DiotimosReading Desk

Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition

Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

Explore the Lexicon
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook VI · Chapter 1 · §§ 1–3

Swipe or use the arrow keys.

English Page · Branch 67 of 191

Book VI · Chapter 1 · §§ 1–3

Book Mode

Latin

p. 128

Reductio opinionum de anima in quinque capita.

Haec olim in agro Regnano apud Ioannem Cavalcantem, unicum amicum nostrum, Kalendis Martiis sub lauro disputaveram. Quibus disserendis interfuerunt praecipui familiares nostri tres: Christophorus Landinus, Bernardus Nuthius, Georgius Antonius Vespuccius, viri probitate et doctrina clarissimi. His autem Ioannes summa cum attentione auditis, ‘Marsili Ficini,’ inquit, ‘dici non posset quantum superiori disputatione fuerim delectatus. Sed hoc insuper cupio: ut, postquam de communi animarum rationalium immortalitate disseruisti, deinceps, si placet, diligentius de animae nostrae immortalitate propriis rationibus disseras. Assentior equidem quinque esse rerum gradus, quemadmodum superiori disputatione disposuisti, atque horum medium obtinere tertiam illam essentiam, quae a materia soluta sit ac perpetua. Praeterea caelestes animas in illius essentiae gradu collocari non dubito. Opinor etiam probabile esse ut ibidem noster animus collocetur. Arbitror tamen non prius id posse penitus affirmari quam omnes opiniones philosophorum de hominis anima ad quinque capita reducantur et, quattuor confutatis, ultima teneatur.’

Aut enim anima corpusculum aliquod est tenuissimum, corpori huic crassiori suffusum. Sive igneum id sit, ut Democritus, Leucippus et Hipparchus existimant; sive aereum, ut Anaximenes, Diogenes Apolloniates et Critias; sive aqueum, ut Hippias; sive terreum, ut Hesiodus et Pronopides; sive ex igne constet et aere, ut Boethus et Epicurus; sive ex aqua et terra, ut Xenophantes.

Aut melius aliquid est anima, id est, non moles ipsa corpusculi proprie, sed qualitas illius aliqua per partes corpusculi sparsa, puta calor vel complexio calida. Quod voluisse videntur Zeno Cittieus, Cleantes, Antipater, Posidonius.

128

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VI

p. 129

The views concerning the soul are reduced to five principal positions.

Once, on the Kalends of March, I debated these matters beneath a laurel tree in the country near Regnano, at the home of Giovanni Cavalcanti, my one and only friend. Three of our closest associates took part in the discussion: Cristoforo Landino, Bernardo Nuzzi, and Giorgio Antonio Vespucci, men distinguished for integrity and learning. Giovanni listened to them with the greatest attention and then said: ‘Marsilio Ficino, it would be impossible to say how greatly I delighted in your preceding disputation. But I desire this as well. Now that you have discussed the immortality common to rational souls, I should like you, if you please, to examine the immortality of our own soul more carefully by arguments proper to it. I fully agree that there are five grades of things, as you set out in the preceding disputation, and that the middle one is occupied by that third essence which is free from matter and everlasting. Nor do I doubt that the celestial souls are placed within the grade of that essence. I also think it probable that our soul belongs there. Yet I do not believe this can be firmly affirmed until every philosophical opinion concerning the human soul has been reduced to five principal positions and, after the first four have been refuted, the last has been upheld.’

Either the soul is some exceedingly subtle little body diffused throughout this coarser body. It may be fiery, as Democritus, Leucippus, and Hipparchus hold; airy, as Anaximenes, Diogenes of Apollonia, and Critias maintain; watery, as Hippias believes; earthy, as Hesiod and Pronopides teach; composed of fire and air, as Boethus and Epicurus suppose; or composed of water and earth, as Xenophantes holds.

Or the soul is something better: not, strictly speaking, the bulk of that little body itself, but some quality of it spread throughout its parts—heat, for example, or a warm constitution. This appears to have been the view of Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, Antipater, and Posidonius.

129

About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.