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Gorgias

Ancient Greek with an independent English translation.

GorgiasGorgias · 475d–476c

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Ancient Greek Page · Branch 55 of 154

Gorgias · 475d–476c

Ancient Greek

p. 86

ὄκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσῃ· ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, καὶ ἢ 475e φάθι ἢ μὴ ἃ ἐρωτῶ.—ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, ὦ Σώκρατες.—ΣΩ. Ἄλλος δέ τις ἀνθρώπων;—ΠΩΛ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.—ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὔτ’ ἂν ἐγὼ οὔτ’ ἂν σὺ οὔτ’ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων δέξαιτ’ ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· κάκιον γὰρ τυγχάνει ὄν.—ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον παραβαλλόμενος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ ἐξαρκεῖς εἷς ὢν 476a μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυρῶν, καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ μόνον ἐπιψηφίζων τοὺς ἄλλους ἐῶ χαίρειν. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτως ἐχέτω· μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ περὶ οὗ τὸ δεύτερον ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν σκεψώμεθα, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην ἆρα μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν, ὡς σὺ ᾤου, ἢ μεῖζον τὸ μὴ διδόναι, ὡς αὖ ἐγὼ ᾤμην.

Σκοπώμεθα δὲ τῇδε· τὸ διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ἀδικοῦντα ἆρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς;—ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.— 476b ΣΩ. Ἔχεις οὖν λέγειν ὡς οὐχὶ τά γε δίκαια πάντα καλά ἐστιν, καθ’ ὅσον δίκαια; καὶ διασκεψάμενος εἰπέ.—ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.—ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε· ἆρα εἴ τίς τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ποιοῦντος;—ΠΩΛ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.—ΣΩ. Ἆρα τοῦτο πάσχον ὃ τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιοῦτον οἷον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι;— ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.—ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἢ ταχὺ ὁ 476c τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτεσθαι;—ΠΩΛ. Ναί.— ΣΩ. Τοιοῦτον ἄρα πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστὶν οἷον ἂν τὸ

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Gorgias

p. 87

hesitate to answer, Polus; for you will not be harmed at all. But offering yourself nobly to the argument, as to a doctor, answer, and either 475e say so or not to what I ask.—Pol. But I would not accept it, Socrates.—Soc. And would anyone else among human beings?—Pol. I think not, according to this argument at any rate.—Soc. Then I was speaking the truth, that neither I nor you nor anyone else among human beings would accept doing injustice rather than suffering injustice; for it is in fact worse.—Pol. So it appears.

Soc. You see, then, Polus, the refutation, when set beside the refutation, how it resembles it not at all: with you all the others agree except me, but for me you are enough, being one, 476a alone, both agreeing and bearing witness; and I, putting the question to the vote of you alone, let the others pass, bidding farewell.1 And let this be so for us. But after this let us look into what we disputed about second: whether paying the penalty when doing injustice is the greatest of bad things, as you thought, or not paying it greater, as I, again, thought.

And let us look into it this way: paying the penalty and being punished justly when doing injustice, do you call them the same?—Pol. I do.—Soc. 476b Have you the means, then, to say that just things, at any rate, are not all beautiful, so far as they are just? Say, when you have looked thoroughly into it.—Pol. Well, I think they are, Socrates.—Soc. Look into this too, then: if anyone does anything, is it a necessity that there also be something that suffers at the hands of this doer?2—Pol. I think so.—Soc. Does it suffer that which the doer does, and of such a kind as the doer does it? I mean this sort of thing: if anyone strikes, is it a necessity that something be struck?—Pol. It is a necessity.—Soc. And if the 476c striker strikes violently or quickly, is what is struck also struck thus?—Pol. Yes.—Soc. Such, then, is the suffering in what is struck as the

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About This Reading Edition

Socrates questions Gorgias, Polus and Callicles about rhetoric, power, pleasure and justice, and asks what it means to live well. This complete edition presents 447a–527e across 117 Greek–English page pairs, with an introduction, Key Words of the Dialogue, an outline, later readings of Callicles and the judgment myth, a glossary, critical apparatus, and 208 translator’s notes.

Historical Text and Translation

The Greek follows John Burnet’s Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford, 1903), in the corrected second impression of January 1909, printed by Horace Hart. The supplied Editorial Note reports checking the Perseus Digital Library transcription against photographs of the printed pages. Burnet’s readings, speaker labels, verse quotations, editorial signs and critical apparatus are retained. The unchanged PDF preserves the complete printed layout.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared the independent English translation and editorial matter in 2026. Each English dialogue page translates the Greek page opposite it, with matching Stephanus references and linked translator’s notes. The introductory and concluding sections remain complete, including both later-readings essays, the Editorial Note, glossary, and all twelve records in the Note on this Edition. The supplied English-only EPUB is available alongside the complete Greek–English downloads.

Rights

The ancient Greek work and Burnet’s historical printed edition are in the public domain. The Perseus digital Greek transcription and its modifications are attributed to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, under CC BY-SA 4.0. The new English translation and editorial matter are © 2026 Diotimos Editions and appear with the site owner’s permission. All five supplied downloads are preserved unchanged.