... ἀξιον BT: τὸ... ἀξιον vulg. d5 με ἐπιχείρει B: ἐπιχείρει με T
a2 εἰπέ· ἄρ' Boeckh (responde... an Ficinus): εἴπερ BT a4 φυτεύει Stephanus:
φυτεύειν BT κερδανεῖν Cobet (et mox b1) a8 διαφθερεῖ Cobet

comp. I do.

soc. Who, then, has knowledge of the worth of plants, in what time and clime they are worth planting? So that we too may throw in some of those wise sayings with which the men who are clever at lawsuits speak finely.¹

comp. I think a farmer.

d

soc. Then by “thinking fit to gain” do you mean anything other than thinking that one ought to gain?²

comp. That is what I mean.

soc. Then don’t try to deceive me, an older man by now, when you are so young, by answering, as you did just now, what not even you yourself think; but tell me truly: is there anyone, do you think, who, being a farming man and knowing that the plant he is planting is worth nothing, thinks he gains from it?³

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comp. By Zeus, not I.

soc. What about this: a horseman who knows that he is giving his horse food worth nothing, do you think he is ignorant that he is ruining the horse?

comp. Not I.

soc. Then he does not think, at least, that he gains from this food worth nothing.

b

comp. No.

soc. What about this: a pilot who has equipped his ship with sails and rudders worth nothing, do you think he is ignorant that he will suffer loss, and will be in danger both of perishing himself and of losing the ship and all that he carries?

comp. Not I.

soc. Then he does not think, at least, that he gains from the tackle worth nothing.

c

1. In the Greek a rhyme, *hōrāi kai chōrāi*, “season and place”, which Socrates throws in as one of the fine phrases of men clever at lawsuits; the English rhymes in its turn.

2. Burnet prints the correction of Etwall’s Oxford edition of 1771, *to axioun*, “thinking fit”; B and T have *ton axion*, “the one deserving” (to gain).

3. Burnet prints Boeckh’s correction, “tell me: is there” (*eipe, ar’*), which Ficino’s Latin translation supports; B and T have *eiper*, “if indeed”.

ΕΤ. Οὐ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ στρατηγὸς γινώσκων ὅτι ἡ στρατιὰ αὐτῷ οὐδενὸς ἄξια ὅπλα ἔχει, οἴεται ἀπὸ τούτων κερδαίνειν καὶ ἀξιοῖ κερδαίνειν;

5

ΕΤ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' αὐλητῆς αὐλοὺς οὐδενὸς ἀξίους ἔχων ἢ κιθαριστῆς λύραν ἢ τοξότης τόξον ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις οὖν συλλήβδην τῶν δημιουργῶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐμφρόνων ἀνδρῶν μηδενὸς ἄξια ὄργανα ἢ ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἡντιναοῦν ἔχων ἀπὸ τούτων οἴεται κερδαίνειν;

10

ΕΤ. Οὐκ οὖν φαίνεται γέ.

d

ΣΩ. Τίνας οὖν ποτε λέγεις τοὺς φιλοκερδεῖς; οὐ γάρ που τούτους γε οὓς διεληλύθαμεν, (ἀλλ') οἵτινες γινώσκοντες τὰ οὐδενὸς ἄξια ἀπὸ τούτων οἴονται δεῖν κερδαίνειν· ἀλλ' οὕτω μὲν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὥς σὺ λέγεις, οὐκ ἔστ' ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς φιλοκερδής.

5

ΕΤ. Ἀλλ' ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, βούλομαι λέγειν τούτους φιλοκερδεῖς εἶναι, οἱ ἐκάστοτε ὑπὸ ἀπληστίας καὶ πάνυ σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια καὶ οὐδενὸς γλίσχονται ὑπερφυῶς καὶ φιλοκερδοῦσιν.

e

ΣΩ. Οὐ δῆπου, ὦ βέλτιστε, γινώσκοντες ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιά ἐστιν· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ ἐξηλέγξαμεν ὅτι ἀδύνατον.

5

ΕΤ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ γινώσκοντες, δῆλον ὅτι ἀγνοοῦντες, οἰόμενοι δὲ τὰ οὐδενὸς ἄξια πολλοῦ ἄξια εἶναι.

ΕΤ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν οἷ γέ φιλοκερδεῖς φιλοῦσι τὸ κέρδος;

10

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κέρδος δὲ λέγεις ἐναντίον τῇ ζημίᾳ;

ΕΤ. Ἐγώ γε.

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c3 στρατιὰ T: στρατεία B
e8 οὐδενὸς BT: μηδενὸς vulg.

d2 που B: δῆ που T

d3 ἀλλ' add. Apelt

comp. He does not.

soc. Well, does a general who knows that his army has arms worth nothing think that he gains from them, and think fit to gain?

comp. Not at all.

soc. Well, does a flute-player who has flutes worth nothing, or a lyre-player a lyre, or an archer a bow, or anyone at all, in sum, of the craftsmen or of the other intelligent men, who has instruments worth nothing or any other equipment whatever, think that he gains from them?

comp. It does not appear so, at any rate. d

soc. Then whom can you mean by the lovers of gain? For it is not, I suppose, those we have gone through, but those who, knowing what is worth nothing, think they ought to gain from it;¹ but in the way you say, my wonderful friend, there is no one among men who is a lover of gain.

comp. But what I mean, Socrates, is that those are lovers of gain who, out of insatiability, every time crave prodigiously even things quite small and worth little or nothing, and love gain. e

soc. Not, surely, my excellent friend, knowing that they are worth nothing; for we have already refuted ourselves on this point by the argument: it is impossible.

comp. I think so.

soc. Then if not knowing it, plainly being ignorant of it, and thinking that things worth nothing are worth a great deal.

comp. It appears so.

soc. Then the lovers of gain, at least, love gain, don't they?

comp. Yes.

soc. And you call gain the opposite of loss?

comp. I do. 227

1. "But" (*all'*) is Apelt's addition, which Burnet prints; without it the clause would describe the men just gone through.

- ΣΩ. Ἐστιν οὖν ὅτῳ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ ζημιουῖσθαι;
 ΕΤ. Οὐδενί.
 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ κακόν;
 ΕΤ. Ναί. 5
 ΣΩ. Βλάπτονται ὑπὸ τῆς ζημίας ἄρα ἄνθρωποι.
 ΕΤ. Βλάπτονται.
 ΣΩ. Κακὸν ἄρα ἡ ζημία.
 ΕΤ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Ἐναντίον δὲ τῇ ζημίᾳ τὸ κέρδος. 10
 ΕΤ. Ἐναντίον.
 ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν ἄρα τὸ κέρδος.
 ΕΤ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Τοὺς οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦντας φιλοκερδεῖς καλεῖς. b
 ΕΤ. Ἔοικεν.
 ΣΩ. Οὐ μανικούς γε, ὦ ἐταῖρε, λέγεις τοὺς φιλοκερδεῖς.
 ἀλλὰ σὺ αὐτὸς πότερον φιλεῖς ὃ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ᾖ, ἢ οὐ φιλεῖς;
 ΕΤ. Ἐγωγε. 5
 ΣΩ. Ἐστὶ δέ τι ἀγαθόν, ὃ οὐ φιλεῖς, ἀλλὰ κακόν;
 ΕΤ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.
 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἴσως φιλεῖς.
 ΕΤ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Ἐροῦ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ εἰ οὐ καὶ ἐγώ· ὁμολογήσω γὰρ καὶ 10
 ἐγώ σοι φιλεῖν τὰγαθὰ. ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ οἱ ἄλλοι c
 ἄνθρωποι ἅπαντες οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι τὰγαθὰ φιλεῖν, τὰ δὲ κακὰ
 μισεῖν;
 ΕΤ. Ἐμοιγε φαίνεται.
 ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ κέρδος ἀγαθὸν ὡμολογήσαμεν;
 ΕΤ. Ναί. 5
 ΣΩ. Πάντες αὖ φιλοκερδεῖς φαίνονται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον·
 ὃν δὲ τὸ πρότερον ἐλέγομεν, οὐδεὶς ἦν φιλοκερδής. ποτέρῳ
 οὖν ἂν τις τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐξαμαρτάνοι;

a 6 ὑπὸ τῆς ζημίας ἄρα B: ἄρα ὑπὸ τῆς ζημίας T ἄνθρωποι] ἄνθρωποι Hirschig
 b 3 γε B: δὲ T b 8 τὰ B: om. T b 10 οὐ καὶ B: οὐκ T c 2 ἅπαντες B: πάντες T
 c 9 τῷ λόγῳ] τῶν λόγων Cobet

soc. Is there anyone, then, for whom it is good to suffer loss?

comp. For no one.

soc. Bad, rather?

comp. Yes.

soc. Then men are harmed by loss.

comp. They are harmed.

soc. Then loss is bad.

comp. Yes.

soc. And gain is the opposite of loss.

comp. The opposite.

soc. Then gain is good.

comp. Yes.

soc. Then you call lovers of gain those who love the good. b

comp. It seems so.

soc. It is not madmen, at any rate, my friend, that you call lovers of gain. But you yourself: do you love whatever is good, or do you not?

comp. I do.

soc. And is there anything good that you do not love, rather than something bad?

comp. By Zeus, not I.

soc. Then perhaps you love all good things.

comp. Yes.

soc. Ask me too, then, whether I do not as well; for I too shall c
agree with you that I love good things. But besides me and you,
don't all other men seem to you to love good things and to hate
bad ones?

comp. It appears so to me.

soc. And gain we agreed was good?

comp. Yes.

soc. In this way, in turn, all men appear to be lovers of gain; but
in the way we were speaking of before, no one was a lover of gain.
Which of the two arguments, then, could one use without making
a mistake?

ΕΤ. Εἴ τις, ὦ Σώκρατες οἶμαι ὀρθῶς λαμβάνει τὸν 10
φιλοκερδῆ. ὀρθῶς δ' ἐστὶ τοῦτον ἡγείσθαι φιλοκερδῆ, ὅς ἂν d
σπουδάξῃ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἀξιοῖ κερδαίνειν ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἀφ' ὧν
οἱ χρηστοὶ οὐ τολμῶσι κερδαίνειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὁρᾷς, ὦ γλυκύτατε, τὸ κερδαίνειν ἄρτι ὠμολογή-
σαμεν εἶναι ὠφελείσθαι. 5

ΕΤ. Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι καὶ τότε αὐτῷ προσωμολογήσαμεν, βούλεσθαι
τὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντας καὶ ἀεί.

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ πάντα τὰ κέρδη βούλονται 10
ἔχειν, εἴπερ ἀγαθὰ γέ ἐστιν.

ΕΤ. Οὐκ ἀφ' ὧν γε μέλλουσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, βλαβήσεσθαι e
τῶν κερδῶν.

