Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation
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Latin Page · Branch 97 of 191
Book VI · Chapter 8 · §§ 5–7
Latin
p. 188Continet invicem per suam simplicem consonantiam dissonas corporis qualitates. Quid hoc est, corpusne? Si corpus est, eget similiter alio connectente. Quid aliud illud? Num corpus? Si corpus, eget et alio. Quocirca fatendum est nullam esse posse in corporibus unitatem, nullam constantiam, nullamve concordiam, nisi illis insit vis aliqua incorporea. Ergo si et anima corpus dicatur esse, eget ipsa etiam aliqua copula. Vim autem huiusmodi copulantem nos animam vel virtutem animae potius quam illud copulatum asseverabimus, cum videamus esse animae proprium humores contrarios membraque diversa in unam animalis compagem devincire, qua abeunte diffluunt omnia. Igitur anima neque est corpus, sed copula corporis intima vel substantia copulatrix. Neque forma divisa per corpus.
Talis enim forma, ut Platonici putant, simplicitatis et constantiae naturam amittit in corpore. Unde ipsa aeque ut corpus eget alio continente, quod unum in se ipso consistat, ad divisionem corporis minime dissipatum.
Si quis autem quaerat unde saxa et ligna sortiantur suarum partium unionem, respondebunt Platonici illa quamdiu affiguntur terrae, ab anima sortiri et unionem et augmentum. Postquam vero avulsa sunt, non augmentum amplius, sed unionem.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VI
p. 189By its own simple concord, it holds the discordant qualities of body together with one another. What is this? A body? If it is a body, it likewise needs another thing to connect it. What is that other thing? A body? If it is a body, it too needs another. We must therefore admit that no unity, no constancy, and no concord can exist in bodies unless some incorporeal power is present in them. Hence, if soul too is said to be a body, it itself also needs some bond. We, however, shall affirm that the power which binds in this way is the soul, or the soul's power, rather than the thing bound. For we see that it is proper to the soul to bind contrary humors and diverse members into the single structure of an animal; when the soul departs, all these flow apart. The soul, therefore, is not a body, but the body's inward bond or a substance that binds. Nor is it a form divided throughout body.
For such a form, as the Platonists hold, loses in the body the nature of simplicity and constancy. It too, like the body, therefore needs something else to contain it—something that remains one in itself and is not in the least scattered when the body is divided.
If anyone asks whence stones and wood obtain the union of their parts, the Platonists will reply that as long as they are fastened to the earth, they obtain both union and growth from the soul; but once torn away, they obtain no further growth, only union.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II · Book VI · VI.8.5–VI.8.7
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.
- PDF editionComplete Volume II — PDF
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- public-domain-base-witnessFlorence 1482 editio princeps — Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
- collating-witness-cc-by-4.0Paris 1559 printing — Universidad Complutense de Madrid
- late-control-and-ocr-aidParis 1641 Opera printing — Internet Archive