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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook V · Chapter 13 · §§ 11–13

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Latin Page · Branch 46 of 191

Book V · Chapter 13 · §§ 11–13

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Latin

p. 86

Quae effluit sine controversia distat ab esse, quod a re ipsa non effluit. Quae manet ob id etiam discrepat, quia esse creaturae certa quadam rerum specie clauditur; operatio talis per genera multa vagatur, immo vero intelligentia ipsa atque voluptas per infinita. Illius enim obiectum est ipsum verum, huius ipsum bonum. Verum autem et bonum saltem tam late patent quam ipsum quod ens vocatur.

Operatio vero ab obiecto trahit speciem. Ergo operatio talis omnibus rerum omnium speciebus induitur. Sed num differt operatio a virtute, et virtus ab essentia atque esse? Certe. Primo enim, quia actus potentiae semper opponitur, operatio, quae est actus, a virtute discrepat et essentia, quae potentiae quaedam sunt; et virtus ab esse, quod est actus; et ab essentia, quia potentiae per suos actus distinguuntur, cum propria potentia proprium respiciat actum. Essentiae actus est esse; virtutis actus est operatio. Igitur tanto inter se distant essentia atque virtus quanto esse distat et operatio.

Quorsum haec tam multa? Ut intelligas operationem cuiuslibet creaturae virtuti haerere; virtutem et esse essentiae; ac nullam creaturam per substantiam proxime operari, sed per virtutem operatricem, quae est qualitas sive accidens, cum a substantia undique distinguatur. Quotiens ergo aliquid operatur, qualitates quasdam proxime generat et esse dat quale habet ipsa, id est inhaerens alteri semper. Talia vero praecedente indigent fundamento. Quae fundamento indigent ex nihilo non creantur. Ergo nulla creatura creat aliquid; nec iniuria. Operatio enim eius et virtus, quia haerent alteri, et quicquid haeret non restat liberum atque integrum, sed pro facultate suscipientis accipitur, subiecti sui limitibus finiuntur. Creatio vero operatricem virtutem exigit infinitam. Itaque anima a solo creatur Deo.

86

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book V

p. 87

The operation that flows outward plainly differs from being, since being does not flow out of the thing itself. The operation that remains within also differs from being for this reason: a creature's being is enclosed within one determinate species, whereas such an operation ranges across many genera—indeed, understanding itself and pleasure range across infinitely many things. For the object of the former is the true itself, and of the latter the good itself. The true and the good extend at least as widely as whatever is called being.

Operation takes its species from its object; such an operation therefore clothes itself in all the species of all things. But is operation distinct from power, and power from essence and being? Certainly. First, because actuality is always opposed to potentiality, operation, which is an actuality, differs from power and essence, which are potentialities of a kind. Power likewise differs from being, which is an actuality, and from essence, because potentialities are distinguished by their own actualities, each proper potentiality being directed toward its proper actuality. The actuality of essence is being; the actuality of power is operation. Essence and power are therefore as far apart as being and operation.

Why so much argument? So that you may understand that the operation of every creature inheres in its power, while its power and being inhere in its essence; and that no creature operates immediately through its substance, but through an operative power. Since that power is distinguished from substance at every point, it is a quality or accident. Whenever a creature acts, therefore, what it immediately produces are qualities; and it gives the kind of being it possesses itself, namely, a being that always inheres in another. Such things require a preexisting foundation, and whatever requires a foundation is not created from nothing. No creature, then, creates anything—and rightly so. Because a creature’s operation and power inhere in another, and because whatever inheres does not remain free and whole but is received according to the capacity of its recipient, they are bounded by the limits of their subject. Creation, however, requires an infinite operative power. The soul is therefore created by God alone.

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About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.