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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook V · Chapter 9 · § 2

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Latin Page · Branch 27 of 191

Book V · Chapter 9 · § 2

Latin

p. 48

At enim formarum conditor ad certum operis mundani finem integritatemque formas ea distinctione producit in esse ut singulas naturaliter ad certum esse determinet, et alias quidem ad esse in corpore, alias ad esse in se ipsis absque materia. Forma impressa materiae non proprie est neque proprium habet esse, sed dicitur id quo compositum ipsum est; et ipsa per commune esse totius exsistit. Si esse formae per se congruit, haec certe forma quae est in corpore, quia et ipsa forma est, id habet ut et ipsi esse per se conveniat. At quomodo, cum a materia pendeat et sub esse totius compositi contineatur? Attende: esse per se convenit illi, id est, per se sequitur illam. Sequitur, inquam, per se, id est secundum naturam suam. Quid enim aliud per se significat quam per sui naturam? Natura sua talis est qualem sibi suus opifex assignavit. Opifex autem statuit ut materiae inhaereret. Haec itaque natura sua est, inhaerere materiae. Per hanc naturam esse eam sequitur. Ergo esse eam sequitur per se, eam, inquam, materiae inhaerentem; ita prius quodammodo sibi competit materiae infigi quam exsistere. Quare tamdiu exsistit quamdiu haeret materiae. Non haeret autem semper, quia materia omnibus parata formis locum saepe dat formis contrariis, priores formas inde pellentibus. Non ergo exsistit semper. Forma vero illa quae ita a conditore est ad esse determinata ut in se ipsa consistat seorsum a corpore, etiam quia forma est, habet illud ut esse sibi per se conveniat; per se, inquam, per naturam suam. Natura ipsi assignata est sibimet ipsi haerere. Igitur esse suum eam sequitur quantum sibi haeret, id est exsistere suum eam sequitur ex subiecto minime pullulantem. Et quotiens dicis esse per se sequitur eam, totiens dicis esse eam sequitur sibi ipsi haerentem. Nihil autem a se ipso discedit. Quid enim intercidit inter se et ipsummet quod separet ipsum a semet ipso? Si quatenus haeret sibi eatenus est, quia haeret semper, est et semper. Talis quidem forma est anima. Est igitur immortalis.

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book V

p. 49

Yet the creator of forms, with a view to the determinate end and completeness of the work of the world, brings forms into being with this distinction: he naturally determines each to a definite mode of being, some to be in a body and others to be in themselves without matter. A form impressed upon matter does not properly exist and has no being of its own. Rather, it is called that by which the composite itself exists, and it exists through the common being of the whole. If being belongs to form in its own right, then surely, because a form in a body is itself form, being must likewise belong to it in its own right. But how can this be, when it depends upon matter and is contained under the being of the composite whole? Attend closely. Being belongs to it in its own right—that is, being follows it through itself. It follows through itself, I say, according to the form's own nature. For what else does ‘through itself’ mean but ‘through its own nature’? Its nature is such as its maker assigned to it, and its maker ordained that it should inhere in matter. Its own nature, therefore, is to inhere in matter. Through this nature being follows it. Being thus follows it through itself, but follows it, I say, as inhering in matter; in a certain sense it belongs to the form to be implanted in matter before it belongs to it to exist. It therefore exists only so long as it inheres in matter. It does not inhere forever, because matter, prepared for every form, often gives place to contrary forms that drive out the earlier ones. It therefore does not exist forever. But a form determined by the creator to a mode of being in which it subsists in itself apart from body has, because it too is form, the further property that being belongs to it in its own right—that is, through its own nature. The nature assigned to it is to adhere to itself. Its being therefore follows it insofar as it adheres to itself; that is, its existence follows it without springing from a subject. Whenever you say that being follows it through itself, you are saying that being follows it as it adheres to itself. Yet nothing departs from itself. For what could fall between a thing and its very self and separate it from itself? If it exists insofar as it adheres to itself, then because it always so adheres, it also always exists. The soul is a form of this kind. It is therefore immortal.

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About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.