Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Name: Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Author: Marsilio Ficino

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook V · Chapter 15 · §§ 4–5

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Facing Pages · Branch 56 of 191

Book V · Chapter 15 · §§ 4–5

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Latin

p. 106

Quapropter inde prius manat in animam vitae immortalis ubertas quam divinarum splendor imaginum. Secunda, quia si rationalis anima principium est formandi et continendi, neque formam suam neque constantiam naturalem potest amittere. Nempe, cum totum animale genus sit toto genere corporali praestantius et in omnibus mundi membris sint aliqua corporalia sempiterna, probabile est ut in omnibus his sint animae sempiternae. Quis enim negaverit animarum genus caput habere perpetuum, in quo rationales animae sunt, postquam corporalis mundus membra quaedam habet ubique perpetua? Tertia, quia, si anima conciliationis universalis et vinculi fons est, distrahi et dissolvi non potest. Si enim universorum vinculum resolvatur, quid ulterius vincietur?

Platonica haec mysteria ita deinceps Aurelii Augustini sententia confirmabimus. Si anima rationalis interiret corpore pereunte, necessario mutaretur corpore permutato. Non mutatur autem a corpore. Ipsa enim motionis principium est. Ideo cum a corpore mutari videtur, tunc ipsa et corpus mutat et se ipsam ducit ut lubet. Si anima movet saepissime corpus immobilis perseverans, longe magis ex eo quod sistit continetque corpus se ipsam sistit et continet. Quod enim stat plurimum in movendo alio stare potest semper in sistendo se et continendo. Quis autem nesciat, quando corpus vel proprium vel alienum movetur ab animo, tam motionem ipsam quam rem motam non habere sua omnia simul, sed labi prorsus a futuro in praesens atque praeteritum; in animo autem tunc esse simul propositum operis totius immobile, intentionem praesentis operis, memoriam praeteriti, expectationemque futuri? Illic intentio animi circa ea quae non sunt est ipsa.

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book V

p. 107

Therefore the abundance of immortal life flows into the soul from that source before the radiance of divine images does. The second gift proves the same conclusion because, if the rational soul is the principle that forms and contains, it can lose neither its own form nor its natural constancy. The entire animal order is more excellent than the whole bodily order, and in every region of the world there are some everlasting bodies; it is therefore reasonable that in all those regions there should also be everlasting souls. Who would deny that the genus of souls has a perpetual head, where rational souls are found, when the bodily world everywhere possesses members that are perpetual? The third gift proves the conclusion because, if the soul is the fountain of universal reconciliation and union, it cannot be torn apart or dissolved. If the bond of all things were itself unbound, what would any longer be bound?

We shall now confirm these Platonic mysteries with a judgment of Aurelius Augustine. If the rational soul perished when the body perished, it would necessarily change whenever the body changed. But the body does not change the soul, for the soul itself is the principle of motion. Thus, when it appears to be changed by the body, it is then both changing the body and directing itself as it chooses. If the soul so often moves the body while itself remaining unmoved, then much more, in holding the body steady and containing it, does it hold and contain itself. What stands firm while moving another can always stand firm by establishing and containing itself. Everyone knows that when a mind moves either its own body or another, neither the motion itself nor the thing moved possesses all of itself at once; each slips entirely from future to present and into past. Yet in the mind there are simultaneously the unchanging purpose of the whole work, attention to the present task, memory of the past, and expectation of the future. There the mind’s attention is itself directed toward things that do not exist.

About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.