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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook V · Chapter 14 · § 7

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Latin Page · Branch 52 of 191

Book V · Chapter 14 · § 7

Latin

p. 98

Hic pugnabit sic Strato vel Epicureus aliquis: sane mortem non suscipit anima, quia veniente mortifera qualitate abit anima et desinit esse. Si esse desinit, suscipit certe nihil. At nos, o Epicuree, non ita desipimus ut ignoremus non posse mortem ab aliquo suscipi: tum quia ipsa nihil est—quod vero non est non capitur—tum quia neque viventes eam capiunt neque defuncti; illi, quia dum vivunt a morte absunt; isti, quia si non sunt, ut ipse putas, nihil suscipiunt, et si supersunt, ut nostri volunt, etiam absunt a morte. Desistamus ludere verbis. Audi quid velimus. Quando dicimus animam non suscipere mortem, intelligimus eam non admittere in se ipsa ullam mortiferam qualitatem per quam desinat vivere. Profecto contrariae qualitates se invicem non suscipiunt, nam se vicissim et fugant et fugiunt. Ideo calor natura sua non modo non suscipit frigus, sed neque loco etiam illi propinquat. Longissime namque sese fugant et fugiunt quae per naturam longissimo discrepant intervallo. Postquam natura sua hae formae tales sunt, si in mera sui et sola natura consisterent essentque ita ut modo sunt contrariae invicem, numquam sibi invicem propinquarent. Natura enim illas dissociaret, neque adesset medius aliquis illarum conciliator. Tales profecto forent, si calor ita in se ipso subsisteret a materia separatus ut nihil praeter calorem haberet admixtum, atque frigus similiter. Nunc iacet calor in materia, quae suapte natura non minus ad frigus parata quam ad calorem advenienti frigori sinum pandit suum; quam ingressa frigiditas calorem inde detrudit, qui inde depulsus extinguitur, cum ab auctore suo ea lege fuerit ad esse productus ut tamdiu maneret quamdiu a tali sinu materiae foveretur. Quapropter formae quae a materia sustinentur, licet formas sibi contrarias non suscipiant, illarum tamen impetu et propinquatione perduntur.

98

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book V

p. 99

At this point Strato, or some Epicurean, will object: ‘Certainly the soul does not receive death, because when a death-bearing quality arrives the soul departs and ceases to be. If it ceases to be, it surely receives nothing.’ But, Epicurean, we are not so foolish as to be unaware that death cannot be received by anything. Death is itself nothing, and what does not exist cannot be received; moreover, neither the living nor the dead receive it. The living do not, because while they live they are absent from death. The dead do not because, if they do not exist, as you suppose, they receive nothing; and if they survive, as our philosophers hold, they too are absent from death. Let us stop playing with words and hear what we mean. When we say that the soul does not receive death, we mean that it admits into itself no death-bearing quality by which it ceases to live. Contrary qualities certainly do not receive one another: each in turn drives the other away and flees from it. Heat, therefore, not only does not receive cold by its nature; it does not even draw near to it in place. Things separated by the greatest natural interval drive one another away and flee to the greatest distance. Since these forms are of this character by nature, if each subsisted in its own pure nature alone and remained opposed just as it now is, they would never come near one another. Their natures would keep them apart, and no mediator would be present to reconcile them. So it would be if heat subsisted in itself, separated from matter and mixed with nothing but heat, and likewise with cold. As things stand, heat lies in matter; and matter, no less prepared by its own nature for cold than for heat, opens its bosom to the approaching cold. Cold enters and drives heat out. Once expelled, the heat is extinguished, because its author brought it into being under the law that it should remain only so long as it was cherished in that bosom of matter. Thus forms sustained by matter do not receive forms contrary to themselves, yet they perish under the assault and approach of those contraries.

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About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.