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Gorgias

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GorgiasKey Words of the Dialogue

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English Introduction · Branch 12 of 154

Key Words of the Dialogue

Gorgias: Key Words of the Dialogue

p. 18

Key Words of the Dialogue

Each entry says what the word meant in Athens, what the dialogue does with it, and how it is rendered. The Glossary at the back lists the renderings with the places where they occur.

Do injustice, suffer injustice; just, justice (adikein, adikeisthai; dikaios; dikaiosynē; adikia)

Adikein is the verb of adikos, “unjust”: to act against dikē, the right or due. Its passive, adikeisthai, is to have it done to one. In ordinary Greek they are “to wrong” and “to be wronged”, but the dialogue’s thesis is that “doing injustice is worse than suffering injustice” (473a), and in Greek the thesis is made of the words of justice. The English keeps the family visible in every place: adikein “do injustice”, adikeisthai “suffer injustice”, adikia “injustice”, adikēma “act of injustice”, adikos “unjust”, dikaios “just”, dikaiosynē “justice”, dikaiōs “justly”, and never “do wrong” or “be wronged”. The reader can therefore follow the word from Gorgias’ admission that the rhetorician must know “the just things and the unjust” (460a), through Polus’ “many human beings who do injustice are happy” (470d) and Callicles’ “it is just for the superior to have more than the inferior” (483d), to the soul that arrives in Hades “laden with many acts of injustice” (522e) and the last argument, “that one must beware of doing injustice more than of suffering injustice” (527b). The cost is some stiffness, as in “to this man no one will do injustice and rejoice” (510d), where the Greek idiom means “with impunity”. See Penalty and Nature and law.

Beautiful, shameful (kalos; aischros)

Kalos meant beautiful to look at, and also fine, noble, honourable; aischros, its contrary, ugly and shameful. Greek used the same pair for a body and for a deed, and the argument with Polus depends on it. Polus grants that doing injustice is “more shameful” but denies that it is worse (474c); Socrates asks what makes bodies, colours, shapes, voices, laws, pursuits and studies “beautiful”, and Polus agrees that it is pleasure or benefit or both (474d–475a); so the more shameful must exceed in pain or in bad (475a–c). In English “fine” and “noble” would hide the step from a beautiful body to a beautiful law, so kalos is “beautiful” in every use, and the comparative “more beautiful”; the adverb kalōs is “well”, save at 507c, where it stands beside eu: “well and beautifully”. The series’ ruling is kept, as in the Symposium and the Phaedrus, with a note at the first use (447a) and at the first use of conduct (459d). So Callicles speaks of “the beautiful and the just” (484a) and sneers at “the beautiful thing of justice and of temperance” (492c), and Socrates’ good man “does well and beautifully whatever he does” (507c). Kalos kai agathos, the Athenian phrase for a gentleman, is “beautiful and good” (470e, 515a).

Rhetoric, orator, rhetorician (rhētorikē; rhētōr; rhētorikos)

Rhētōr was the ordinary word for a public speaker, the man who spoke in the assembly and so took part in politics; rhētorikē, “the craft of the speaker”, is a word not found before Plato, and some scholars think he coined it (note at 449a). The English renders rhētorikē “rhetoric”, rhētōr “orator”, and the adjective used of a person, rhētorikos, “rhetorician”, as in “you are able to make a rhetorician” (458e). Gorgias calls himself an orator (449a) and his craft the one that persuades “judges in a law court, and councillors in a council-chamber, and assemblymen in an assembly” (452e). Socrates’ first account of it is that it is “a craftsman of persuasion that convinces, not of persuasion that teaches” (455a); his second, that it is “an image of a part of politics”, “the counterpart of cookery in the soul” (463d, 465d); his third, that it could be beautiful if it fought it out for the best (503a), but that no orator, old or new, has done so (503b–c, 517a). He names the two rhetorics again, “the true rhetoric” and “the flattering one” (517a), and the last argument says “one must make use of rhetoric thus, always for what is just” (527c). See Flattery and Persuade.

