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Gorgias

Ancient Greek with an independent English translation.

GorgiasIntroduction · What is most exposed

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English Introduction · Branch 8 of 154

Introduction · What is most exposed

Gorgias: Introduction

p. 12

What is most exposed

A first reader will find several things hard.

Polus’ concession. The proof that doing injustice is worse than suffering it starts from Polus’ admission that it is more shameful (474c), and from a definition of the beautiful by pleasure and benefit that he accepts at once (474d–475a). Callicles says that Polus was “hobbled” by shame (482d–e), as Polus said of Gorgias (461b–c); many readers have thought the argument weak at just this point, and the reader should see that the proof binds Polus through two things he grants: that doing injustice is more shameful, and that the beautiful is beautiful by pleasure or benefit (interpretation).

The just man who has learned justice. The refutation of Gorgias rests on a step of a few lines: “the one who has learned the just things is just too” (460b). It is taken from the crafts (the one who has learned carpentry is a carpenter), and it is commonly read as the thesis that knowledge of justice makes a man just (interpretation). Gorgias grants it at once: “Surely, in every way” (460b).

The rules of the conversation. Socrates asks for short answers instead of speeches (449b–c, 461d–462a), and for answers that say what the answerer thinks: he tells Callicles that “you would no longer be examining with me sufficiently the things that are, if you will say things contrary to what you think” (495a), and asks him not to “answer whatever comes to you contrary to what you think” (500b). A refutation is won by the agreement of the one man being questioned (472b–c, 474a). That is why shame, sincerity and Callicles’ withdrawal matter to the argument.

Rhetoric condemned? Socrates does not condemn all speaking to the people. He allows that of two kinds of addressing the people one would be flattery and “the other beautiful: preparing so that the souls of the citizens will be the best possible” (503a), speaks of “the true rhetoric” (517a), and ends by saying “one must make use of rhetoric thus, always for what is just” (527c), as at 480d and 508b.

Want and think fit. The claim that orators and tyrants have “the smallest power” (466d) depends on separating what one wants (the good for whose sake one acts) from what one thinks fit (the act). It can look like a verbal trick. Socrates later appeals to it for the claim that “no one does injustice wanting to” (509e), though that claim follows only with the proof that doing injustice is worse for the one who does it (interpretation; see the note at 509e).

An argument without a partner. Callicles answers grudgingly (“Let it be so”, 504d, 505a; “so that I may gratify you”, 516b), withdraws (505c), and is left unpersuaded: “I am not altogether persuaded by you” (513c). Socrates carries the argument on by himself (506c–507c), and after calling his conclusions bound by arguments of iron and adamant he says, “I do not know how these things are” (509a). Whether the dialogue refutes Callicles or only silences him is still argued.

Doing well. At 507c the man who “does well” is “blessed and happy”. The Greek eu prattein means both acting rightly and faring well, and Socrates seems to pass from one to the other (interpretation); the note at 507c says so.

The statesmen. Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades and Themistocles, the heroes of Athenian memory, are judged failures as caretakers of the citizens (515c–517a), and Socrates claims that he attempts the true political craft “with few Athenians, so as not to say alone” (521d). The reader should note what he grants them: they were “more serving than those now” and good at procuring what the city desired (517b).

Foreknowledge. Callicles’ picture of Socrates led off to prison and condemned (486a–b), and Socrates’ own picture of himself before the jury (521c–522c), are commonly read as Plato’s allusions to the trial of 399 BC (interpretation); the note at 486b marks them.

The myth. After saying he does not know how these things are (509a), Socrates tells the judgment of the dead “as being true” (523a), and then allows that Callicles may despise it as an old woman’s tale (527a). How seriously the myth is meant, and how its punishments fit with the claim that no one does injustice willingly, is one of the questions its readers have most often asked (see the essay on later readings).

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About This Reading Edition

Socrates questions Gorgias, Polus and Callicles about rhetoric, power, pleasure and justice, and asks what it means to live well. This complete edition presents 447a–527e across 117 Greek–English page pairs, with an introduction, Key Words of the Dialogue, an outline, later readings of Callicles and the judgment myth, a glossary, critical apparatus, and 208 translator’s notes.

Historical Text and Translation

The Greek follows John Burnet’s Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford, 1903), in the corrected second impression of January 1909, printed by Horace Hart. The supplied Editorial Note reports checking the Perseus Digital Library transcription against photographs of the printed pages. Burnet’s readings, speaker labels, verse quotations, editorial signs and critical apparatus are retained. The unchanged PDF preserves the complete printed layout.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared the independent English translation and editorial matter in 2026. Each English dialogue page translates the Greek page opposite it, with matching Stephanus references and linked translator’s notes. The introductory and concluding sections remain complete, including both later-readings essays, the Editorial Note, glossary, and all twelve records in the Note on this Edition. The supplied English-only EPUB is available alongside the complete Greek–English downloads.

Rights

The ancient Greek work and Burnet’s historical printed edition are in the public domain. The Perseus digital Greek transcription and its modifications are attributed to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, under CC BY-SA 4.0. The new English translation and editorial matter are © 2026 Diotimos Editions and appear with the site owner’s permission. All five supplied downloads are preserved unchanged.