Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Name: Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Author: Marsilio Ficino

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook V · Chapter 15 · §§ 25–26

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Latin Page · Branch 64 of 191

Book V · Chapter 15 · §§ 25–26

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Latin

p. 122

Postremo, si quamvis locum occupanti corpori anima tamen non localiter iungitur, summis illis aeternisque rationibus quae incommutabiliter manent nec utique continentur loco prior afficitur anima quam corpus, nec prior tantum, sed etiam magis. Tanto enim prior quanto propinquior, et eadem causa tanto etiam magis quanto corpore est melior; nec ista propinquitas loco sed naturae ordine dicta sit. Hoc autem ordine intelligitur a summa essentia speciem corpori per animam tribui, qua est quantumcumque est. Per animam ergo corpus subsistit et eo ipso est quo animatur, sive universaliter ut mundus sive particulariter ut unumquodque animal intra mundum. Quapropter consequens erat ut anima per animam corpus fieret, nec omnino aliter posset. Quod quia non fit—manente quippe anima in eo quod anima est, corpus per illam subsistit, dantem speciem, non adimentem—commutari in corpus anima non potest.

Si enim non tradit speciem quam sumit a summo bono, non per illam fit corpus; et si non per illam fit, aut non fit omnino, aut tam propinque speciem sumit quam anima. Nec etiam fit corpus, quia si tam propinque sumeret speciem idem esset quod anima. Nonne eo ipso est anima melior quo sumit propinquius? Tam propinque autem etiam corpus sumeret si non per animam sumeret; etenim nullo interposito tam propinque utique sumeret. Nec invenitur aliquid congruens medium inter summam vitam, quae sapientia et veritas est incommutabilis, et id quod ultimum vivificatur, id est corpus, nisi vivificans anima. Quod si tradit speciem anima corpori, ut sit corpus quantum est, non utique speciem tradendo adimit; adimit autem speciem in corpus animam transmutando. Non igitur anima sive per se ipsam corpus fit quod per eam fit—quia non nisi manente anima corpus per eam fit—sive per alia, quia non nisi traditione speciei fit corpus per animam, et ademptione speciei anima in corpus converteretur si converteretur.

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book V

p. 123

Finally, although body occupies place, the soul is not joined to body spatially. The soul is affected before the body by those supreme and eternal principles which remain unchangeable and are not contained in place—and it is affected by them not only earlier but more deeply. It is prior in proportion as it is nearer to them, and for the same reason it is affected more deeply in proportion as it is better than body. This nearness must be understood not spatially but according to the order of nature. In that order, supreme essence is understood to bestow upon body, through soul, the form by which body is whatever it is. Body therefore subsists through soul and is what it is precisely insofar as it is ensouled, whether universally as the world or particularly as each living being within the world. It would therefore follow that, if soul became body, soul would have to become body through soul; there is no other way it could do so. But this does not happen. Body subsists through soul only while soul remains what it is, giving form rather than taking it away; hence soul cannot be changed into body.

If soul does not transmit the form it receives from the highest good, body does not come to be through it. And if body does not come to be through soul, either it does not come to be at all or it receives form as immediately as soul does. Yet then it would not be body, because if it received form so immediately it would be the same as soul. Is not soul better precisely because it receives from a nearer source? Body too would receive form equally near the source if it did not receive it through soul, for with no intermediary it would necessarily receive it just as immediately. No fitting mean can be found between the supreme life—which is wisdom and immutable truth—and the last thing to be vivified, namely body, except the soul that gives life. If soul gives form to body so that body may be whatever it is, soul does not take form away by giving it; but it would take form away by transmuting soul into body. Therefore soul does not become body, either through itself—that is, become what comes to be through it, since body comes to be through soul only while soul remains soul—or through other agents, because body comes to be through soul only by the transmission of form, whereas soul, if it were converted into body, would be converted by the removal of form.

218.The difficult Augustinian clause ut anima per animam corpus fieret is retained in the Latin and translated conditionally from its argumentative context: if soul became body, it would have to do so through soul, since body receives form only through soul.

219.The distinctions between natural order and spatial nearness, and between giving and removing form, are preserved.

220.Editorial subdivision: M1482 has no paraph before Si enim. The split falls at Ficino’s new conditional analysis of how body can receive form and keeps the synchronized Latin–English unit within the facing-page capacity.

221.The entire mediation proof is preserved: without soul, body would either not arise or would receive form as immediately as soul and therefore would no longer be body; transmission of form is then opposed to its removal.

About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.