Craft, routine, knack (technē; empeiria; tribē)

Technē was any skilled practice that could be taught by rule: medicine, carpentry, piloting, the arts of speech. Empeiria, “experience”, was the practice that knows only what usually happens; tribē, “practice”, “knack”, the facility that comes from rubbing away at a thing. Polus’ first set speech turns on a jingle in which “routine makes our life journey by craft” (448c), and Socrates answers him in his own words: rhetoric is “a certain routine” (462c), as cookery is “not a craft but routine and knack” (463b), and flattery is no craft “because it has no account by which it applies the things it applies, of what sort they are in their nature, so that it does not have the means to say the cause of each” (465a). So medicine “has looked into both the nature of what it tends and the cause of what it does”, while cookery “by knack and routine” keeps “only a memory of what usually happens” (501a–b). The English renders technē “craft”, empeiria “routine” (as in the Phaedrus, 270b), apeiria “lack of routine”, empeiros “versed”, and tribē “knack”, so that Polus’ boast and Socrates’ verdict show as one word. Technikos is “masterly” of a pursuit (463a, 501b) and “master of the craft” of a person (500a, 504d).

Flattery; gratification, gratify (kolakeia; charis, charizesthai)

The kolax, “flatterer”, was a stock figure of comedy, the hanger-on who pleased a rich man for his dinner (note at 463b). Socrates makes kolakeia, “flattery”, the name of the whole family of pursuits that aim “at the pleasant without the best” (465a): cookery, cosmetics, sophistry and rhetoric (463b), and later the music of the pipe and lyre, the dithyramb and tragedy (501d–502d). Their aim is charis, which meant both the pleasure one gives and the gratitude one gets for it; Socrates calls rhetoric a “routine”, “Of the production of a certain gratification and pleasure” (462c), and Polus picks up the verb at once: “Then do you not think rhetoric a beautiful thing, to be able to gratify human beings?” (462c). The English renders charis “gratification” and charizesthai “gratify”, against the series’ “favour” and “grace”, so that the play between the noun and the verb shows (note at 462c). Callicles answers “and I may gratify Gorgias here” (501c) and “so that I may gratify you” (516b); Socrates refuses to speak “for gratification” (521d). Where charis is the return owed for a benefit, as in the sophist’s complaint, it is “gratitude” (470c, 519c, 520c).

Persuade, persuasion; conviction (peithein, peithō; pisteuein, pistis)

Peithein is “persuade”, and peithesthai, its middle, “be persuaded”, which is also “obey”. Gorgias’ craft is “a craftsman of persuasion” (453a), and Socrates asks what kind. He separates “having learned” from “having been convinced” (454c–d): there is a conviction that is false and one that is true, but no knowledge that is false (454d), so there are “two forms of persuasion, the one providing conviction without knowing, the other knowledge” (454e). Here pistis is “conviction”, and pisteuein “be convinced”, the state it names; set against knowledge, they are kept apart from hēgeisthai, “believe”. Where no contrast with knowledge is drawn, pisteuein is “trust”: of the women relied on (512e), of an argument (527e), and in Callicles’ charge that Socrates trusts he will suffer nothing (521c); and in the myth Socrates says of the account “which I have heard and am convinced are true” (524a). Callicles’ answer to the argument is that he has “suffered the suffering of the many: I am not altogether persuaded by you” (513c), and Socrates’ last exhortation is “So be persuaded by me and attend me thither” (527c).

Power, have great power; want, think fit (dynasthai, dynamis; boulesthai; ha dokei autois)

Dynasthai is “to be able”, “to have power”, and mega dynasthai, “to have great power”, was the phrase for influence in a city. Gorgias undertakes “to unveil for you clearly the whole power of rhetoric” (455d), and Polus says that orators, like tyrants, “have the greatest power in the cities” (466b). Socrates’ answer turns on two verbs that Polus uses as one: they “put to death whomever they want”, Polus says, “and throw out of the cities whomever they think fit” (466c). Boulesthai, “want”, is aimed at the good for whose sake we act; ha dokei autois, “what they think fit” or “think best”, is the act itself (467c–468c). So one who acts “thinking it better for himself, while it is in fact worse”, does what he thinks fit and not what he wants, and “it is possible for a person doing in a city what he thinks fit not to have great power” (468d–e). The English renders dynasthai “have power”, dynamis “power”, boulesthai “want” and ha dokei autois “what they think fit” throughout, keeping “able” for dynatos and hoios te. The distinction returns in the last part, where Socrates asks whether one avoids suffering injustice by “Power or wanting?” (509d–e).

