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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook VIII · Chapter 16 · § 1

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Latin Page · Branch 188 of 191

Book VIII · Chapter 16 · § 1

Latin

p. 370

Decimasexta ratio. Forma corporalis non habet vim infinitam; mens habet.

Constat apud physicos formam corporalem, praesertim elementalem, esse usque adeo terminatam, ut nullo modo vim aliquam infinitam indefessamque possit habere. Mens autem absque termino pervagatur, neque fatigatur umquam. Principio in se ipsa quasi est sine termino: intelligit enim se ipsam. Ideo intellectio eius profecta ab ipsa mentis substantia in eandem revolvitur. Revolutio infinitus est motus. Ad nullum enim terminum proficiscitur extrinsecus acquirendum, quo pacto quiescat, sed propriam ambit substantiam, sui ipsius avida. Sui vero ipsius aviditas numquam extinguitur. Substantia igitur quae suimet cupiditate coepit semel sibi undique fieri obvia et circumeundo se ipsam undique contueri, eadem cupiditate perpetuo instigante, semet ipsam perpetuo similiter pro arbitrio amplectetur. Motus igitur intellectus, quoniam orbicularis est, in se ipsum circumvolutus, quatenus intellectualis est, est utique sempiternus. Caret etiam fine, ut diximus, ob eam causam quod infinite intelligentia replicatur. Potest enim qui aut se aut aliud quodvis intelligit, sicut rem ipsam intelligit, sic suam intelligentiam intelligere, itemque aliam et aliam sine fine, dum et rem cognoscit et quod cognoscat illam animadvertit. Rursus, quod sic animadvertat, ipsum non latet, et similiter absque termino. Talem intelligentiae cursum comitatur rationalis appetitio illa quam nuncupant voluntatem. Haec sane se ipsam vult aut quodvis aliud, et vult se velle, et rursus vult quod velit, similiterque deinceps. Quin etiam corpora dividit in partes plurimas partiumque particulas. Numeros auget supra numeros absque fine. Figurarum modos mutuasque illarum proportiones, atque etiam numerorum comparationes innumerabiles invenit; lineam supra caelum ultra terminum undique protendit. Tempus in praeteritum absque principio, in futurum absque fine producit. Neque solum ultra omne tempus aliud antiquius cogitat et prolixius, verum etiam ultra omnem locum alium semper cogitat ampliorem. Innumeros quoque effingit gradus in singulis qualitatibus. Accedit quod non uno quodam rerum genere mens, sicuti sensus, contenta est. Non solis coloribus ut visus, non solis vocibus ut auditus, sed currit per omnia; per omnia, inquam, non modo quae sunt, sed quae fuerunt, eruntve. Neque id solum, sed per illa etiam quae neque sunt neque fuerunt umquam aut erunt. Multa enim excogitat quae forte esse possent, non tamen fient umquam; et multa quae esse forsitan numquam possunt ipsa fingit.

370

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VIII

p. 371

Sixteenth argument. A bodily form does not possess infinite power; the mind does.

It is agreed among the natural philosophers that a corporeal form, especially an elemental one, is so bounded that it can possess no infinite and unwearied power. Mind, however, ranges without limit and is never fatigued. To begin with, it is as though without limit within itself, for it understands itself. Thus its act of understanding, proceeding from the mind’s own substance, returns into that same substance. Revolution is an infinite motion. For it does not set out toward any external end to be acquired, at which it might rest, but circles its own substance in desire for itself; and its desire for itself is never extinguished. A substance, therefore, which through desire for itself has once begun to meet itself from every side and, by circling itself, to behold itself on every side, will, under the perpetual impulse of that same desire, perpetually embrace itself in the same way and at will. The motion of intellect, then, because it is circular and revolves upon itself, is assuredly everlasting insofar as it is intellectual. It also has no end, as we have said, because intelligence is repeated infinitely. Whoever understands himself or any other thing can understand his own act of intelligence just as he understands the thing itself, and then a further act and another without end: he both knows the thing and notices that he knows it. Again, he is not unaware that he notices this, and so onward without limit. This course of intelligence is accompanied by the rational appetite they call will. The will desires itself or any other thing, wills itself to will, and in turn wills that it wills, and so onward in the same manner. Furthermore, mind divides bodies into many parts and the parts into particles. It raises number upon number without end. It discovers innumerable kinds of figures, their mutual proportions, and comparisons of numbers; it extends a line in every direction above the heavens and beyond all limit. It carries time backward into a past without beginning and forward into a future without end. Nor does it merely conceive another time older and more protracted than every span of time; beyond every place it also always conceives another place more spacious. It fashions innumerable degrees within each quality. Add that the mind, unlike sensation, is not confined to any one class of things: not to colors alone, as sight is, nor to sounds alone, as hearing is, but it ranges through all things. Through all things, I say—not only those that are, but those that have been or will be; and not these alone, but also things that neither exist nor ever have existed or will exist. For it devises many things that might perhaps exist but never will, and itself invents many things that perhaps could never exist.

371

About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.