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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook V · Chapter 13 · §§ 14–16

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Latin Page · Branch 47 of 191

Book V · Chapter 13 · §§ 14–16

Latin

p. 88

Sed forsitan putabit quispiam animam ita a Deo fieri ut per angelum tamquam medium efficiatur, atque Deus in ea creatione sit opifex, angelus instrumentum. Quae quidem opinio ideo videtur absurda, quoniam instrumentum hanc habet naturam ut ipsum ab alio motum moveat aliud, afficiat subiectum aliquod formamque principalis agentis traducat in subiectum per temporis intervallum. Creatio autem neque subiectum exigit neque fit motu vel tempore.

Rursus, si creationis opus virtutem requirit immensam, quid absurdius quam ad id exequendum virtutem ipsam, quae in Deo immensa est, prius in angelo, cuius natura terminata est, terminari—

Deinde opus illud quod ad immensam virtutem spectat peragere? Ex supradictis concluditur animam a Deo summo sine medio procreari. Cur non perfectione pares inter se sunt angelus atque anima, cum utraque a Deo absque medio pendeant? Quia sub alia idea et ratione Deus angelum producit, sub alia animam: illum sub altiori idea, istam sub inferiori; quemadmodum ab eodem pictore homo et equus picti non aeque sunt pulchri. Pulchrior enim hominis figura quam equi, quia pictor ad pulchrius suae mentis exemplar hominis picturam expressit quam equi.

88

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book V

p. 89

Someone may perhaps think that the soul is made by God in such a way that an angel serves as intermediary: God would be the craftsman in its creation and the angel his instrument. This opinion seems absurd because an instrument, by its nature, is moved by another and in turn moves something else; it acts upon an underlying subject and conveys the principal agent’s form into that subject over an interval of time. Creation, however, requires no subject and takes place through neither motion nor time.

Again, if the work of creation requires immeasurable power, what could be more absurd than for that very power, immeasurable in God, first to be bounded in an angel whose nature is bounded—

—and then for it to accomplish a work that belongs to immeasurable power? From what has been said, we conclude that the soul is brought forth immediately by the supreme God. Why, then, are an angel and a soul not equal in perfection, since each depends upon God without an intermediary? Because God produces the angel under one Idea and intelligible plan and the soul under another: the angel under a higher Idea, the soul under a lower. In the same way, a man and a horse painted by the same artist are not equally beautiful. The human figure is more beautiful than the horse because the painter fashioned the human image according to a more beautiful exemplar in his mind.

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About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.