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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook V · Chapter 13 · §§ 7–10

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Latin Page · Branch 45 of 191

Book V · Chapter 13 · §§ 7–10

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Latin

p. 84

Praeterea res omnis praeter ipsum Deum creatura dicitur a theologis et ex quatuor quibusdam componitur necessario. Ideo Pythagorici non solum in corporibus, verum etiam in spiritibus quodammodo ponunt quatuor elementa, quia utraque constant ex essentia, esse, virtute et actione. Nempe aliud in eis essentia est, aliud esse. Est enim esse actus essentiae. Quod si praeter hunc actum non esset illic essentia cui talis actus haereret, esset actus purus et infinitus, quia non circumscriptus ab ullo. Hic autem solus est Deus. Rursus esse ipsum ab omni esset participatione alterius absolutum. Omne vero tale unicum est in natura. Soli igitur Deo convenit. Merito autem creatura non est ipsum esse suum, quia ipsa suus actus esse nequit, cum habeat in se potentiae passivae nonnihil immixtum, quia subest Deo; potentia vero opponitur actui.

Quoniam vero operatio differt ab essentia magis quam esse ipsum—prius enim est essentia quam operetur—ideo ubi est essentiae et ipsius esse distinctio multo magis est distincta operatio ab essentia.

Operatio quidem ita est virtutis essentialis actus sicut esse est actus essentiae. Quia vero creata essentia non est suus actus, ideo nec est operatio sua. Alioquin operatio talis esset per se subsistens, ab omni participantis limite penitus absoluta. Quod tale est, unicum diximus et infinitum existere. Sed numquid operatio differt ab esse sicut ab essentia differre monstratur?

Proculdubio. Duplex enim est operatio: una effluit extra operantem, ut calefactio; altera manet intus, ut cognitio et voluntas.

84

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book V

p. 85

Moreover, theologians call every thing except God himself a creature, and every creature is necessarily composed of four elements of a certain kind. Hence the Pythagoreans posit, in a qualified sense, four elements not only in bodies but also in spirits, because both kinds of creature consist of essence, being, power, and action. In them essence is one thing and being another, for being is the actuality of essence. If there were no essence there besides this actuality—no essence in which such an actuality inhered—it would be pure and infinite actuality, circumscribed by nothing; but that is God alone. Again, being itself would then be wholly free from participation in anything else. Whatever is of that kind is unique in nature and therefore belongs to God alone. A creature, accordingly, is not its own being, because it cannot be its own actuality. Some passive potentiality is mingled in it, since it is subject to God, and potentiality is opposed to actuality.

Operation differs from essence even more than being itself does—for essence exists before it operates. Wherever essence is distinct from its being, therefore, operation is much more distinct from essence.

Operation is the actuality of an essential power just as being is the actuality of essence. Since a created essence is not its own actuality, neither is it its own operation. Otherwise such an operation would subsist in itself, wholly free from every limit imposed by what participates in it; and we have said that whatever is of this kind is unique and infinite. But does operation differ from being as it has been shown to differ from essence?

Without question. Operation is of two kinds: one flows outward beyond the agent, as heating does; the other remains within, as cognition and will do.

85

About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.