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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook V · Chapter 11 · § 8

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Latin Page · Branch 36 of 191

Book V · Chapter 11 · § 8

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Latin

p. 66

Tum quia essentia spiritalium stabilior est quam materia corporalium; tum quia essentia animae, cum propria ipsius animae ratio sit, non esse aliud omnino et aliud respicit pariter, sed esse solummodo animale secundum certam videlicet animae speciem. Materia quidem communis absque hoc actu vel illo esse potest; materia vero propria absque proprio actu nequaquam. Quapropter essentia animae quae in tali specie animarum est numquam actum speciei alterius animarum suscipiet; neque migrabit rursus essentia in eadem specie de animo hoc in illum, ne mobilis aeque sit ac materia corporalium. Immo, si materia caeli eadem forma contenta est semper, ut placet quamplurimis, quid mirum materiam animi spiritalem eodem essendi actu semper esse contentam? Ea essentia vita est; hoc esse, vivere. Semper itaque vivit.

66

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book V

p. 67

It is absurd, first, because the essence of spiritual things is more stable than bodily matter; and second, because the soul’s essence, being the soul’s own defining nature, is not equally open to being now one thing and now another. It is directed only to animal being according to one determinate species of soul. Common matter can exist without this or that particular actuality, but the proper matter of a thing cannot exist without its proper actuality. Therefore the essence of a soul established in a given species of souls will never receive the actuality of another species. Nor, within the same species, will an essence migrate from this mind into that one, for then it would be as mutable as bodily matter. Indeed, if the matter of heaven remains forever content with one and the same form, as very many hold, why should it be surprising that the mind’s spiritual matter remains forever content with one and the same actuality of being? That essence is life; for it, to be is to live. Therefore it lives forever.

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About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.