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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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English Introduction · Branch 3 of 191

Contents

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Contents

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Volume II contents

Book V · 7

V.1 Every rational soul is immortal. First argument: because it moves itself and moves in a circle. · 8

V.2 Second argument: because it stands firm in its substance. · 12

V.3 Third argument: because it cleaves to divine things. · 14

V.4 Fourth argument: because it rules over matter. · 16

V.5 Fifth argument: because it is free from matter. · 26

V.6 Sixth argument: because it is indivisible. · 32

V.7 Seventh argument: because it has its being in its own essence. · 34

V.8 Eighth argument: because it has a being of its own and never departs from its form. · 38

V.9 Ninth argument: because being belongs to it in its own right. · 46

V.10 Tenth argument: because by its own nature it is related to God. · 54

V.11 Eleventh argument: because it is not composed of any potency into which it could be resolved. · 60

V.12 Twelfth argument: because it has within itself no potency toward non-being. · 68

V.13 Thirteenth argument: because it receives its being from God without an intermediary. · 78

V.14 Fourteenth argument: because it is life in itself. · 94

V.15 Fifteenth argument: because life is more excellent than body. · 104

Book VI · 127

VI.1 The views concerning the soul are reduced to five principal positions. · 128

VI.2 Philosophers of the common sort, persuaded by no argument but misled by corrupt habit, held that the soul was corporeal. · 134

VI.3 The soul is neither a body nor a form divided within a body, as its natural power shows. · 168

VI.4 First argument: because the soul is the principle of nourishment and of every other mode of action. · 170

VI.5 Second argument: the soul is neither an animate body nor an inanimate one. · 174

VI.6 Third argument: the soul is neither a gross body nor a subtle one. · 178

VI.7 Fourth argument: a body is composed of matter and form. · 182

VI.8 Fifth argument: a body is by nature dispersed. · 186

VI.9 Sixth argument: two bodies do not occupy the same place. · 190

VI.10 Seventh argument: a body is not wholly present in several places at once. · 196

VI.11 Eighth argument: the soul is life or the source of life. · 198

VI.12 Ninth argument: a body does not move itself. · 202

VI.13 Tenth argument: the soul does not increase with the growth of this body. · 222

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About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.