Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Name: Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Author: Marsilio Ficino

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

Explore the Lexicon

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook V · Chapter 12 · §§ 7–10

Swipe or use the arrow keys.

Latin Page · Branch 39 of 191

Book V · Chapter 12 · §§ 7–10

Book Mode

Latin

p. 72

Quoniam potentia ad extremum utrumque indifferens vel ad neutrum vertitur vel aeque atque vicissim vertitur ad utrumque; et sicut ad esse ex non esse conversa est, ita vicissim ab esse vertitur in non esse. Atque hinc sequitur rerum corruptio corporalium. Verum rationalis anima, cum sit forma simplex unde motus exoritur in compositis, non potest ex aliqua materia praecedente et subsequente forma facta fuisse; et cum sit forma in se subsistens, non innixa materiae, quia et supra et infra materiam progreditur iudicando, non est composita ex aliqua potentia materiae velut animae inchoatione et actu potentiae addito velut ipsius animae perfectione. Neque igitur ex materia constat, neque exstat.

Si talis est, ex nihilo processit in lucem.

Eius ergo solus Deus est auctor, ut alias ostendemus. Atqui haec nisi potuisset fieri, numquam profecto facta fuisset.

Quapropter praecessit animam nostram nascendi potentia. Ubinam erat illa potentia? Non in anima, quae nondum erat; non in parte animae, quae est simplex et tota simul efficitur, non per partes; non in materia aliqua, quoniam anima a materia non dependet; non in nihilo, non enim potentia ipsa essendi fundatur in nihilo. Nam quo pacto alterum oppositum sit oppositi et contradictorii alterius fundamentum? Esse vero et non esse contradictoria sunt. Restat ut illa potentia in solo animae auctore fundetur Deo. Igitur potentia essendi per quam anima ad esse producitur ipse solus immortalis stabilisque est Deus.

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book V

p. 73

A potentiality indifferent to both extremes either turns toward neither or turns equally and by turns toward both. Just as it was converted from nonbeing to being, so in turn it is converted from being to nonbeing; and from this follows the corruption of bodily things. The rational soul, however, is a simple form from which motion originates in composites. It therefore cannot have been made from some preexisting matter followed by an added form. Moreover, because it is a form subsisting in itself and does not rest upon matter—for in judgment it ranges both above and below matter—it is not composed of a material potentiality serving as the soul’s initial seed and an actuality added to that potentiality as the soul’s completion. It is therefore neither constituted from matter nor drawn out from it.

If the soul is of this kind, it has come forth from nothing into the light.

God alone, then, is its author, as we shall show elsewhere. And certainly, unless the soul had been capable of being made, it would never have been made.

A potentiality for being born therefore preceded our soul. Where was that potentiality? Not in the soul, which did not yet exist; not in some part of the soul, since the soul is simple and is brought into being all at once rather than part by part; not in any matter, since the soul does not depend upon matter; and not in nothing, for the very potentiality of being cannot be founded upon nothing. How could one opposite serve as the foundation of the other opposite and contradictory? Being and nonbeing are contradictories. It remains, then, that this potentiality is founded in God alone, the soul’s author. Thus the potentiality of being through which the soul is brought into existence is God himself, who alone is immortal and stable.

121.Exstat is read in its context as being brought forth from matter, not merely as ‘exists’; the English makes the contrast with constat ex materia explicit.

122.The soul’s judgment ‘above and below matter’ preserves Ficino’s claim that it surveys both immaterial and material orders.

123.The emergence metaphor in processit in lucem is retained rather than flattened into the abstract ‘was created.’

124.The modal premise—actual creation presupposes a capacity to be created—is kept distinct from the following inquiry into where that capacity resides.

125.The four rejected locations of the soul’s preexistent capacity are preserved in their exact sequence.

126.Nascendi is rendered ‘being born’ while produci ad esse is ‘brought into existence,’ preserving Ficino’s shift from natal to ontological language.

About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.