Penalty, pay the penalty; punish; retribution (dikē, dikēn didonai; kolazein; timōria)

Dikē is the due that is exacted for a wrong, and dikēn didonai, “to give the due”, is to pay the penalty; the word is the root of dikaios, “just”, and adikein, “do injustice”. Kolazein is to check or chasten, and so to punish; timōria is the retribution exacted on behalf of the one wronged. Socrates’ second thesis against Polus is that the one who does injustice is more wretched “if he does not pay the penalty” (472e), and his proof makes paying the penalty a benefit: “the one who pays the penalty suffers good things”, is “rid of vice of soul” (477a), and penalty “becomes a medicine for baseness” (478d). The English renders dikē “penalty” and dikēn didonai “pay the penalty” throughout, kolazein “punish”, timōria “retribution” and timōreisthai, passive, “suffer retribution” (525b–e). Where dikē is a case at law, in the myth, it is “case” (523b–c, 526e), and in Euripides’ “the counsels of justice” (486a) it is the poet’s right. The licentious soul, akolastos, is the “unpunished” one, a play the English cannot carry (note at 505b). See Do injustice.

Refute, refutation (elenchein, elenchos)

Elenchein, in Homer “to put to shame”, was in Attic to cross-examine and test, and in argument to refute; elenchos is the refutation. The Gorgias is a dialogue about refutation as much as about rhetoric. Socrates is one of those “who would gladly be refuted if I say anything not true, and would gladly refute if anyone says anything not true” (458a); he sets the refutation of the law courts, by “many reputable witnesses”, against his own, which needs one witness only, the man he is talking with (471e–472c, 474a); and when Polus laughs, he asks whether laughing is “another form of refutation” (473e). The English renders elenchein “refute” and elenchos “refutation” in every place. At the end the refutation becomes a test of lives: “while the others are refuted, this argument alone stands unmoved” (527b). See Persuade.

Nature and law (physis; nomos)

Physis is what a thing is by birth and growth; nomos is what is customary, and so both custom and written law. The sophists of the fifth century often set them against each other (note at 483a). Callicles builds his speech on the antithesis: “for the most part these are contrary to each other, nature and law” (482e). By law doing injustice is more shameful, by nature suffering it; by law all should have an equal share, by nature “it is just for the superior to have more than the inferior” (483c–d); and Xerxes acted “according to law, at any rate, the law of nature” (483e), a phrase that turns law against itself. Since Greek has one word for custom and statute, the English keeps “law” for nomos in every place, and “lawful things” for nomima (488d, 488e); physis is “nature”, kata physin “according to nature”, physei “by nature”. Socrates’ reply makes law the order of the soul: “the lawful and law, whence they also become lawful and orderly; and these are justice and temperance” (504d). See Stronger.

Stronger, better, superior, mightier; overreach (kreittōn, beltiōn, ameinōn, ischyroteros; pleonektein)

Greek had several comparatives that meant “better”, and kreittōn, the comparative of strength, also meant “superior” and “better” in common speech. Callicles uses kreittōn, ameinōn and beltiōn as one (483d–e; restated by Socrates at 488b and granted at 488d), and Socrates asks whether “the stronger and the better and the mightier” are the same (488d), adding ischyroteros, the word of bodily strength. The English keeps the words apart in every place: kreittōn “stronger”, hēttōn “weaker”, beltiōn “better”, ameinōn “superior” (of persons), cheirōn “inferior”, ischyros “mighty”, ischyroteros “mightier”, asthenēs “feeble”. So the reader can see Callicles’ “better” turn from “mightier” to “more intelligent” to “courageous” (491c). The verb of his view is pleonektein, from pleon echein, “to have more”, rendered “overreach” (483c), with pleonexia “overreaching”; Socrates answers it with “geometrical equality” (508a). See Nature and law.

Pleasure, pleasant; good (hēdonē, hēdys; agathos)

Hēdonē is pleasure, hēdys pleasant, chairein “rejoice”; agathos is good, and to agathon, “the good”, the end of action. The beautiful, as Polus grants, is pleasure or benefit (474d–475a), and Callicles’ life is the life of the largest desires filled (491e–492a). Callicles at first says that the pleasant and the good are the same (495a); Socrates shows that one can be in pain and rejoice at once, but not fare well and badly at once (495e–497a), and that the cowardly and foolish rejoice as much as the courageous and intelligent (497e–499b). Callicles then grants that “some pleasures are better and others inferior” (499b), and the good is agreed to be “the end of all actions” (499e). The English renders hēdonē “pleasure”, hēdys “pleasant”, hēdesthai “be pleased”, chairein “rejoice”, and agathos “good” throughout; ōphelimos is “beneficial”, blaberos “harmful”, sympheron “to one’s advantage”. Eu prattein is “fare well” in the argument about pleasure (495e–497a) and “do well” at 507c (note there).