ΣΩ. Βλαβήσεσθαι δὲ λέγεις ζημιώσεσθαι ἢ ἄλλο τι;

ΕΤ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ ζημιώσεσθαι λέγω.

ΣΩ. Ὑπὸ τοῦ κέρδους οὖν ζημιοῦνται ἢ ὑπὸ τῆς ζημίας 5
ἄνθρωποι;

ΕΤ. Ὑπὸ ἀμφοτέρων· καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς ζημίας ζημιοῦνται
καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ κέρδους τοῦ πονηροῦ.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δοκεῖ οὖν τί σοι χρηστὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν πρᾶγμα
πονηρὸν εἶναι; 10

ΕΤ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὠμολογήσαμεν ὀλίγον πρότερον τὸ κέρδος 228
τῇ ζημίᾳ κακῶ ὄντι ἐναντίον εἶναι;

ΕΤ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἐναντίον δὲ ὃν κακῶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι;

ΕΤ. Ὁμολογήσαμεν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ὅρᾷς οὖν, ἐπιχειρεῖς με ἐξαπατᾶν, ἐπίτηδες ἐναντία 5
λέγων οἷς ἄρτι ὠμολογήσαμεν.

d2 ἀπ' αὐτῶν] ἀπὸ τῶν Naber d5 εἶναι... d7 προσωμολογήσαμεν Tb:
om. pr. B d7 αὐτῷ b: αὐτὸ BT d8 πάντας B: ἅπαντας T e1 γέ Tb: σε B
(ut videtur) e4 ζημιώσεσθαι B: ζημιωθήσεσθαι T

comp. If one were rightly to take the lover of gain, Socrates, I think. And it is right to think that man a lover of gain who is in earnest about those things, and thinks fit to gain from them, from which decent men do not dare to gain.¹

soc. But you see, my sweetest friend, we agreed just now that to gain is to be benefited.

comp. Well, what of it?

soc. That in addition to it we also agreed to this: that everyone wishes for good things, and always.²

comp. Yes.

soc. Then good men too wish to have all gains, if indeed they are good things.

comp. Not the gains, at any rate, Socrates, from which they are going to be harmed.

soc. By “going to be harmed” do you mean “going to suffer loss”, or something else?

comp. No: I mean “going to suffer loss”.

soc. Then do men suffer loss by gain, or by loss?

comp. By both: for they suffer loss both by loss and by base gain.

soc. Well, does any decent and good thing seem to you to be base?

comp. Not to me.

soc. Didn't we agree a little earlier that gain is the opposite of loss, which is bad?

comp. I say so.

soc. And that, being the opposite of a bad thing, it is good?

comp. We did agree to it.

soc. You see, then: you are trying to deceive me, saying on purpose things that are the opposite of what we agreed just now.

1. *Chrēstoi*, “decent men”, the respectable; their opposite, *ponēros*, is “base” (225b, 227e). Both are kept apart from “good” and “bad” (*agathos*, *kakos*), beside which the next exchanges set them (227e–228a).

2. Neither was agreed in these words: what was agreed is that gain is good, as the opposite of loss, by which men are harmed (227a), and that all men love good things (227b–c).

ΕΤ. Οὐ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τὸυναντίον σύ με
ἐξαπατᾷς καὶ οὐκ οἶδα ὅπῃ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἄνω καὶ κάτω
στρέφεις.

10

ΣΩ. Εὐφήμεῖ· οὐ μεντὰν καλῶς ποιοίην οὐ πειθόμενος
ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ σοφῷ.

b

ΕΤ. Τίνι τούτῳ; καὶ τί μάλιστα;

ΣΩ. Πολίτῃ μὲν ἐμῷ τε καὶ σῷ, Πεισιστράτου δὲ υἱὲ
τοῦ ἐκ Φιλαίδων, Ἰππάρχῳ, ὃς τῶν Πεισιστράτου παίδων
ἦν πρεσβύτατος καὶ σοφώτατος, ὃς ἅλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ
ἔργα σοφίας ἀπεδείξατο, καὶ τὰ Ὀμήρου ἔπη πρῶτος ἐκόμισεν
εἰς τὴν γῆν ταυτηνί, καὶ ἠνάγκασε τοὺς ῥαψωδοὺς Πανα-
θηναίοις ἐξ ὑπολήψεως ἐφεξῆς αὐτὰ διέναι, ὥσπερ νῦν ἔτι
οἶδε ποιοῦσιν, καὶ ἐπ’ Ἀνακρέοντα τὸν Τήμιον πεντηκόντορον
στείλας ἐκόμισεν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, Σιμωνίδην δὲ τὸν Κεῖον
αἰεὶ περὶ αὐτὸν εἶχεν, μεγάλους μισθοῖς καὶ δώροις πείθων·
ταῦτα δ’ ἐποίει βουλόμενος παιδεύειν τοὺς πολίτας, ἵν’ ὥς
βελτίστων ὄντων αὐτῶν ἄρχοι, οὐκ οἰόμενος δεῖν οὐδενὶ
σοφίας φθονεῖν, ἅτε ὢν καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθός. ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτῷ
οἱ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ τῶν πολιτῶν πεπαιδευμένοι ἦσαν καὶ
ἐθαύμαζον αὐτὸν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ἐπιβουλεύων αὐ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς
ἀγροῖς παιδεῦσαι ἔστησεν αὐτοῖς Ἑρμᾶς κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ἐν
μέσῳ τοῦ ἄστεος καὶ τῶν δήμων ἐκάστων, κᾶπειτα τῆς
σοφίας τῆς αὐτοῦ, ἣν τ’ ἔμαθεν καὶ ἦν αὐτὸς ἐξηῦρεν, ἐκλεξά-
μενος ἃ ἡγείτο σοφώτατα εἶναι, ταῦτα αὐτὸς ἐντείνας εἰς
ἐλεγείον αὐτοῦ ποιήματα καὶ ἐπιδείγματα τῆς σοφίας ἐπ-
έγραψεν, ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμματα τὰ σοφὰ
ταῦτα μὴ θαυμάζοιεν οἱ πολῖται αὐτοῦ, τό τε “Γνῶθι σαυτὸν”
καὶ τὸ “Μηδὲν ἄγαν” καὶ τὰλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὰ
Ἰππάρχου ῥήματα μᾶλλον σοφὰ ἡγοῖντο, ἔπειτα παριόντες
ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκοντες καὶ γεῦμα λαμβάνοντες

5

c

5

d

5

e

5

a 8 σύ με B: σύ ἐμέ T b 7 ἀπεδείξατο BT (sed ἃ ex emend. T): ὑπεδείξατο Coisl.:
ἐπεδείξατο W ἔπη B: om. TW c 4 παιδεύειν B: πείθειν TW c 5 ὄντων αὐτῶν B:
αὐτῶν ὄντων T d 1 αὐ τοὺς T: αὐτοὺς B d 3 ἄστεως Schanz (et mox) τῆς
σοφίας B: ὑπὸ σοφίας T d 5 ἃ T: om. B

comp. No, by Zeus, Socrates; it is the opposite: it is you who are deceiving me, and I don't know how you twist things up and down in the arguments.

soc. Speak auspiciously!¹ I would certainly not be acting well if I did not obey a good and wise man.

comp. Who is that? And what exactly do you mean?

soc. A fellow citizen of mine and yours, and the son of Pisistratus of Philaidae, Hipparchus,² who was the eldest and wisest of Pisistratus' sons; who displayed many other fine works of wisdom, and was the first to bring the epics of Homer into this land here, and compelled the rhapsodes at the Panathenaea to go through them in order, each taking up from the last,³ as even now they do; and he sent a fifty-oared ship for Anacreon of Teos and brought him to the city, and kept Simonides of Ceos always about him, persuading him with large fees and gifts. And he did this because he wished to educate the citizens, so that he might rule over them as men who were as good as could be, not thinking that he ought to begrudge wisdom to anyone, since he was a fine and good man. And when those of the citizens around the town had been educated by him and admired him for his wisdom, plotting in turn to educate those in the country, he set up Herms for them along the roads, midway between the town and each of the demes;⁴ and then, choosing from his own wisdom, both what he had learned and what he had discovered himself, what he thought wisest, he himself put these things into elegiac verse and inscribed them as his own poems and specimens of his wisdom, so that, first, his citizens would not admire those wise inscriptions at Delphi, "Know thyself" and "Nothing too much" and the rest of that kind,⁵ but would think the sayings of Hipparchus wiser; and then, passing up and down, reading them and getting a taste

1. *Euphēmei*: speak only words of good omen; said to silence an ill-omened remark, as at *Alcibiades II* 143d.

2. Son of the Athenian tyrant Pisistratus; killed by Harmodius and Aristogeiton at the Panathenaea of 514 BC. Plutarch gives Philaidae as Pisistratus' deme (*Solon* 10.2). Thucydides insists that Hippias was the eldest son and the ruler (1.20.2; 6.54.2, 6.55.1); in the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* Hippias, the elder, heads the government, and Hipparchus sends for the poets Anacreon and Simonides (18.1).

3. Diogenes Laertius gives such a rule to Solon (1.57). Aelian retells this account as Plato's, "if the *Hipparchus* is really Plato's" (*Historical Miscellany* 8.2).

4. Pillars topped with a head of Hermes. One, generally assigned to Hipparchus, survives from Koropi in Attica: "Midway between Kephale and the town, splendid Hermes" (*IG I³* 1023). The *elegeion* is a hexameter followed by a pentameter.

