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Gorgias
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Introduction · The question and the answers
Gorgias: Introduction
p. 5The question and the answers
The dialogue is three conversations, with Gorgias (447a–461b), with Polus (461b–481b) and with Callicles (481b–527e), and each begins where the last breaks down.
Gorgias. Asked what his craft is, Gorgias answers “In rhetoric” (449a), and asked what rhetoric is about, “About speeches” (449e). Socrates shows that medicine and gymnastics too are about speeches (450a–b); Gorgias answers that rhetoric is about “The greatest of human affairs” (451d), and names the greatest good: “That which truly is the greatest good, Socrates, and the cause at the same time of freedom for human beings themselves, and at the same time of ruling others, for each in his own city”, which is “To be able, I say, to persuade by speeches judges in a law court, and councillors in a council-chamber, and assemblymen in an assembly” (452d–e). Socrates sums this up, “rhetoric is a craftsman of persuasion” (453a), and asks of what persuasion, and about what. Gorgias answers, “the one in the law courts and in the other crowds, … and about those things that are just and unjust” (454b). Socrates then separates “two forms of persuasion, the one providing conviction without knowing, the other knowledge” (454e), and Gorgias agrees that rhetoric “is a craftsman of persuasion that convinces, not of persuasion that teaches, about the just and the unjust” (455a). Gorgias praises its power: he has persuaded his brother’s patients where the doctor could not, and in a contest for the post of public doctor “the doctor would appear nowhere” (456b–c). If a pupil misuses it, the fault is the pupil’s, as a boxer’s is his own and not his trainer’s (456c–457c). Socrates gets him to grant that his pupils must know the just things, and that “if he in fact does not know, he will learn these things too from me” (460a); and since “the one who has learned the just things is just too” (460b), “the rhetorician will never want to do injustice” (460c). That contradicts what Gorgias said of the pupil who misuses his craft, and Socrates says that the things said “did not sing together” (461a).
Polus. Polus breaks in: Gorgias conceded only from shame (461b–c). Asked in turn what rhetoric is, Socrates calls it “A certain routine” (462c), “Of the production of a certain gratification and pleasure” (462c), a part of a “pursuit” that is “not masterly” and whose sum is “flattery” (463a–b). There are two crafts that tend the body, gymnastics and medicine, and two that tend the soul, legislation and justice, the parts of politics; flattery has divided itself into four and “slipped in under each of the parts” (464b–d), so that “what cosmetics is to gymnastics, sophistry is to legislation, and … what cookery is to medicine, rhetoric is to justice” (465c). It is “not a craft but a routine, because it has no account by which it applies the things it applies” (465a). Polus answers that the orators have the greatest power in the cities, like tyrants (466b–c). Socrates replies that they “have the smallest power”, since “they do nothing of what they want, so to speak; they do, however, whatever they think best” (466d–e): we want the good for whose sake we act, not the act itself, and one who kills or banishes “thinking it better for himself, while it is in fact worse”, does what he thinks fit but not what he wants (467c–468d). Polus asks whether Socrates would not envy a man allowed to kill whom he thinks fit; Socrates answers that doing injustice is “the greatest of bad things”, and that “if it were necessary either to do injustice or to suffer injustice, I would choose to suffer injustice rather than do injustice” (469b–c). Polus offers Archelaus, who murdered his way to the throne of Macedonia, as a man happy in his crimes (470d–471d), and appeals to what every Athenian would choose (471c–d, 473e); Socrates wants one witness only, the man he is talking to (471e–472c, 474a). He then proves two things. First, doing injustice is worse than suffering it: Polus grants that it is more shameful (474c); the beautiful is beautiful by pleasure or benefit or both (474d–475a); doing injustice is not more painful; it is therefore more shameful by exceeding in bad, and so worse (475a–e). Second, the one who does injustice is more wretched if he does not pay the penalty: such as the doer does, such is what the sufferer suffers (476b–d); the one who pays the penalty justly suffers just things, beautiful things, good things, and is “rid of vice of soul” (477a); penalty “becomes a medicine for baseness” (478d); and “not paying the penalty when doing injustice is naturally the greatest and first of all bad things” (479d). Rhetoric, then, is useful for accusing oneself and one’s own people, so that they may pay the penalty (480b–d), and, if one is to harm an enemy, for keeping him from paying it (480e–481b).
Callicles. Callicles asks whether Socrates is in earnest, “or is he playing?” (481b), for if he is, “our life, the life of human beings, would be overturned” (481c). His long speech (482c–486d) is the subject of a section of its own below. He accuses Polus of the shame Polus had imputed to Gorgias (482c–e), sets nature against law, and tells Socrates to leave philosophy, a charming thing at the right time of life, for the affairs of men (484c–486d). Socrates asks what he means by “the stronger” (488b–491d), draws from him the life of the largest desires and their filling (491e–492c), and spends the long middle of the dialogue on it.
Socrates
Reading Gorgias · Introduction · The question and the answers
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Socrates questions Gorgias, Polus and Callicles about rhetoric, power, pleasure and justice, and asks what it means to live well. This complete edition presents 447a–527e across 117 Greek–English page pairs, with an introduction, Key Words of the Dialogue, an outline, later readings of Callicles and the judgment myth, a glossary, critical apparatus, and 208 translator’s notes.
Historical Text and Translation
The Greek follows John Burnet’s Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford, 1903), in the corrected second impression of January 1909, printed by Horace Hart. The supplied Editorial Note reports checking the Perseus Digital Library transcription against photographs of the printed pages. Burnet’s readings, speaker labels, verse quotations, editorial signs and critical apparatus are retained. The unchanged PDF preserves the complete printed layout.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared the independent English translation and editorial matter in 2026. Each English dialogue page translates the Greek page opposite it, with matching Stephanus references and linked translator’s notes. The introductory and concluding sections remain complete, including both later-readings essays, the Editorial Note, glossary, and all twelve records in the Note on this Edition. The supplied English-only EPUB is available alongside the complete Greek–English downloads.
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The ancient Greek work and Burnet’s historical printed edition are in the public domain. The Perseus digital Greek transcription and its modifications are attributed to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, under CC BY-SA 4.0. The new English translation and editorial matter are © 2026 Diotimos Editions and appear with the site owner’s permission. All five supplied downloads are preserved unchanged.
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