DiotimosReading Desk

Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition

Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

Explore the Lexicon
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook V · Chapter 12 · §§ 11–12

Swipe or use the arrow keys.

Latin Page · Branch 40 of 191

Book V · Chapter 12 · §§ 11–12

Book Mode

Latin

p. 74

Potentiae vero secundum congruentiam respondet actus. Actus ergo illi potentiae divinae respondens est stabilis per essentiam. Talis actus est anima. Et quemadmodum in Deo eadem potentia est per quam et Deus potest facere animam et anima fieri, sic in anima idem actus est, id est nixus idem, per quem et anima subsistit in natura sua et Deus eam sistit in ipsa.

Quo fit ut non minori desiderio Deus animam in natura animae sistat quam subsistat anima in eadem. Quae cum soli subiciatur Deo, si perimenda est ab aliquo, ab illo est perimenda. Ab illo vero non potest. Quomodo enim causa alicuius effectrix et conservatrix erit quoque corruptrix eiusdem? Aut quo pacto ipsum bonum cuiquam perniciosum est? Aut prima vita et infinita vita est alicui mortis origo? Dicet aliquis: non perimit Deus animam vim novam aliquam inferendo, sed vim ante illi tributam auferendo, id est subtrahendo influxum suum per quem anima vixerat, sicut qui intuitu imaginem suam creat in speculo, subtrahendo vultum desinit imaginem procreare. Sed contingere hoc ibi non potest, ut paulo ante ostendimus. Rursus, si Deus nunc infundit animae vitam, postea non infundit, mutatio ibi provenit ab infundendo in non infundendum. Quaero utrum anima desinat haurire vitam, an Deus infundere. Non desinit anima haurire.

74

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book V

p. 75

An actuality corresponds fittingly to a potentiality. The actuality corresponding to that divine potentiality is therefore stable in its very essence; the soul is such an actuality. And just as in God there is one and the same power by which God can make the soul and the soul can be made, so in the soul there is one and the same actuality—one and the same sustaining impulse—by which the soul subsists in its own nature and God establishes it there.

It follows that God’s desire to establish the soul in the nature of soul is no less than the soul’s desire to subsist in that nature. Since it is subject to God alone, if anyone is to destroy it, God must do so. But God cannot. How could the cause that produces and preserves a thing also be the cause of its corruption? How could the good itself be ruinous to anything? How could the first and infinite life become the source of death for another? Someone will object that God destroys the soul not by bringing a new force against it but by withdrawing the force previously bestowed upon it—that is, by withholding the influx through which it lived. In the same way, a person whose gaze produces an image in a mirror ceases to produce it by turning away his face. But, as we showed shortly before, that cannot happen here. Again, if God now pours life into the soul and later does not, there is a change from infusing to not infusing. I ask, then: does the soul cease to draw in life, or does God cease to pour it forth? The soul does not cease to draw it in.

75

About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.