5. Inscribed at Delphi; see *Charmides* 164d–165a.

αὐτοῦ τῆς σοφίας φοιτῶν ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ
 παιδευθησόμενοι. ἐστὸν δὲ δύο τῶπιγράμματε· ἐν μὲν τοῖς 229
 Ἐρμῆς ὅτι ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ ἄστεος καὶ τοῦ δήμου ἔστηκεν, ἐν
 δὲ τοῖς ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ—

μνήμα τὸδ' Ἰππάρχου· στείχε δίκαια φρονῶν
 φησίν. ἔστι δὲ τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ ἄλλα ἐν ἄλλοις Ἑρμαῖς 5
 πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπιγεγραμμένα· ἔστι δὲ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῇ
 Στεριακῇ ὁδῷ, ἐν ᾧ λέγει—

μνήμα τὸδ' Ἰππάρχου· μὴ φίλον ἐξαπάτα. b
 ἐγὼ οὖν σὲ ἐμοὶ ὄντα φίλον οὐ δήπου τολμῶν ἂν ἐξαπατᾶν
 καὶ ἐκείνῳ τοιούτῳ ὄντι ἀπιστεῖν, οὐ καὶ ἀποθανόντος τρία
 ἔτη ἐτυραννέυθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰππίου,
 καὶ πάντων ἂν τῶν παλαιῶν ἤκουσας ὅτι ταῦτα μόνον τὰ 5
 ἔτη τυραννὶς ἐγένετο ἐν Ἀθήναις, τὸν δ' ἄλλον χρόνον ἐγγύς
 τι ἕζων Ἀθηναῖοι ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Κρόνου βασιλεύοντος. λέγεται
 δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν χαριεστέρων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὁ θάνατος αὐτοῦ
 γενέσθαι οὐ δι' ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ φήθησαν, διὰ τὴν τῆς ἀδελφῆς c
 ἀτιμίαν τῆς κατηγορίας—ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε εὐήθες—ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν
 Ἀρμόδιον γεγονέναι παιδικὰ τοῦ Ἀριστογείτονος καὶ πεπαι-
 δεῦσθαι ὑπ' ἐκείνου, μέγα δ' ἐφρόνει ἄρα καὶ ὁ Ἀριστο-
 γείτων ἐπὶ τῷ παιδεῦσαι ἀνθρωπον, καὶ ἀνταγωνιστὴν ἡγήτο 5
 εἶναι τὸν Ἰππαρχον. ἐν ἐκείνῳ δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ αὐτὸν τὸν
 Ἀρμόδιον τυγχάνειν ἐρώντά τινος τῶν νέων τε καὶ καλῶν d
 καὶ γενναίων τῶν τότε—καὶ λέγουσι τοῦνομα αὐτοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ
 οὐ μέμνημαι—τὸν οὖν νεανίσκον τοῦτον τέως μὲν θαυμάζειν
 τὸν τε Ἀρμόδιον καὶ τὸν Ἀριστογείτονα ὡς σοφούς, ἔπειτα
 συγγενόμενον τῷ Ἰππάρχῳ καταφρονῆσαι ἐκείνων, καὶ τοὺς 5
 περιαλγῆσαντας ταύτῃ τῇ ἀτιμίᾳ οὕτως ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν
 Ἰππαρχον.

a1 ἐπαισπερᾶ BT ἐπιγέγραπται B: ὁ ἐπιγέγραπται TW a2 ὅτι B: ὅτι ὁ T
 a3 ἐπαδεξιᾶ BT a5 δὲ τῶν ποιημάτων B: τῶν ποιημάτων δὲ T b5 πάντων
 ἂν] πάντως δὴ Cobet μόνον B: μόνα T d1 καλῶν καὶ γενναίων B: γενναίων
 καὶ καλῶν T

of his wisdom, they would keep coming in from the country to be educated in the rest as well. And the inscriptions are two: on the left side of each Herm, Hermes is inscribed saying that he stands midway between the town and the deme; and on the right— 229

This is Hipparchus' memorial: go your way with just thoughts,

he says.¹ And there are many other fine poems of his inscribed on other Herms; and there is also, notably, this one on the Steirian road, in which he says—²

This is Hipparchus' memorial: do not deceive a friend.

So I would surely not dare to deceive you, who are my friend, and to disobey him, such a man as he was, after whose death, indeed, the Athenians were ruled by a tyrant, his brother Hippias, for three years; and you could have heard from all the men of old that only in those years was there a tyranny in Athens, and that the rest of the time the Athenians lived nearly as in the reign of Cronus.³ And it is said by the more cultivated people that his death too came about not for the reasons the many thought, the dishonour to the sister over the basket-bearing—for that, at any rate, is simple-minded—but that Harmodius had become Aristogeiton's beloved and had been educated by him; and Aristogeiton too, as it turns out, prided himself on having educated a man, and thought Hipparchus his opponent.⁴ And at that time, the story goes, Harmodius himself was in fact in love with one of the young, beautiful and wellborn men of the day—they tell his name, but I don't remember it—and this young man for a while admired both Harmodius and Aristogeiton as wise, but then, after keeping company with Hipparchus, despised them; and they, deeply pained by this dishonour, killed Hipparchus for that reason. c d

1. Each of the two lines quoted is a pentameter, the second line of an elegiac couplet.

2. The road from Athens to Steiria, a deme on the east coast of Attica (Strabo 9.1.22).

3. Hesiod's golden race lived "in the days of Cronus, when he was king in heaven" (*Works and Days* 109–111). Thucydides gives Hippias three more years (6.59.4) but says the tyranny grew harsher after Hipparchus' death (6.59.2), the sons of Pisistratus having ruled till then with virtue and good sense (6.54.5); the *Constitution of the Athenians* gives the name of the life under Cronus to Pisistratus' own tyranny, harsher under his sons (16.7).

4. Harmodius and Aristogeiton, honoured at Athens as the tyrant-slayers (*Constitution of the Athenians* 58.1). In Thucydides, Hipparchus courts Harmodius, Aristogeiton's beloved, and when refused has Harmodius' sister turned away from carrying a basket in a procession (6.54.2–4, 6.56.1); the *Constitution* blames a younger brother, Thessalus (18.2). The rivalry in wisdom is found only here.

ΕΤ. Κινδυνεύεις τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ οὐ φίλον με ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ, εἰ ἡγῇ φίλον, οὐ πείθεσθαι Ἰππάρχῳ· ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅπως οὐ σὺ ἐμὲ ἐξαπατᾷς—οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινα μέντοι τρόπον—
ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι. e

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὥσπερ πεττεύων ἐθέλω σοι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀναθέσθαι ὅτι βούλει τῶν εἰρημένων, ἵνα μὴ οἷη ἐξαπατᾶσθαι. πότερον γὰρ τοῦτό σοι ἀναθῶμαι, ὥς οὐχὶ τῶν
ἀγαθῶν πάντες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι; 5

ΕΤ. Μή μοί γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὥς τὸ ζημιοῦσθαι καὶ ἡ ζημία οὐ κακόν;

ΕΤ. Μή μοί γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὥς οὐ τῇ ζημίᾳ καὶ τῷ ζημιοῦσθαι τὸ κέρδος
καὶ τὸ κερδαίνειν ἐναντίον; 10

ΕΤ. Μηδὲ τοῦτο. 230

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὥς ἐναντίον ὃν τῷ κακῷ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστι τὸ κερδαίνειν;

ΕΤ. Οὔτι πᾶν γε· τουτί μοι ἀνάθου.

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ ἄρα σοι, ὥς ἔοικε, τοῦ κέρδους τὸ μέν τι
ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δέ τι κακόν. 5

ΕΤ. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀνατίθεμαι τοίνυν σοὶ τοῦτο· ἔστω γὰρ δὴ κέρδος
τι ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕτερον κέρδος τι κακόν. κέρδος δέ γε οὐδὲν
μᾶλλον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ κακόν· ἢ γάρ; 10

ΕΤ. Πῶς με ἐρωτᾷς;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ φράσω. σιτίον ἐστὶν τι ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν;

ΕΤ. Ναί. b

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν μᾶλλον τι αὐτῶν ἐστι τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου
σιτίον, ἢ ὁμοίως τοῦτό γε, σιτία, ἐστὸν ἀμφοτέρω καὶ ταύτῃ
γε οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, κατὰ τὸ σιτίον εἶναι,
ἀλλὰ ἢ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δέ κακόν; 5

ΕΤ. Ναί.

δ 9 ἢ εἰ ἡγεί b: ἢ ἡγεί B: ἢ εἰ γεί T e 1 σὺ ἐμὲ W: σὺ ἐ**μὲ B: σύ με T μέντοι B: om. T a 2 ὃν T: om. B a 12 ἐστὶν τι T: ἔστιν B b 3 τοῦτό B: τούτῳ T

comp. It looks, then, Socrates, as though either you do not think me a friend, or, if you think me a friend, you do not obey Hipparchus. For I cannot be persuaded that it is not you who are deceiving me—in what way, though, I do not know—in the arguments.¹

soc. Well, but just as when playing draughts, I am willing to take back for you, in the arguments, whatever you wish of what has been said, so that you may not think you are being deceived.² Shall I take this back for you, then, and say that men do not all desire good things?

comp. Not for me, no.

soc. Well, that suffering loss, and loss, are not bad?

comp. Not for me, no.

soc. Well, that gain and gaining are not the opposite of loss and suffering loss?

comp. Not that either.

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soc. Well, that gaining, being the opposite of the bad thing, is not good?

comp. Not all of it, at any rate. Take that back for me.

soc. Then, it seems, some gain seems to you to be good and some bad.

comp. To me, yes.

soc. Then I take this back for you. For let there be some gain that is good, and another gain that is bad. But the good one of them is no more gain, at any rate, than the bad; isn't that so?

comp. How do you mean the question?

soc. I'll tell you. Is there food that is good and food that is bad?

comp. Yes.

b

soc. Then is one of them any more food than the other, or are both, in this at least, equally food, and in this respect, as far as being food goes, does the one differ from the other not at all, but only in that one of them is good and the other bad?

comp. Yes.

1. *Peithesthai*, "obey", and *peisthēnai*, "be persuaded", are forms of one verb.

2. *Anatithesthai*, "take back", is the word for taking back a move in the board game Socrates names (*petteuein*); he offers the same to Polus in the *Gorgias* (461d).

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ποτὸν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα, ὅσα τῶν ὄντων ταῦτ' ὄντα τὰ μὲν πέπονθεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κακά, οὐδὲν ἐκείνη γε διαφέρει τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστίν; ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος δήπου ὁ μὲν χρηστός ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ c πονηρός.

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄνθρωπός γε οἶμαι οὐδέτερος οὐδετέρου οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἥττον ἐστίν, οὔτε ὁ χρηστός τοῦ πονηροῦ οὔτε 5 ὁ πονηρὸς τοῦ χρηστοῦ.

ΕΤ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ κέρδους διανοώμεθα, ὡς κέρδος γε ὁμοίως ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ πονηρὸν καὶ τὸ χρηστόν;

ΕΤ. Ἀνάγκη. 10

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα μᾶλλον κερδαίνει ὁ τὸ χρηστὸν κέρδος ἔχων ἢ τὸ πονηρόν· οὐκουν μᾶλλον γε κέρδος φαίνεται οὐδέτερον ὄν, ὡς ὁμολογοῦμεν. d

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐδετέρω γὰρ αὐτῶν οὔτε τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτε τὸ ἥττον πρόσεστιν.

