Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation
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Latin Page · Branch 92 of 191
Book VI · Chapter 6 · §§ 1–3
Latin
p. 178Tertia ratio: neque crassum corpus est neque subtile.
Numquid crassum corpus est anima? Puta vel aqua vel terra atque similia? An potius subtile rarumque, ut ignis et aer? Primum dici non potest, quoniam animae officium est penetrare facillime corpora, implere, movere. Huic operationi crassa corpora sunt ineptissima.
Secundum vero illud esse fortasse videbitur probabilius, ut rarum sit corpus anima, ut ignis aut aer. Verum si ignis dicatur esse, utrum ignis ille qua ratione ignis anima est, aut quadam alia ratione? Si qua ratione ignis est, esse dicatur anima, profecto quilibet ignis anima erit et omnia ignita viventia.
Igitur alia ratione. Ita de aere percontandum, concludendumque animam semper esse ultra naturam corporis requirendam. Neque adducat quispiam quintum aliquod tenuissimumque corpusculum praeter quattuor elementa, quod crassioribus infusum corporibus illorum sit anima. Eadem namque redibit quaestio: utrum corpusculum illud per materiam suam sit anima, an per vim aliquam materiae superadditam. Si primum detur, omnia corpora erunt animae, quia omnibus subest materia. Si secundum, assecuti erimus iam quod cupimus, ut anima sit ad aliquam vim quodammodo incorpoream referenda.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VI
p. 179Third argument: the soul is neither a gross body nor a subtle one.
Is the soul a dense body—for example, water, earth, or something similar? Or is it rather a subtle and rarefied body, like fire or air? The first cannot be maintained, because the soul's office is to penetrate bodies with the greatest ease, fill them, and move them. Dense bodies are utterly unfit for this operation.
The second possibility may perhaps appear more plausible: that soul is a rarefied body, such as fire or air. But if it is said to be fire, is that fire soul by the same reason that it is fire, or by some other reason? If it is said to be soul precisely insofar as it is fire, then every fire will certainly be a soul, and everything fiery will be alive.
It must therefore be soul by some other reason. The same question must be asked about air, and we must conclude that the soul is always to be sought beyond the nature of body. Nor let anyone introduce a fifth and exceedingly subtle little body beyond the four elements, infused into denser bodies to serve as their soul. For the same question will return: is that little body soul through its own matter, or through some power superadded to the matter? If the first is granted, all bodies will be souls, since matter underlies them all. If the second, we shall already have gained what we desire: the soul must be referred to some power that is in some manner incorporeal.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II · Book VI · VI.6.1–VI.6.3
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.
- PDF editionComplete Volume II — PDF
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- public-domain-base-witnessFlorence 1482 editio princeps — Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
- collating-witness-cc-by-4.0Paris 1559 printing — Universidad Complutense de Madrid
- late-control-and-ocr-aidParis 1641 Opera printing — Internet Archive