Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation
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Latin Page · Branch 26 of 191
Book V · Chapter 9 · § 1
Latin
p. 46Nona ratio: quia sibi per se convenit esse.
Quod alicui per se convenit, numquam separatur ab ipso. Rotunditas suapte natura circulo inest. Atque ideo nullus umquam sine rotunditate est circulus. Ligno autem quandoque rotunditas inest, non quia lignum est. Omne enim lignum rotundum esset. Sed quia ab artifice figuram accipit circularem quam rotunditas comitatur, ideo tunc rotunditatem capere cogitur. Desinit aliquando lignum esse rotundum, cum primum esse desinit circulare. Deinde restat lignum, sed non rotundum. Figura vero circularis ita necessario rotunda est ut, si desierit esse rotunda, esse etiam desinat circularis. Similiter calor igni per se convenit, humor aquae, soli lumen. Non aliter et formae esse per se convenit. Nam quicquid aliquid est in aliqua specie, id certe quod est a propria quadam forma sortitur ad talem speciem conducente. Quoniam igitur esse proprium cuique per formam propriam competit, sequitur ut esse communiter et simpliciter per genus ipsum formae conveniat. Unde oportet ipsam formam fontem dici essendi et per se esse. Quod si per aliud esse dicatur ab aliquo, interrogabimus utrum illud per quod forma dicitur esse naturam formae habeat an materiae. Non materiae, quia videmus in compositis singulis esse cuiusque proprium non sequi materiam. Ergo neque in hac ipsa forma per quam res compositae sunt, illud per quod ipsa est vim habet materiae; ergo formae. Ita quaestio redit in idem. Utrum forma illa alia per quam forma est per se ipsa sit an per aliud quippiam? Si per se, tunc constat formam fontem essendi dici debere. Sin per aliud, tunc quaeremus ut ante, atque in infinitum erit progressio. Quapropter formae per se convenit esse.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book V
p. 47Ninth argument: because being belongs to it in its own right.
What belongs to something in its own right is never separated from it. Roundness belongs to a circle by its very nature; therefore no circle is ever without roundness. Wood, however, is sometimes round, not because it is wood—for then every piece of wood would be round—but because an artisan gives it a circular figure, which is accompanied by roundness. Only then is it compelled to receive roundness. The wood ceases to be round as soon as it ceases to be circular. The wood then remains, but is no longer round. A circular figure, by contrast, is necessarily round, so that if it ceased to be round, it would also cease to be circular. In the same way heat belongs to fire in its own right, moisture to water, and light to the sun. In the same way, being too belongs to form in its own right. For whatever a thing is within a given species, it receives what it is from a proper form that brings it into that species. Since the proper being of each thing belongs to it through its proper form, it follows that being universally and without qualification belongs to the very genus of form. Form itself must therefore be called the fountain of being and must exist in its own right. But if anyone says that form exists through something else, we shall ask whether that through which form is said to exist has the nature of form or of matter. It cannot have the nature of matter, because we see that in every composite thing its proper being does not follow from matter. Thus, in the very form through which composite things exist, that through which the form itself exists cannot have the character of matter; it must have that of form. The question therefore returns to the same point: does that other form through which a form exists itself exist in its own right, or through something else? If in its own right, it is clear that form must be called the fountain of being. If through something else, we shall ask the same question as before, and the regress will proceed to infinity. Being therefore belongs to form in its own right.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II · Book V · V.9.1
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.
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- late-control-and-ocr-aidParis 1641 Opera printing — Internet Archive