DiotimosReading Desk

Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition

Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

Explore the Lexicon
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook V · Chapter 9 · § 3

Swipe or use the arrow keys.

Facing Pages · Branch 28 of 191

Book V · Chapter 9 · § 3

Latin

p. 50

Sed potest aliquis huic rationi sic obicere, quod quemadmodum ignis qui per se calet calet semper dum est, non tamen est semper, ex quo etiam non calet absolute semper, ita etiam animae essentia, quia proprie et vere forma est in se ipsa subsistens, ideo per se est; et quia per se est, ideo est et semper, scilicet dum est. Non tamen semper est. Ergo non est semper. Haec obiectio duabus de causis ridicula iudicatur. Primo sibimet ipsi repugnat quando ita contexitur: Forma illa per se est; ergo semper est, dum scilicet est; non autem est semper. Quattuor enim hic orationes sunt, quarum secunda illa quae dicit, Ergo semper est, posteriori huic contradicit quae infert, Non autem est semper. Deinde obiectio huiusmodi abundat superfluis quando addit, Dum scilicet est. Istud siquidem, dum est, non potest dici aliud esse quam primum illud ubi dicitur, Semper est. Sic enim esset eadem in re geminum est et geminum esse; neque exsisteret res una quaedam, sed duae. Hinc sequitur ut illud est quod ponitur quando additur, Dum scilicet est, sit illud idem quod iam erat positum quando prius dicebatur, Est semper. Quae sunt eadem eadem sunt ratione tractanda. Idcirco si primum est absolute profertur, ita secundum est absolute proferri debet absque illa dictione, Dum scilicet est. Ergo dici oportet: Est, semper est, est; non autem addendum, dum scilicet est. Vel si addis illi primo est illud postea, Dum scilicet est, adde et huic secundo est quod sequitur post dum scilicet est rursus illud, Dum scilicet est, et huic tertio est rursus, Dum scilicet est, atque ita in infinitum. Neque usquam reperies primam essendi radicem per quam competat illi rei quod sit sitque semper. Quod autem radicem essendi non habet nihil est omnino. Age iam siste pedem. Forma illa separata qualis est anima per se est. Ergo est semper.

50

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book V

p. 51

But someone may object to this argument as follows. Fire, which is hot in its own right, is always hot while it exists, yet it does not always exist; hence it is not hot always without qualification. In the same way, the soul's essence, because it is properly and truly a form subsisting in itself, exists in its own right; and because it exists in its own right, it exists always—that is, while it exists. Yet it does not always exist. Therefore it does not exist always. This objection is judged ridiculous for two reasons. First, it contradicts itself when it is joined together in this form: ‘That form exists in its own right; therefore it always exists, while, of course, it exists; yet it does not always exist.’ There are four assertions here. The second, ‘Therefore it always exists,’ contradicts the later conclusion, ‘Yet it does not always exist.’ Second, an objection of this kind abounds in superfluities when it adds, ‘while, of course, it exists.’ For ‘while it exists’ cannot mean anything other than the first assertion, ‘it always exists.’ Otherwise, in the same thing there would be a double ‘is’ and a double being, and what existed would not be one thing but two. It follows that the ‘is’ introduced when one adds ‘while it is’ is the very same ‘is’ already posited when one first said ‘it always is.’ Things that are the same must be treated in the same way. Hence, if the first ‘is’ is uttered without qualification, the second ‘is’ must likewise be uttered without qualification and without the words ‘while, of course, it is.’ The statement should therefore run: ‘It is; it always is; it is’—not with the addition ‘while, of course, it is.’ Or, if after the first ‘is’ you add ‘while, of course, it is,’ then to the second ‘is’ that follows after ‘while it is,’ add ‘while, of course, it is’ once again; and to this third ‘is,’ again add ‘while, of course, it is,’ and so on to infinity. Nowhere will you find the first root of being through which it belongs to the thing both to be and to be always. But what has no root of being is nothing at all. Come now, stop here. A separate form such as the soul exists in its own right. Therefore it exists always.

51

About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.