Temperance, licentiousness; order, arrangement (sōphrosynē, akolasia; kosmos, taxis)

Sōphrosynē was soundness of mind, self-control and modesty; the common account, as Socrates gives it, is “being temperate and master of himself, ruler of the pleasures and desires within himself” (491d–e). Callicles calls the temperate “simpletons” (491e), and Socrates answers with the leaky jars of the licentious man (493a–494a). Akolasia, “licentiousness”, is the state of the unpunished, unchastened soul. In the series these are “temperance” and “licentiousness”, sōphrōn “temperate”, akolastos “licentious”. Socrates’ positive account is drawn from the crafts: every craftsman puts his work into “a certain arrangement” (taxis, 503e), so that the whole is “a thing arranged and ordered” (kosmos, 504a). Kosmos meant order, ornament, and, as at 508a, the universe; the English renders it “order” throughout this passage, with “orderly”, “orderliness”, “unordered” and “disorder” for its family, and taxis “arrangement” (note at 504a), so that the chain runs from the house and the ship to the soul, and to heaven and earth, of which the wise, Socrates says, “call this whole order” (507e–508a). In the myth, of the dead man’s finery, kosmos is “adornment” (523e).

Tend, take care of; politics (therapeuein, epimeleisthai; politikē)

Therapeuein is to serve, attend to, care for, and so to tend a body or a soul as a doctor or trainer does; epimeleisthai is to take care of, and an epimelētēs is a caretaker. Socrates’ map of the crafts is a map of tendings: “the tending of the body being one”, it has two parts, gymnastics and medicine, and the soul has politics, with legislation and justice (464b–c). In the last part the question is “To which tending of the city, then, are you summoning me?” (521a): the one that fights it out for the best, “as a doctor”, or the one that serves. Pericles is judged as a caretaker “of asses and horses and oxen” would be (516a). Politikē is “politics”, the craft that has the city in its charge (note at 463d), politikos “politician”, and prattein ta tēs poleōs pragmata “do the affairs of the city” (515a). The English renders therapeuein “tend”, therapeia “tending”, epimeleisthai “take care of”, and kēdesthai “care for”, and keeps “serve” for hypēretein and “act as servant” for diakonein (517b–521a).

Tale and account (mythos; logos)

Logos is speech, word, account and argument; mythos is a tale, a story told. Socrates’ myth at the end is introduced with the two words set against each other: “Listen, then, as they say, to a very beautiful account, which you will believe a tale, I think, but I an account” (523a), and he closes by allowing that Callicles may think it “said as a tale, like an old woman’s” (527a). Earlier he has called the leaky jar “legends” told by “some refined man” (493a, 493d), and said that one must not leave even tales without a head (505c–d). The English renders mythos “tale” and logos “speech” where it is a speech made, “account” where it is a story or a statement of how things are (523a, 524b, 526d), and “argument” where it is the argument of the conversation (527b–e): “this argument alone stands unmoved” (527b), “let us, then, use as a leader the argument that has now shown itself” (527e). See Refute.

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About This Reading Edition

Socrates questions Gorgias, Polus and Callicles about rhetoric, power, pleasure and justice, and asks what it means to live well. This complete edition presents 447a–527e across 117 Greek–English page pairs, with an introduction, Key Words of the Dialogue, an outline, later readings of Callicles and the judgment myth, a glossary, critical apparatus, and 208 translator’s notes.

Historical Text and Translation

The Greek follows John Burnet’s Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford, 1903), in the corrected second impression of January 1909, printed by Horace Hart. The supplied Editorial Note reports checking the Perseus Digital Library transcription against photographs of the printed pages. Burnet’s readings, speaker labels, verse quotations, editorial signs and critical apparatus are retained. The unchanged PDF preserves the complete printed layout.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared the independent English translation and editorial matter in 2026. Each English dialogue page translates the Greek page opposite it, with matching Stephanus references and linked translator’s notes. The introductory and concluding sections remain complete, including both later-readings essays, the Editorial Note, glossary, and all twelve records in the Note on this Edition. The supplied English-only EPUB is available alongside the complete Greek–English downloads.

Rights

The ancient Greek work and Burnet’s historical printed edition are in the public domain. The Perseus digital Greek transcription and its modifications are attributed to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, under CC BY-SA 4.0. The new English translation and editorial matter are © 2026 Diotimos Editions and appear with the site owner’s permission. All five supplied downloads are preserved unchanged.