ΕΤ. Οὐ γὰρ δῆ. 5

ΣΩ. Τῷ δὴ τοιούτῳ πράγματι πῶς ἂν τις μᾶλλον ἢ ἥττον ὅτιοῦν ἂν ποιοῖ ἢ πᾶσχοι, ᾧ μῆδέτερον τούτων προσείη;

ΕΤ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν κέρδη μὲν ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἀμφότερα καὶ κερδαλέα, τουτὶ δὴ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκέψασθαι, διὰ τί ποτε 10 ἀμφότερα αὐτὰ κέρδος καλεῖς, τί ταῦτόν ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ὄρων; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ [ᾧ] σύ με ἡρώτας τὰ νυνδῆ, διὰ τί ποτε καὶ τὸ e ἀγαθὸν σιτίον καὶ τὸ κακὸν σιτίον ὁμοίως ἀμφότερα σιτία καλῶ, εἶπον ἂν σοι διότι ἀμφότερα ξηρὰ τροφή σώματός

c9 τὸ πονηρὸν καὶ τὸ χρηστόν B: τὸ χρηστὸν καὶ τὸ πονηρόν TW c12 ἢ (ὁ) τὸ Stephanus d3 οὔτε... οὔτε B: οὐδέ... οὐδέ T d6 δῆ] δὲ Ast d7 προσείη B: προσῆ T d10 τουτὶ B: τοῦτ' ἔτι T e1 ᾧ del. Schleiermacher e2 ὁμοίως B: ὅμως T

soc. Then drink too, and all the other things there are that, being the same, are so affected that some are good and some bad: does the one differ from the other not at all, in that respect at least in which it is the same? Just as with a man, I suppose: one is decent, c another base.

comp. Yes.

soc. But neither, I think, is more or less a man, at any rate, than the other, the decent than the base, or the base than the decent.

comp. What you say is true.

soc. Then shall we think in the same way about gain too, that both the base and the decent are, at any rate, equally gain?

comp. Necessarily.

soc. Then the man who has the decent gain gains no more than the man who has the base; so neither, as we agree, appears to be d any more gain.

comp. Yes.

soc. For to neither of them does the more or the less belong.

comp. It does not, indeed.

soc. Then with a thing of that kind, to which neither of these belongs, how could anyone do or undergo anything more or less?

comp. Impossible.

soc. Since, then, both are equally gains and gainful, this is what we must look into: why ever do you call both of them gain? What do you see in both that is the same? Just as, if you had asked me e just now why ever I call both good food and bad food equally food, I would have told you: because both are dry nourishment of the body,

ἐστιν, διὰ τοῦτο ἔγωγε· τοῦτο γὰρ εἶναι σιτίον κὰν σύ που
ἡμῖν ὁμολογοῖς. ἦ γάρ;

5

ΕΤ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ περὶ ποτοῦ οὖν ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν τρόπος εἴη τῆς
ἀποκρίσεως, ὅτι τῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑγρᾷ τροφῇ, ἐάντε χρηστή
ἐάντε πονηρὰ ἦ, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομά ἐστι, ποτόν· καὶ τοῖς 231
ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως. πειρῶ οὖν καὶ σὺν ἐμὲ μμείσθαι οὕτως
ἀποκρινόμενον. τὸ χρηστὸν κέρδος καὶ τὸ πονηρὸν κέρδος
κέρδος φῆς ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι τί τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁρῶν, ὅτι
δὴ καὶ τοῦτο κέρδος ἐστίν; εἰ δ' αὖ μὴ αὐτὸς ἔχεις ἀποκρί- 5
νασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει· ἄρα κέρδος λέγεις πᾶν
κτῆμα ὃ ἂν τις κτήσεται ἢ μηδὲν ἀναλώσας, ἢ ἔλαττον
ἀναλώσας πλέον λάβῃ;

ΕΤ. Ἐμοιγε δοκῶ τοῦτο καλεῖν κέρδος.

b

ΣΩ. Ἄρα καὶ τὰ τοιάδε λέγεις, ἐὰν τις ἐστιαθεῖς, μηδὲν
ἀναλώσας ἀλλ' εὐωχηθεῖς, νόσον κτήσεται;

ΕΤ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ὑγίειαν δὲ κτησάμενος ἀπὸ ἐστιάσεως κέρδος ἂν 5
κτῆσαιτο ἢ ζημίαν;

ΕΤ. Κέρδος.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτό γέ ἐστι κέρδος, τὸ ὅτιοῦν κτῆμα
κτῆσασθαι.

ΕΤ. Οὐ μέντοι.

10

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὐκ, ἐὰν κακόν; ἢ οὐδ' ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὅτιοῦν
κτῆσεται, οὐ κέρδος κτήσεται;

ΕΤ. Φαίνεται, ἐὰν γε ἀγαθόν.

ΣΩ. Ἐὰν δὲ κακόν, οὐ ζημίαν κτήσεται;

c

ΕΤ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ὅρᾳς οὖν ὡς πάλιν αὖ περιτρέχεις εἰς τὸ αὐτό; τὸ
μὲν κέρδος ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται, ἡ δὲ ζημία κακόν.

e5 ὁμολογοῖς T: ὁμολογεῖς B a5 δὴ b: δεῖ BT b8 γέ B: om. T
b9 κτῆσασθαι Tb: κτήσεσθαι pr. B (ut videtur) b12 κτήσεται T: κτήσεται B

that is why I do; for that this is what food is, you too, I suppose, would agree with us. Isn't that so?

COMP. I would.

SOC. Then about drink too the manner of the answer would be the same: that the wet nourishment of the body, whether decent or base, has this name, "drink"; and so with the others. Try, then, you too, to imitate me as I answer in this way. Decent gain and base gain, you say, are both gain: what do you see in them that is the same, on account of which this too is gain? And if, on the other hand, you cannot answer yourself, look into it as I speak: do you call gain every possession that one acquires either without spending anything, or by spending less and getting more? 231

COMP. I think I call that gain. b

SOC. Do you mean things like this too: if someone is entertained at a feast, spending nothing but feasting richly, and acquires a disease?

COMP. By Zeus, not I.

SOC. And if he acquired health from a feast, would he acquire gain or loss?

COMP. Gain.

SOC. Then this, at least, is not gain: to acquire any possession whatever.

COMP. No indeed.

SOC. Is it not, if it is bad? Or even if he acquires anything whatever that is good, will he not acquire gain?

COMP. It appears he will, if it is good, at least.

SOC. And if it is bad, will he not acquire loss? c

COMP. I think so.

SOC. Do you see, then, how you are running round back again to the same place? Gain appears good, and loss bad.

ΕΤ. Ἀπορῶ ἔγωγε ὅτι εἶπω.

5

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀδίκως γε σὺν ἀπορῶν. ἔτι γὰρ καὶ τόδε ἀπόκριναι· ἐάν τις ἔλαττον ἀναλώσας πλέον κτήσεται, φῆς κέρδος εἶναι;

ΕΤ. Οὔτι κακόν γε λέγω, ἀλλ' ἐὰν χρυσίον ἢ ἀργύριον ἔλαττον ἀναλώσας πλέον λάβῃ.

10

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγὼ μέλλω τοῦτο ἐρήσεσθαι. φέρε γάρ, ἐάν τις χρυσίου σταθμὸν ἡμισυν ἀναλώσας διπλάσιον λάβῃ ἀργυρίου, κέρδος ἢ ζημίαν εἴληφεν;

d

ΕΤ. Ζημίαν δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀντὶ δωδεκαστασίου γὰρ διστάσιον αὐτῷ καθίσταται τὸ χρυσίον.

5

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν πλέον γ' εἴληφεν· ἢ οὐ πλέον ἐστὶ τὸ διπλάσιον τοῦ ἡμίσεος;

ΕΤ. Οὔτι τῇ ἀξίᾳ γε ἀργύριον χρυσίου.

ΣΩ. Δεῖ ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικε, τῷ κέρδει τοῦτο προσεῖναι, τὴν ἀξίαν. νῦν γοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀργύριον πλέον ὄν τοῦ χρυσίου οὐ φῆς ἄξιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ χρυσίον ἔλαττον ὄν ἄξιον φῆς εἶναι.

10

ΕΤ. Σφόδρα· ἔχει γὰρ οὕτως.

e

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν ἄξιον ἄρα κερδαλέον ἐστίν, ἐάντε συμκρὸν ἢ ἐάντε μέγα, τὸ δὲ ἀνάξιον ἀκερδές.

ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἄξιον λέγεις ἄξιον εἶναι ἄλλο τι ἢ κεκτηῖσθαι;

5

ΕΤ. Ναί, κεκτηῖσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἄξιον αὖ λέγεις κεκτηῖσθαι τὸ ἀνωφελές ἢ τὸ ὠφέλιμον;

ΕΤ. Τὸ ὠφέλιμον δήπου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ ὠφέλιμον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν;

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ΕΤ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ ἀνδρειότατε πάντων, οὐ τὸ κερδαλέον ἀγαθὸν αὖ πάλιν τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἦκει ἡμῖν ὁμολογούμενον;

ΕΤ. Ὅμοιον.

5

c6 γὰρ B: δὲ T c7 πλέον κτήσεται t: κτήσεται B: πλεονεκτήσεται T d1 μέλλω τοῦτο B: τοῦτο μέλλω T d5 διστάσιον T: διστάσιμον B d10 χρυσίου οὐ W: χρυσίου οὐ σὺ B: χρυσίου T

comp. I am at a loss what to say.¹

soc. Not unjustly, at any rate, are you at a loss. For answer one thing more: if someone, spending less, acquires more, do you say it is gain?²

comp. It is not something bad that I mean, at any rate, but if, spending less gold or silver, he gets more.

soc. And that is just what I am going to ask. For come: if someone spends half a weight of gold and gets twice that weight of silver, has he got gain or loss? d

comp. Loss, surely, Socrates: for instead of twelve times its weight his gold becomes for him twice its weight.³

soc. And yet he has got more, at any rate; or is the double not more than the half?

comp. Not in worth, at any rate, is silver more than gold.

soc. Then, it seems, gain must have this belonging to it as well: worth. Now, at any rate, the silver, though more than the gold, you say is not of worth,⁴ and the gold, though less, you say is of worth.

comp. Very much so: that is how it is. e

soc. Then what is of worth is gainful, whether it is small or great, and what is of no worth is without gain.

comp. Yes.

soc. And when you say that something is of worth, you mean that it is worth possessing, don't you?

comp. Yes: possessing.

soc. And by what is worth possessing, in turn, do you mean what is of no benefit, or what is beneficial?

comp. What is beneficial, surely.

soc. Then what is beneficial is good? 232

comp. Yes.

soc. Then, most courageous of all men, hasn't it come round to us once again, agreed for the third or fourth time, that what is gainful is good?⁵

comp. It seems so.

1. "At a loss" renders *aporein*, the verb of *aporia*, "perplexity", not *zēmia*, "loss".

2. "Acquires more" is a later hand's reading in T, which Burnet prints; B has "acquires", T "gets the advantage".

3. Gold at twelve times the worth of silver: his half weight of gold was worth six of silver, and he has received one. Herodotus reckons thirteen to one (3.95.1).

4. "Not" is W's reading, which Burnet prints; T omits it, and B has *hou sy*, "of which you".

