Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation
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Facing Pages · Branch 185 of 191
Book VIII · Chapter 15 · § 1
Latin
p. 364Decimaquinta ratio. Actio mentis finitur in actione; actio corporis in corpore.
Nullius corporis actio in ipsam actionem proprie desinit, sed in exteriorem transit materiam. Nam si in actionem desineret, actio illa in operante restaret, ubi in se ipsum operaretur, puta ignis se ipsum calefaceret. Quod non potest a corpore fieri, quia si corpus non agit ex se, etiam non agit in se. Rursus, si quicquid corpus agit movendo agit, certe, cum movere se nequeat, in se ipsum agere nequit. Videmus autem mentis operationem, ipsam scilicet intelligentiam, in se ipsam desinere, neque quicquam per se extrinsecus facere, nisi forte quandoque moveat voluntatem, quae motis brachiis opus aliquod extra producat, quale fuerat cogitatum. Sensum autem dicimus quodammodo extra se fluere, quia aliunde movetur, prospicit aliena, externi finis gratia operatur, neque sui ipsius est conscius. Mens contra movetur libere, se suaque inspicit, sui gratia operatur. Ideo essentia apud Platonem status dicitur, quia, si sine vita sit, torpet; vita motus, quia iam exit in actum; mens reflexio, quia sine hac vita in externum opus efflueret. Sed mens sistit vitalem essentiae motum in semetipso; reflectit ipsum in essentiam quadam sui ipsius animadversione. Trahit quoque cetera omnia ad se ipsam, prout res potius ut ipsa mens est quam ut res extra existunt considerat. Vocatur etiam reflexio infinita, quia in operationem suam non modo semel mens hominis terminatur, verum etiam innumerabiliter, cum se aliquid intelligere animadvertit, et quod animadvertat agnoscit; et cum aliquid velle se vult, et vult quod velit se velle, atque eadem ratione deinceps, ubi vel operatio alia in infinitum terminatur ad aliam vel eadem in se replicatur innumere.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VIII
p. 365Fifteenth argument. The mind's action has its end in action; a body's action, in a body.
No body’s action properly ends in the action itself; rather, it passes into external matter. For if it ended in the action, that action would remain within the agent, which would then act upon itself—as though fire were to heat itself. A body cannot do this, because if a body does not act from itself, neither does it act upon itself. Again, if whatever a body does it does by moving, then, since it cannot move itself, it cannot act upon itself. Yet we see that the mind’s operation—intelligence itself—ends in the mind, and of itself produces nothing outside, except perhaps when at some time it moves the will, which sets the arms in motion and produces outwardly a work such as had been conceived. Sensation, however, is said in a certain way to flow outside itself, because it is moved from elsewhere, regards things foreign to itself, acts for the sake of an external end, and is not conscious of itself. Mind, by contrast, moves freely, beholds itself and its own contents, and acts for its own sake. Thus in Plato essence is called repose, because without life it lies dormant; life is called motion, because it has now gone forth into act; and mind is called reflection, because without reflection life would flow outward into an external work. Mind, however, arrests the vital motion of essence within itself and turns that motion back into essence through a certain awareness of itself. It also draws all other things to itself, considering things rather according to the mode in which mind itself exists than according to the mode in which they exist outside it. This is also called infinite reflection, because the human mind terminates in its own operation not only once but countless times: it notices that it understands something, recognizes that it notices, wills itself to will something, and wills that it wills itself to will, and so onward in the same manner. Here either one operation terminates endlessly in another, or the same operation is folded back upon itself without number.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II · Book VIII · VIII.15.1
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.
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- public-domain-base-witnessFlorence 1482 editio princeps — Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
- collating-witness-cc-by-4.0Paris 1559 printing — Universidad Complutense de Madrid
- late-control-and-ocr-aidParis 1641 Opera printing — Internet Archive