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Gorgias
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Ancient Greek Page · Branch 73 of 154
Gorgias · 488e–489d
Ancient Greek
p. 122ΚΑΛ. Φημί.
ΣΩ. Ἆρ’ οὖν οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως, ὡς ἄρτι αὖ σὺ ἔλεγες, δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν 489a τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἔστιν ταῦτα ἢ οὔ; καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἁλώσῃ ἐνταῦθα σὺ αὖ αἰσχυνόμενος. νομίζουσιν, ἢ οὔ, οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ πλέον δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; μὴ φθόνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἵν’, ἐάν μοι ὁμολογήσῃς, βεβαιώσωμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ, ἅτε ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς διαγνῶναι ὡμολογηκότος.
ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ’ οἵ γε πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως.
ΣΩ. Οὐ νόμῳ ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ 489b ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει· ὥστε κινδυνεύεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδὲ ὀρθῶς ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν λέγων ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὁ νόμος καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς κακουργῶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν τις κατὰ φύσιν λέγῃ, ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον ἄγων, ἐὰν δέ τις κατὰ νόμον, ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν.
ΚΑΛ. Οὑτοσὶ ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ τηλικοῦτος ὢν ὀνόματα θηρεύων, καὶ 489c ἐάν τις ῥήματι ἁμάρτῃ, ἕρμαιον τοῦτο ποιούμενος; ἐμὲ γὰρ οἴει ἄλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρείττους εἶναι ἢ τὸ βελτίους; οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω ὅτι ταὐτόν φημι εἶναι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κρεῖττον; ἢ οἴει με λέγειν, ἐὰν συρφετὸς συλλεγῇ δούλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδενὸς ἀξίων πλὴν ἴσως τῷ σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι, καὶ οὗτοι φῶσιν, αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι νόμιμα;
ΣΩ. Εἶεν, ὦ σοφώτατε Καλλίκλεις· οὕτω λέγεις;
ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
489dΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τοπάζω τοιοῦτόν τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ ἀνερωτῶ γλιχόμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅτι λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε τοὺς δύο
Gorgias
p. 123Call. I claim so.
Soc. Then do the many hold thus, as you, again, were saying just now, that it is just to have an equal share, and more shameful to do injustice 489a than to suffer injustice? Is this so or not? And see that you, again, are not caught here being ashamed. Do the many hold, or not, that to have an equal share, and not more, is just, and that it is more shameful to do injustice than to suffer injustice? Do not begrudge answering me this, Callicles, so that, if you agree with me, I may at once have it confirmed from you, since a man sufficient to discern will have agreed.
Call. Well, the many, at any rate, hold thus.
Soc. Then it is not by law alone that doing injustice is more shameful than 489b suffering injustice, and having an equal share just, but by nature too; so it looks as if you were not speaking the truth in what went before, nor accusing me rightly when you said that law and nature are contrary, and that I too, indeed, having come to know it, do mischief in the arguments, if someone speaks according to nature, leading to law, and if someone speaks according to law, to nature.1
Call. This man here will not stop talking nonsense. Say to me, Socrates, are you not ashamed, at your age, hunting words, and, 489c if someone errs in an expression, making a godsend of it? For do you think I mean that being stronger is anything other than being better? Have I not long been saying to you that I claim the better and the stronger are the same? Or do you think I mean, if a rabble of slaves and human beings of every sort is gathered together, worth nothing except perhaps for exerting might with the body, and these claim things, that these very things are lawful?
Soc. Very well, most wise Callicles: do you mean it thus?
Call. Very much so.
Soc. 489d But I, for my part, you daimonic man, have myself long been guessing that you mean some such thing by the stronger, and I question you because I am eager to know clearly what you mean. For surely you, at any rate, do not believe the two
Socrates
Reading Gorgias · Gorgias · 488e–489d
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Socrates questions Gorgias, Polus and Callicles about rhetoric, power, pleasure and justice, and asks what it means to live well. This complete edition presents 447a–527e across 117 Greek–English page pairs, with an introduction, Key Words of the Dialogue, an outline, later readings of Callicles and the judgment myth, a glossary, critical apparatus, and 208 translator’s notes.
Historical Text and Translation
The Greek follows John Burnet’s Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford, 1903), in the corrected second impression of January 1909, printed by Horace Hart. The supplied Editorial Note reports checking the Perseus Digital Library transcription against photographs of the printed pages. Burnet’s readings, speaker labels, verse quotations, editorial signs and critical apparatus are retained. The unchanged PDF preserves the complete printed layout.
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