5. Gain was agreed good at 227a, recalled at 227c and 228a, and appeared good again at 231c.

ΣΩ. Μνημονεύεις οὖν ὅθεν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος γέγονεν;

ΕΤ. Οἶμαί γε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἐγὼ σε ὑπομνήσω. ἡμφεσβήτησάς μοι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς μὴ πάντα τὰ κέρδη βούλεσθαι κερδαίνειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν κερδῶν τάγαθά, τὰ δὲ πονηρὰ μή. 10

ΕΤ. Ναίχι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν πάντα τὰ κέρδη ὁ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἠνάγκακε b καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ὁμολογεῖν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι;

ΕΤ. Ἠνάγκακε γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἐμέ γε ἢ πέπεικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἴσως μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ πείσειεν ἄν· νῦν δ' οὖν, 5 εἴτε πέπεισαι εἴτε ὀπωσδὴ ἔχεις, σύμφης γοῦν ἡμῖν πάντα τὰ κέρδη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα.

ΕΤ. Ὅμολογῶ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς ἀνθρώπους βούλεσθαι τάγαθὰ ὁμολογεῖς ἅπαντα ἅπαντας· ἢ οὐ; 10

ΕΤ. Ὅμολογῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ τοὺς γε πονηροὺς αὐτὸς εἶπες ὅτι καὶ c σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα κέρδη φιλοῦσιν.

ΕΤ. Εἶπον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον πάντες ἄνθρωποι 5 φιλοκερδεῖς ἂν εἶεν, καὶ οἱ χρηστοὶ καὶ οἱ πονηροί.

ΕΤ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ὀνειδίζει, εἴ τίς τῶν ὀνειδίζει φιλο- κερδεῖ εἶναι· τυγχάνει γὰρ καὶ ὁ ταῦτα ὀνειδίζων αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος ὢν.

a6 οὖν B: γ' οὖν T a8 ἡμφισβήτησας BW: ἡ ἀμφισβήτησας T b4 πέπεικε T: πεπεικεί B c1 αὐτὸς Bekker: αὐτοὺς BT: om. vulg. c4 πάντες B: ἅπαντες T

soc. Do you remember, then, where this argument of ours started from?

comp. I think I do.

soc. And if not, I will remind you. You disputed with me, holding that good men do not wish to gain all gains, but of gains the good ones, and not the base.¹

comp. Yes indeed.

soc. Then hasn't the argument now compelled us to agree that all gains, both small and great, are good? b

comp. It has compelled, yes, Socrates—me, at any rate—rather than persuaded.

soc. Well, perhaps after this it might also persuade you; but for now, at any rate, whether you have been persuaded or however you stand, you do at least concur with us that all gains are good, both small and great.

comp. Yes, I agree.

soc. And do you agree that decent men, every one, wish for good things, every one? Or not?

comp. I agree.

soc. But surely you yourself said that base men, at any rate, love gains both small and great.² c

comp. I did.

soc. Then by your argument all men would be lovers of gain, both the decent and the base.

comp. It appears so.

soc. Then if anyone reproaches someone with being a lover of gain, he does not reproach him rightly; for even the one who casts this reproach is himself, in fact, such a man.

1. At 227e, where the companion excepted the gains from which good men are going to be harmed, and spoke of base gain.

2. The companion said that the lovers of gain, whom he called base (225b), crave things "quite small and worth little or nothing" (226d–e). "You yourself" (*autos*) is Bekker's correction, which Burnet prints; B and T have *autous*, "the base themselves".

OUTLINE

The divisions follow the argument. References are to Stephanus pages and sections, which stand in the margins of both pages of the text.

I. THE QUESTION AND THE FIRST ANSWER (225A–226D)

- 225a** Socrates: “What, then, is the love of gain? What is it, after all, and who are the lovers of gain?” The companion: those “who think fit to gain from things worth nothing”.
- 225a–b** Do they know that these things are worth nothing, or are they ignorant of it? If ignorant, “it is senseless men you are calling lovers of gain”. The companion calls them “unscrupulous and base, and no match for gain”, men who know, “and yet dare to love gain, out of shamelessness”.
- 225b–c** Is the lover of gain a farmer who knows that what he plants is worth nothing and thinks fit to gain from it when it has grown? The companion: “The lover of gain, at any rate, Socrates, thinks he ought to gain from everything.” Socrates: “Don’t answer me so at random, as though someone had done you some wrong”; the lover of gain “has knowledge of the worth of that from which he thinks fit to gain”.
- 225c–d** Who has knowledge of the worth of plants, “in what time and clime they are worth planting”? “I think a farmer.” By “thinking fit to gain” the companion means “thinking that one ought to gain”.
- 225d–226a** “Then don’t try to deceive me, an older man by now, when you are so young”: no farming man who knows that his plant is worth nothing thinks he gains from it. “By Zeus, not I.”
- 226a–c** The horseman who gives his horse food worth nothing; the pilot with sails and rudders worth nothing, who knows that “he will suffer loss”; the general; the flute-player, the lyre-player, the archer, “or anyone at all, in sum, of the craftsmen or of the other intelligent men”: none thinks he gains from what he knows is worth nothing.
- 226d** So “in the way you say, my wonderful friend, there is no one among men who is a lover of gain”.

II. THE SECOND ANSWER: ALL MEN LOVERS OF GAIN (226D–227C)

- 226d–e** The companion: the lovers of gain are those “who, out of insatiability, every time crave prodigiously even things quite small and worth little or nothing, and love gain”.
- 226e** “Not, surely, my excellent friend, knowing that they are worth nothing”: that was refuted. So they are ignorant, “thinking that things worth nothing are worth a great deal”.
- 226e–227a** The lovers of gain love gain; gain is “the opposite of loss”; “men are harmed by loss”; “Then loss is bad”; “Then gain is good.”
- 227b** “Then you call lovers of gain those who love the good.” “It seems so.” Socrates: “It is not madmen, at any rate, my friend, that you call lovers of gain.” The companion loves all good things, and Socrates too: “Ask me too, then, whether I do not as well”.
- 227c** All other men “love good things” and “hate bad ones”; and gain was agreed to be good. “In this way, in turn, all men appear to be lovers of gain; but in the way we were speaking of before, no one was a lover of gain.”

III. THE THIRD ANSWER: THE GAIN THAT DECENT MEN DO NOT DARE (227C–228A)

- 227c–d** “Which of the two arguments, then, could one use without making a mistake?” The companion: “it is right to think that man a lover of gain who is in earnest about those things, and thinks fit to gain from them, from which decent men do not dare to gain.”
- 227d** Socrates: they “agreed just now that to gain is to be benefited”, and also “that everyone wishes for good things, and always”; so “good men too wish to have all gains, if indeed they are good things”.
- 227e** “Not the gains, at any rate, Socrates, from which they are going to be harmed”: that is, “going to suffer loss”; men suffer loss “both by loss and by base gain”. “Well, does any decent and good thing seem to you to be base?” “Not to me.”
- 228a** Gain was agreed to be the opposite of loss, which is bad, and so good: “You see, then: you are trying to deceive me”. The companion: “it is you who are deceiving me, and I don’t know how you twist things up and down in the arguments.”

IV. HIPPARCHUS (228B–229D)

- 228b** Socrates: “Speak auspiciously! I would certainly not be acting well if I did not obey a good and wise man”: Hipparchus, “who was the eldest and wisest of Pisistratus’ sons”, who was the first to bring “the epics of Homer into this land here” and compelled the rhapsodes at the Panathenaea “to go through them in order”.
- 228c** He sent a fifty-oared ship for Anacreon and kept Simonides about him, “because he wished to educate the citizens, so that he might rule over them as men who were as good as could be”, “not thinking that he ought to begrudge wisdom to anyone, since he was a fine and good man”.
- 228d–e** Hipparchus, “plotting in turn to educate those in the country”, set up Herms along the roads with his own sayings in elegiac verse, so that his citizens “would not admire those wise inscriptions at Delphi” but “would think the sayings of Hipparchus wiser”.
- 228e–229b** The two inscriptions on each Herm: on the left, Hermes says that he stands midway between the town and the deme; on the right, “This is Hipparchus’ memorial: go your way with just thoughts”. On the Steirian road: “This is Hipparchus’ memorial: do not deceive a friend.” Socrates: “So I would surely not dare to deceive you, who are my friend, and to disobey him”.
- 229b** After Hipparchus’ death his brother Hippias ruled as tyrant for three years, and “you could have heard from all the men of old that only in those years was there a tyranny in Athens, and that the rest of the time the Athenians lived nearly as in the reign of Cronus”.
- 229c–d** The more cultivated say that Hipparchus died “not for the reasons the many thought, the dishonour to the sister over the basket-bearing”: Aristogeiton “prided himself on having educated a man, and thought Hipparchus his opponent”, and the young man whom Harmodius loved, “after keeping company with Hipparchus, despised them”; “deeply pained by this dishonour”, they killed him.

V. TAKING BACK A MOVE: GOOD GAIN AND BAD GAIN (229D–231A)

- 229d–e** The companion: “either you do not think me a friend, or, if you think me a friend, you do not obey Hipparchus. For I cannot be persuaded that it is not you who are deceiving me”.
- 229e–230a** Socrates offers, “just as when playing draughts”, to take

back whatever the companion wishes. Not that all men desire good things, nor that loss is bad, nor that gain is the opposite of loss; but that gaining is good: "Not all of it, at any rate. Take that back for me." "Then, it seems, some gain seems to you to be good and some bad."

230a-c "But the good one of them is no more gain, at any rate, than the bad": good food and bad food are "equally food"; so with drink; and of men "one is decent, another base", but neither "is more or less a man".

230c-d Base gain and decent gain: "both the base and the decent are, at any rate, equally gain"; "to neither of them does the more or the less belong".

230d-231a So "this is what we must look into: why ever do you call both of them gain? What do you see in both that is the same?" Food is "dry nourishment of the body", drink "the wet nourishment of the body". "Try, then, you too, to imitate me as I answer in this way."

VI. WHAT GAIN IS: ACQUIRING MORE, AND WORTH (231A-232A)

231a-b Socrates' proposal: "do you call gain every possession that one acquires either without spending anything, or by spending less and getting more?" "I think I call that gain."

231b-c The man who feasts at no cost and acquires a disease has not gained; one who acquires health has. "Then this, at least, is not gain: to acquire any possession whatever." If what he acquires is good, he acquires gain; if bad, loss. Socrates: "Do you see, then, how you are running round back again to the same place? Gain appears good, and loss bad."

231c "I am at a loss what to say." "Not unjustly, at any rate, are you at a loss." The companion means "if, spending less gold or silver, he gets more".

231d Half a weight of gold for twice that weight of silver: "Loss, surely, Socrates". Yet he has got more, Socrates objects. The companion: "Not in worth, at any rate, is silver more than gold." Socrates: "Then, it seems, gain must have this belonging to it as well: worth."

