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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook VI · Chapter 3 · §§ 1–2

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Latin Page · Branch 87 of 191

Book VI · Chapter 3 · §§ 1–2

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Latin

p. 168

Anima non est corpus aut forma divisa in corpore, ut ostenditur per virtutem animae naturalem.

Propositae quaestionis ordo requirit, ut in prima sequentis disputationis parte ostendamus per virtutem animae naturalem hominis animam potissimum quidem non esse corpus, partim etiam non esse formam divisam in corpore. In secunda parte per virtutem sentiendi monstremus idem, scilicet animam esse formam indivisibilem, ac insuper illud adiiciamus, eam videlicet non alicui corporis membro affigi, sed totam per singula fundi. In tertia vero parte per virtutem intelligendi eadem confirmemus, scilicet eam esse formam impartibilem ubique totam, et illud adiiciamus, quod nullam trahat originem a materia.

Sic enim anima hominis ad tertiam illam essentiam, quae est perpetua, pertinebit et immortalis merito iudicabitur. Iam vero primam disputationis partem divino numine invocato in hunc modum aggrediamur.

168

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VI

p. 169

The soul is neither a body nor a form divided within a body, as its natural power shows.

The order of the question proposed requires us, in the first part of the following disputation, to show from the soul's natural power that the human soul is principally not a body and, in part, that it is not a form divided within a body. In the second part, from the power of sensation, we shall demonstrate the same point—namely, that the soul is an indivisible form—and add that it is not fastened to any one member of the body but is poured forth whole throughout every member. In the third part, from the power of understanding, we shall confirm these same conclusions: that it is an impartible form, whole everywhere, and, in addition, that it derives no origin from matter.

For in this way the human soul will belong to that third essence which is everlasting, and will rightly be judged immortal. Now then, invoking the divine power, let us begin the first part of the disputation in the following manner.

169

About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.