231e-232a "Then what is of worth is gainful", and "what is of no worth is without gain"; what is of worth is "worth possessing", what is worth possessing is "beneficial", and the beneficial is good; so it is "agreed for the third or fourth time, that what is gainful is good".

VII. ALL MEN LOVERS OF GAIN (232A–C)

- 232a** “Do you remember, then, where this argument of ours started from?” Socrates: “You disputed with me, holding that good men do not wish to gain all gains, but of gains the good ones, and not the base.”
- 232b** “Then hasn’t the argument now compelled us to agree that all gains, both small and great, are good?” “It has compelled, yes, Socrates—me, at any rate—rather than persuaded.” “Well, perhaps after this it might also persuade you”.
- 232b–c** Decent men “wish for good things, every one”; base men, as the companion himself said, “love gains both small and great”. “Then by your argument all men would be lovers of gain, both the decent and the base.”
- 232c** “Then if anyone reproaches someone with being a lover of gain, he does not reproach him rightly; for even the one who casts this reproach is himself, in fact, such a man.”

EDITORIAL NOTE

The Greek text. The Greek is John Burnet's, from the second volume of his *Oxford Classical Text of Plato* (1901; second edition, 1910), in which the *Hipparchus* follows the *Alcibiades II*. The copy reproduced is the one used for the two *Alcibiades* of this series: an undated later impression of the second edition, printed at Oxford by John Johnson as Printer to the University and published by Humphrey Milford, and so printed between 1925 and 1945. The title page does not name the edition, but a list of the *Oxford Classical Texts* dated January 1935, bound in after the last page of the text, offers this volume as "Ed. 2", and the copy was therefore issued no earlier than January 1935. It carries Burnet's preface of March 1901 and the short addendum of April 1910 that marks the second edition; it concerns the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* and names no change in the other dialogues. The text is reproduced page for page and line for line: each left-hand page of this edition is one page of Burnet, with his line-ends, his marginal section letters and line numbers, and his apparatus criticus at the foot. In the margin, "St. II p. 225" at the head of the dialogue gives the volume and page of Stephanus' edition at which it begins; where each later page of Stephanus begins, its number (226 to 232) stands in place of the letter a; and within each section every fifth line is numbered. Burnet sets these in the outer margin of his page, this edition in the right-hand margin; his running heads, and the printer's signature at the foot of the tenth page of the dialogue (230e–231c), are not reproduced. The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library's digital transcription of Burnet, and every line was then checked against the photographs of this copy; where the two differ, this edition prints what Burnet printed. Burnet's title, ΠΙΠΑΡΧΟΣ ἢ ΦΙΛΟΚΕΡΔΗΣ, "Hipparchus, or The Lover of Gain", his list of the persons beneath it (ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ, Socrates and a companion), his paragraphing (a new, indented paragraph at each change of speaker), his abbreviations of the speakers' names (ΣΩ. for Socrates, ET. for the companion, *hetairos*), his capitals at the openings of speeches, and the capitals and quotation marks of the two Delphic sayings at 228e ("Γνωθι σαυτόν", "Μηδὲν ἄγαν") are kept. A few letters damaged in this copy are read as the type

intended, among them the second *o* of *πεντηκόντορον* at 228c1. Square brackets [] enclose a word Burnet believed spurious: *â* at 230e1, which Schleiermacher deletes. Angle brackets < > enclose a word that the manuscripts lack and that Burnet supplies by a scholar's conjecture (Apelt's *ἀλλ'* at 226d3). The two verses of Hipparchus quoted at 229a4 and 229b1 are set as verse.

Reading the apparatus. The notes at the foot of each Greek page are Burnet's, unaltered. Entries are keyed by section letter and line as numbered in the margin, so that "a 4" is the fourth line of section a. The section letters begin again with each Stephanus page, so that on page 2, which runs from 225c to 226c, "a 2" after "d 5" belongs to 226a. A further entry on the same line follows after a wider space without repeating the key. Usually the reading printed in the text comes first, followed by the witnesses that have it; a colon separates it from the alternatives, each followed by its witnesses. Where the text's reading is followed by a square bracket, the witnesses for the text are not listed and only the alternative is given (227a6, 227c9, 227d2, 229b5, 230d6). Most entries with no colon report a single proposal without listing the witnesses for the text: an alternative (Cobet's *κερδανεῖν* at 226a4, his *διαφθερεῖ* at 226a8, Schanz's *ἄστεως* at 228d3), an addition (226d3) or a deletion (230e1). An entry may also give only a reading of some manuscripts, without the text's words: *ἐπαριστερῶ* and *ἐπιδεξιῶ* BT at 229a1 and a3, each written as one word and in the dative, where the text prints *ἐπ' ἀριστερά* and *ἐπὶ δεξιὰ*. Words in angle brackets inside an entry are a scholar's supplement that Burnet does not adopt (Stephanus' *ὀ*) at 230c12). Asterisks stand for letters erased in a manuscript, one for each letter: B's *ἐ**μὲ* at 229e1, where two letters are erased. Three spaced points stand for the words between the first and last of a passage: at 225d2 "*τὸ . . . ἀξιούν*" is *τὸ οὖν ἀξιούν*, at 227d5 "*εἶναι . . . d 7 προσωμολογήσαμεν*" runs from *εἶναι* in d5 to *προσωμολογήσαμεν* in d7, and at 230d3 "*οὔτε . . . οὔτε*" is *οὔτε τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτε*. The apparatus reports each witness's own spelling, which may differ from the text's: B and W's *ἡμφισβήτησας* at 232a8, where the text prints *ἡμφεσβήτησας*. It reproduces the faults of the witnesses, as T's *γεί* for *ἡγεί* at 229d9; in the same entry B's *ῆ* lacks the grave that the *ῆ* on either side of it has, whether by a fault of the manuscript or of the printing, and is kept as printed.

Names and abbreviations. Stephanus is Henri Estienne, whose edition of 1578 supplies the page numbers by which Plato is

cited; the *Hipparchus* fills pages 225–232 of his second volume. A scholar's name standing alone after a reading marks that scholar's reading, from his edition or a study: at 226a4 *φντεύει* is the reading of Stephanus' edition. The names are of editors and critics: Stephanus; William Etwall, whose Oxford edition of 1771 (*ed. Oxon.*) contains the two *Alcibiades* and the *Hipparchus*; the editors Bekker, Ast and Schanz; Schleiermacher, Plato's German translator; and Boeckh, Cobet, Hirschig, Naber and Apelt. Ficinus is the Latin form of the name of Marsilio Ficino, whose Latin translation of Plato (Florence, 1484) Burnet cites at 226a2, by its words *responde . . . an*, "answer . . . whether", as support for Boeckh's correction. *add.*, "added", marks a scholar's addition (Apelt's ἀλλ' at 226d3, which Burnet prints in angle brackets), and *del.*, "deleted", a scholar's deletion (Schleiermacher's of ἀ at 230e1, which Burnet brackets). *et mox*, "and soon after", extends a proposal to a later place: to the one named (Cobet would write *κερδανεῖν* at 226a4 and again at 226b1) or, where none is named, to the next place where the word recurs (Schanz's ἄσπεως at 228d3 and again at 229a2). *om.* means that a witness leaves the words out. *ut videtur*, "as it seems", marks a reading that is hard to make out (B at 227e1; B's first hand at 231b9). *sed à ex emend. T*, "but the α from a correction in T", says that the first letter of T's ἀπεδείξατο at 228b7 was written in by correction.

The witnesses. Burnet's apparatus to this dialogue rests on three manuscripts: B, the Bodleian Plato (MS. E. D. Clarke 39, written in 895); T, the Venice manuscript (Marcianus, Append. Class. 4, cod. 1); and W, the Vienna manuscript (Vindobonensis 54, suppl. phil. Gr. 7). W is named in only nine entries; where it is not named, the apparatus does not report its reading. Later hands are marked by the small letter: b for B (225c6, 227d7, 229d9, 231a5, and in "Tb" at 227d5, 227e1 and 231b9, T together with a later hand in B), and t for T (231c7); w, which Burnet's list gives for later hands in W, does not occur here. *pr. B* is B's first hand, before correction (227d5, 231b9). Letters written together share a reading, so that "BT" is B and T. *recc. (recentiores)* are later manuscripts in general (225c7), and *vulg. (vulgata)* the text of the early printed editions (225d2, 226e8, 232c1). Coisl. (228b7) is the Coislinianus 155 in Paris, a later manuscript. Burnet's preface says that the men who corrected it and the Venetus 189 were learned readers after the revival of letters who anticipated many emendations of Heindorf and others, and that such readings rest on conjecture, not on tradition; the entry at 228b7 does not say

whether ὑπεδείξατο is the scribe's reading or a corrector's.

The English. The translation is new. It aims to be exact, with every clause answering to a clause of the Greek, and to keep Socrates' manner: his irony, his patience with a companion who answers in a huff, and the timing of the short exchanges. Nothing is added to make it livelier; where a joke depends on the Greek, a note explains it, and at 225c the English rhymes where the Greek rhymes. Each speech opens with the speaker's name in small capitals. Words that Burnet prints in angle brackets are translated, without the brackets; the word he prints in square brackets (*â* at 230e1) is not translated. The reading Burnet prints is translated, including his conjectures; where his choice changes the sense, a note says so.

Each right-hand page translates the Greek page opposite. When a sentence runs over the turn of Burnet's page, the English breaks at the nearest point English word order allows. The Stephanus section letters in the margin of the English mark where each section begins.

Key terms. The words on which the argument turns have one rendering each throughout. *Kerdos* and *kerdainein* are "gain", *philokerdēs* "lover of gain" and *to philokerdes* "the love of gain"; *kerdaleos* is "gainful" and *akerdēs* "without gain"; *zēmia* is "loss" and *zēmioussthai* "suffer loss". *Axios* is "worth", and *axioun*, as in the *Alcibiades I*, "think fit". *Chrēstos* is "decent" and *ponēros* "base", kept apart from *agathos*, "good", and *kakos*, "bad", never "evil". As elsewhere in the series, *agnoein* is "be ignorant", *anoētos* "senseless", *ōpheleisthai* "be benefited", *exapatan* "deceive" and *euphēmein* "speak auspiciously"; *peithesthai* is "obey", as in the *Charmides*. The Key Words of the Dialogue explain the chief of these, and the Glossary lists them all with their places.

The notes. The notes identify persons, places and quotations, explain what the English cannot carry, and mark the places where Burnet's choice of reading changes the sense or the words. Interpretations are labelled as such. They are numbered afresh on each page.

GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS

The English words on which the argument depends, in alphabetical order, with the Greek they render and the places where they matter, by Stephanus page. Where a word has a longer entry in the Key Words of the Dialogue, the Glossary says so.

acquire, κτᾶσθαι (*ktasthai*); **possess**, κεκτῆσθαι (*kektēsthai*); **possession**, κτήμα (*ktēma*). Gain as “every possession that one acquires”, 231a; a disease or health acquired at a feast, 231b; “acquires more”, 231c; what is of worth is “worth possessing”, 231e. See **get** and Key Words, *Possession, acquire, spend*.

agree, ὁμολογεῖν, προσομολογεῖν (*homologeîn, prosomologeîn*); **concur**, συμφάναι (*symphanai*). The companion’s assent to the steps of the argument: 225c, 227c–d, 228a, 230d–e, 232a–b. “Concur” is kept for συμφάναι, 232b. See Key Words, *Agree, take back*.

argument, λόγος (*logos*). 226e (“by the argument”), 227c (“Which of the two arguments”), 228a and 229e (“in the arguments”), 232a–c.

at a loss, be at a loss, ἀπορεῖν (*aporeîn*). 231c, twice. It has nothing to do with **loss**.

bad, κακός (*kakos*). Never “evil”: loss is bad, 227a, 229e; men hate bad things, 227c; the opposite of a bad thing, 228a, 230a; good food and bad food, 230a–b, 230e; some gain bad, 230a; a bad thing acquired is loss, and loss bad, 231b–c. See **good** and Key Words, *Good and bad, benefit and harm*.

base, πονηρός (*ponēros*); **decent**, χρηστός (*chrēstos*). Of men, 225b, 227d, 230c, 232b–c; of gain, 227e, 230c, 231a, 232a; of drink, 230e–231a; “does any decent and good thing seem to you to be base?”, 227e. See Key Words, *Decent and base*.

be benefited, ὠφελεῖσθαι (*ōphelēisthai*); **beneficial**, ὠφέλιμος (*ōphelimos*); **of no benefit**, ἀνωφελής (*anōphelēs*); **be harmed**, βλάπτεσθαι (*blaptēsthai*). Men are harmed by loss, 227a; “to gain is to be benefited”, 227d; the gains “from which they are going to be harmed”, 227e; what is worth possessing is beneficial, and the beneficial good, 231e–232a. See Key Words, *Good and bad, benefit and harm*.

be ignorant, ἀγνοεῖν (*agnoeîn*); **know**, γιννώσκειν (*gignōskeîn*);

- have knowledge of**, ἐπιστήμων (*epistēmōn*); **senseless**, ἀνόητος (*anoētos*). Do the lovers of gain know, or are they ignorant, 225a–b; the knowledge of worth, 225c; the farmer and the craftsmen, 225d–226c; “if not knowing it, plainly being ignorant of it”, 226e. See Key Words, *Know, be ignorant, senseless*.
- compel**, ἀναγκάζειν (*anankazein*). Hipparchus compelled the rhapsodes, 228b; the argument has “compelled” rather than persuaded, 232b. See **obey** and Key Words, *Obey, persuade, compel*.
- deceive**, ἐξαπατᾶν (*exapatan*). 225d, 228a, 229b (“do not deceive a friend”), 229e. See Key Words, *Deceive*.
- decent**: see **base**.
- dishonour**, ἀτιμία (*atimia*). The sister’s at the basket-bearing, 229c, and Harmodius’ and Aristogeiton’s when the young man despised them, 229d.
- dispute**, ἀμφισβητεῖν (*amphisbētein*). 232a.
- drink**: see **food**.
- educate**, παιδεύειν (*paideuein*). Hipparchus’ purpose, 228c–e; Aristogeiton “prided himself on having educated a man”, 229c. See **wisdom** and Key Words, *Wisdom, educate*.
- equally**, ὁμοίως (*homoiōs*). Good food and bad food “equally food”, 230b, 230e; decent and base gain “equally gain”, 230c–d.
- fine and good man**, καλὸς καγαθός (*kalos kagathos*). Hipparchus, 228c.
- food**, σιτίον (*sition*); **drink**, ποτόν (*poton*); **nourishment**, τροφή (*trophē*). The horse’s food, 226a–b; good food and bad food, 230a–b, 230e; drink, 230b, 230e–231a; food the “dry”, drink “the wet nourishment of the body”, 230e–231a. See Key Words, *Food, drink, nourishment*.
- gain** (noun and verb), κέρδος, κερδαίνειν (*kerdos, kerdainein*). Throughout; the argument turns on it at 225a–228a and 229e–232c. **Gainful** is κερδαλέος (*kerdaleos*), 230d, 231e, 232a; **without gain**, ἀκερδής (*akerdēs*), 231e. See **lover of gain, loss** and Key Words, *Gain, lover of gain*.
- get**, λαμβάνειν (*lambanein*); **spend**, ἀναλίσκειν (*analiskein*). Spending nothing, or spending less and getting more, 231a; feasting without spending, 231b; spending less gold or silver, 231c; half a weight of gold for twice that weight of silver, 231d. See **acquire**.
- good**, ἀγαθός (*agathos*). “Then gain is good”, 227a; all men love good things, 227b–c; good men, 227d, 232a; a decent and good

thing, 227e; the opposite of a bad thing, good, 228a; “a good and wise man”, 228b; good gain and bad gain, 230a; good food and bad food, 230a–b, 230e; a good thing acquired is gain, and gain good, 231b–c; the beneficial is good, 232a; all gains good, 232b. See **bad** and Key Words, *Good and bad, benefit and harm*.

inscriptions, γράμματα (*grammata*), of the Delphic sayings, 228e, and ἐπίγραμμα (*epigramma*; Burnet’s dual τῶπιγράμματε), of the two inscriptions on each Herm, 228e; **inscribe**, ἐπιγράφειν (*epigrapherein*), 228d, 229a.

intelligent, ἔμφρων (*emphrōn*). The other intelligent men, beside the craftsmen, 226c.

know: see **be ignorant**.

look into, σκοπεῖν, ἐπισκέψασθαι (*skopein, episkepsasthai*). Socrates’ word for inquiry: 230d, 231a.

loss, ζημία (*zēmia*); **suffer loss**, ζημιουῖσθαι (*zēmiousthai*). The pilot, 226b; gain the opposite of loss, 226e–227a, 228a, 229e; loss bad, 227a, 229e; suffering loss by base gain, 227e; the feast, 231b; loss again bad, 231c; gold for silver, 231d. Not **at a loss**. See Key Words, *Loss, suffer loss*.

love, φιλεῖν (*philein*). The lovers of gain love gain, 226e; all men love good things, 227b–c; the base love gains small and great, 232c. See **lover of gain**.

lover of gain, φιλοκερδής (*philokerdēs*); **the love of gain**, τὸ φιλοκερδές (*to philokerdēs*); **love gain**, φιλοκερδεῖν (*philokerderein*). The question, 225a; the three answers, 225a–b, 226d–e, 227c–d; all men lovers of gain, 227c, 232c. See Key Words, *Gain, lover of gain*.

madmen, μανικοί (*manikoi*). Those who love the good are not madmen, 227b.

obey, πείθεσθαι (*peithesthai*); **be persuaded**, πεισθῆναι (*peisthēnai*); **persuade**, πείθειν (*peithein*); **disobey**, ἀπιστεῖν (*apistein*). Socrates would obey “a good and wise man”, 228b, and not disobey Hipparchus, 229b; the companion: “you do not obey Hipparchus”, 229d; Hipparchus persuaded Simonides with fees and gifts, 228c; the companion “cannot be persuaded”, 229d; “compelled ... rather than persuaded”, 232b. See **compel** and Key Words, *Obey, persuade, compel*.

opponent, ἀνταγωνιστής (*antagōnistēs*). Hipparchus, to Aristogeiton, 229c.

persuade: see **obey**.

plot, ἐπιβουλεύειν (*epibouleuein*). Hipparchus “plotting in turn to educate those in the country”, 228d.

possession: see **acquire**.

reproach, ὀνειδίζειν (*oneidizein*). 232c.

sayings, ῥήματα (*rhēmata*). The “wise sayings” of men clever at lawsuits, 225c; the sayings of Hipparchus, 228e.

senseless: see **be ignorant**.

speak auspiciously, εὐφημεῖν (*euphēmein*). 228b.

spend: see **get**.

take back, ἀνατίθασθαι (*anatithesthai*); **play draughts**, πεττεύειν (*petteuein*). 229e–230a. See Key Words, *Agree*, *take back*.

think, ἡγεῖσθαι, οἰεσθαι (*hēgeisthai, oiesthai*). Throughout, including “think that man a lover of gain”, 227d, and “think me a friend”, 229d.

think fit, ἀξιοῦν (*axioun*). 225a–d, 226c, 227d. See **worth** and Key Words, *Worth*, *think fit*.

unscrupulous, πανούργος (*panourgος*); **no match for gain**, ἥττων τοῦ κέρδους (*hēttōn tou kerdous*); **shamelessness**, ἀναισχυντία (*anaischyntia*). The companion’s first description of the lovers of gain, 225a–b.

wisdom, wise, σοφία, σοφός (*sophia, sophos*). The “wise sayings” of men clever at lawsuits, 225c; Hipparchus’ wisdom and his sayings, 228b–e; “those wise inscriptions at Delphi”, 228e; Harmodius and Aristogeiton admired “as wise”, 229d. See **educate** and Key Words, *Wisdom*, *educate*.

wish, βούλεσθαι (*boulesthai*); **desire**, ἐπιθυμεῖν (*epithymein*). Everyone wishes for good things, 227d, and decent men, 232b; good men too wish to have all gains, 227d, though the companion held that they do not wish to gain all gains, 232a; Hipparchus wished to educate, 228c; “whatever you wish”, 229e; Socrates offers to say that “men do not all desire good things”, 229e.

worth, ἄξιος, ἀξία (*axios, axia*); **worth nothing**, οὐδενὸς ἄξιος (*oudenos axios*); **of worth, of no worth**, ἄξιον, ἀνάξιον (*axion, anaxion*); **worth possessing**, ἄξιον κεκτῆσθαι (*axion kektēsthai*). Things worth nothing, 225a–226e; the worth of plants, 225c; gold and silver, 231d; “gain must have this belonging to it as well: worth”, 231d; of worth and of no worth, 231e. See **acquire**, **think fit** and Key Words, *Worth*, *think fit*.

NOTE ON THIS EDITION

HOW THE VOLUME WAS MADE

The Greek was taken from the Perseus Digital Library's digital transcription of Burnet and cut into Burnet's lines by reading every line-end from the photographs of his page, in the impression described in the Editorial Note. Accents, breathings and iota subscripts were read on the sharpest image of each page that the scan provides, and a doubtful mark was settled by setting it beside sure examples of each form on the same page. The section letters and line numbers in the margin were computed from the Stephanus divisions rather than copied, and were then compared with Burnet's: across the 349 lines of the dialogue they fall where he prints them. Burnet's apparatus was transcribed from the same images, with its asterisks for erased letters. Where the digital text differs from Burnet's page (small letters at the openings of speeches, and the Delphic sayings at 228e without their capitals and quotation marks), this edition follows Burnet.

The work was done in two blocks of six pages, each finished and checked before the next was begun. Each block was checked by four independent reviewers: two, dividing its pages between them, compared the Greek and the apparatus with the page images letter by letter, one compared the English with the Greek clause by clause, and one checked every fact and reference in the notes. Each finding was examined again against the evidence before it was adopted, and not all were adopted. What each block's check caught is recorded at the end of this Note.

When the second block was done the volume was read through as one text, since a check made page by page cannot see some kinds of error: a word rendered one way in one block and another way in the next, a sentence broken badly at a page turn, a recapitulation that states a step in other words than the step itself. The translator read the whole volume, and four further reviewers read it independently: one for the consistency of terms across the whole book, two for sense, omissions and continuity in its two halves, and one for the Editorial Note against the scan of Burnet's volume. The Introduction, the Key Words of the Dialogue, the Outline and the Glos-

sary were then written from the finished text, and their claims and references were checked against it by three more reviewers.

WHAT THE FINAL READING CAUGHT

It found some forty faults that the two block checks had passed, most of them small and a few substantive. They fall into a few classes.

The most serious was in the Greek pages. In the margin of the first line (225a1) and of 229e1 the edition printed a small black square where Burnet's section letters a and e should stand, and the Editorial Note and the record of the second block said that this copy prints a square there. It does not: the squares came from the scan. Its sharpest image of those pages, on which the accents were read, shows the two margin letters as solid blocks, while the full page image shows the letters. The edition now prints a and e, and every mark in the margins has been checked on the full page image.

In the English, a few renderings changed the sense or could be heard the wrong way. At 232b the companion's last concession had read "more than it has persuaded me", as though he had been partly persuaded; the Greek says "rather than", and Socrates' reply ("it might also persuade you") treats him as not yet persuaded. At 231b the answer "It appears so" could be taken to agree that a man will not acquire gain even by acquiring something good, the opposite of what the companion means; it now reads "It appears he will, if it is good, at least", and the question before it keeps the Greek order. At 230b–c two questions with "not ... at all" were answered "Yes", which in English can mean either thing; they now read "does the one differ from the other not at all". At 229b the Athenians lived "nearly" as in the reign of Cronus, not "very nearly", and not "more or less", which renders another phrase in the argument a page later (230c–d); at 231d10 "Now, at any rate" replaces "As things are", which could be heard as "in reality"; and the "indeed" of 229b, the "some" of 225b, the "rightly ... right" of 227c–d, the "and" that joins "fellow citizen" to "son of Pisistratus" at 228b, and the order of "me and you" at 227c were restored.

Next came renderings that had drifted from the series or from one another. *Hēgeisthai* was "consider" at 227d and 229d against "think" elsewhere; *homoīos* was "alike" of food but "equally" of gain in the analogy the argument rests on (230b–e); *oīesthai* was once "suppose" (229c), *mega phronein* "was proud" for the series' "prided himself" (229c), *exhamartanein* "go wrong" for "make a

mistake" (227c), and *kalōs poiein* "doing right" at 228b, where "right" belongs to *orthōs*; it is now "acting well". Set answers were brought into line with the series: "Impossible." (230d), "To me, yes." after "seems to you" (230a), and "How do you mean the question?" (230a); and "Not for me, at least" is now "Not for me, no." (229e, twice), since "at least" had suggested "though perhaps for others". A step and a recapitulation now share their words: "you call gain the opposite of loss" (226e), which 227a and 228a take up, and "the opposite of the bad thing" (230a), which recalls 228a. At 227c "all men appear to be lovers of gain", so that the dialogue's last step (232c) can be heard to answer it.

Eleven passages matched a published English translation word for word beyond what literal translation forces, and were rewritten: at 225b, 226e, 227b, 227c (twice), 228b, 229b, 230a, 231c, 232b and 232c. At 228b the rewriting also made Homer's poems "epics", since "poems" is kept for Hipparchus' own verses.

In the notes, the doubt about the dialogue's authorship at 228b is now given to Aelian, whose words it is; at 229c the sister turned away from the procession is Harmodius', not Hipparchus'; the note at 228b names Anacreon and Simonides as poets; the note at 225d gives the manuscripts' *ton axion* as "the one deserving" (to gain), since "worthy" would cross the ruling for *axios*; and a note at 232a gives the places where gain was agreed to be good, "for the third or fourth time".

The Editorial Note was provisional, and was completed. It now gives the dates of Burnet's preface and addendum; explains the margins (the Stephanus volume and page at the head, the page numbers in place of the letter a, the numbering of every fifth line, and what is not reproduced); names the list of persons and the capitals of the Delphic sayings; no longer calls B's η at 229d9 a fault of printing, since the same entry reproduces a fault of T's; states Burnet's judgement of the Coislinianus in his own terms; distinguishes the two uses of *et mox*; and says how often W is cited. The edition itself was identified later, when the *Lovers* was made from the same copy: a list of the Oxford Classical Texts dated January 1935, bound in after the last page of the text, offers this volume as "Ed. 2", so that the copy is an impression of the second edition of 1910, issued no earlier than January 1935; the title page and the Editorial Note now say so.

Three proposals were not adopted: a note at 228e placing the Delphic sayings in the forecourt of Apollo's temple, for which the page has no room; the series' "be in a condition" for *paschein* at

230b, which would obscure “do or undergo” at 230d; and “in turn” for *au* at 231a, where “on the other hand” is kept. A cross-reference from the note at 229e to “persuaded” at 232b is left to the Key Words, which follow the thread.

WHAT REMAINS UNDONE

A few marks lie at the limit of what the scan can show, and are printed as read: in the apparatus, B’s ῆ at 229d9 without a grave, and the broken *o* of οῦν in the entry at 232a6; in the text, the damaged second *o* of πεντηκόντορον at 228c1, the *ι* of βέλτιστε at 226e3, the circumflex of Δοκεῖ at 230a5, and the raised point at 230a4, which sits low and close in this copy. They should be checked against another copy of the volume.

The apparatus is Burnet’s alone. It has not been collated against the manuscripts, and readings proposed since 1910 are not reported. The translation follows Burnet’s text even where later scholars would print something else.

The notes are a reader’s aid, not a commentary. They were chosen to explain what the English cannot carry and to set the story of Hipparchus beside the historians’, and they label the more doubtful interpretations as such. The question of who wrote the dialogue, and when, is set out in the Introduction but not argued; a reader who wants the scholarly debate will need a commentary.

The checks described above were made by independent reviewers working from the same page images. The volume has not been read by a specialist outside the project, and a reader who finds an error is asked to report it.

THE RECORD OF THE BLOCKS

The notes that follow were written as each block was finished, and are kept as a record of what each check found. Where the final reading changed something they report, the text above says so.

BLOCK I: 225A–228E (BURNET PAGES 1–6)

The first block runs from the opening question to the middle of Socrates’ story of Hipparchus. It was drafted on 7 October 2026 and read by four reviewers: two for the Greek and the apparatus against the photographs of Burnet’s pages, letter by letter; one for the English against the Greek, clause by clause; one for the notes and the Editorial Note against their sources.

The Greek. The reviewers found the text and the apparatus of all six pages as Burnet prints them. They settled the doubtful places on the photographs: the breathings of αὐτόν and αὐτοῦ at 228c-d, Hirschig's ἀνθρωποι at 227a6, the capital ῥ at 227e9, and a mark under T's ἀξιώσουσιν at 225a3, which is a fleck, not part of the word. Two points of typesetting were corrected: the elision mark after an accented letter (Μὰ Δί' at 226a5 and 227b7) had touched the accent, and Burnet's spaced points in the apparatus (225d2, 226a2, 227d5) had stretched with the line.

The English. A question had lost its negative at 227b: "Ask me too, then, whether I do not as well". Hipparchus' purpose at 228c is to rule over men "as good as could be", not to rule over them once they were. The emphatic "you" of the companion's retort at 228a was restored, and the future infinitives at 227e ("going to be harmed", "going to suffer loss") were kept. "Philaidae" is a deme, so it takes no article. Several sentences were made unambiguous: the question at 227c, the conclusion at 226d, the clause at 226d3. The set answers were brought into line with the series ("It appears so", "It seems so"), and "again" for αὖ was made "in turn", as at 228d. Smaller corrections: "doing right" (228b), "then" and "at any rate" for οἶν and γὰρ (225a, 227e), "what not even you yourself think" (225d), and "these things ... as his own poems" (228d).

The notes and the Editorial Note. The note on Hipparchus now reports the *Constitution of the Athenians* exactly: Hippias, the elder, at the head of the government, and Hipparchus the one who sent for the poets (18.1). The manuscripts' reading at 225d is "the one worthy (to gain)". The elegiac couplet is a hexameter and a pentameter. The opening *gar* is described as an impression ("as though a conversation were already under way"), not as a fact. In the Editorial Note, Schanz's "et mox" at 228d3 points to the next ἄσπερος, at 229a2, not to the next line; Burnet's judgement of the Coislinianus concerns its correctors; and Ficino's words are given as Burnet cites them. The opening question's second half, which matched a published English version word for word, was rewritten.

BLOCK II: 228E-232C (BURNET PAGES 7-12)

The second block runs from the end of Socrates' story of Hipparchus to the end of the dialogue. It was drafted on 7 October 2026 and read by four reviewers, in the same way as the first.

The Greek. The text of all six pages was found as Burnet prints it. In the apparatus, T's reading at 229a1 is the relative ὃ

ἐπιγέγραπται, not the article, and B's ἦ at 229d9 is printed, as in Burnet, without the grave of the ῆ beside it. Burnet's asterisks for letters erased in B (ἐ**μὲ at 229e1) are kept. In the margin of 229e1 this copy prints a black square where the letter e would stand, as at 225a1.

The English. The condition at 230e is past and unreal ("if you had asked me just now ... I would have told you"); the question at 230d10 is two questions, as in the Greek; and the question at 231e5, which in the Greek expects agreement, is put so that "Yes" answers it. The story's word for the lovers' grievance, "dishonour", is kept for the sister's slight too (229c), so that its return at 229d can be heard. Renderings of the earlier volumes were restored: "dispute" for ἀμφισβητεῖν, "despise", "wellborn", "playing draughts". Particles restored: "at any rate" in the steps of the argument (230b–c, 232c), "and yet" for καὶ μὲν where it objects (231d), "even" in the last sentence. Hipparchus is "such a man as he was", not "so great a man". Five phrases that matched a published English version word for word were rewritten.

The notes. New notes report the readings that change the sense at 231c7 and 231d10. The age of Cronus is cited from Hesiod; Steiria from Strabo; the honours of the tyrant-slayers from the *Constitution of the Athenians*. The note at 232c gives the manuscripts' *autous* its sense, "the base themselves". The Editorial Note now lists the later hands and the bracketed entries of the whole dialogue, and the deleted word at 230e1.