Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation
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Facing Pages · Branch 183 of 191
Book VIII · Chapter 13 · § 2
Latin
p. 360Igitur, si ipsa sit aliquid corporale, talis redderetur omnino qualia corpora. Fiet ergo aqua cum aquam intelliget; cum ignem intelliget, ignis. Et quia simul intelligit calorem atque frigus, fiet contraria simul. Nunc autem formas accipit omnium, neque e suo statu deicitur; immo proficit capiendo. Hinc apparet intellectum non esse corporeum. Apparet etiam non esse mortalem. Ille siquidem eo modo quo est accipit quicquid accipit. Esse suum intellectuale est dumtaxat. Non ergo accipit quicquam aliter quam intelligendo. Per huiusmodi susceptionem non modo non deficit, sed et proficit. Nihil ergo suscipit aliunde quod ipsum mutet et perdat; et, quod maius est, tantum in omnibus formis suscipiendis lucratur, ut lucrari etiam videatur in malis. Si tanto perfectior evadit quanto cognoscit plura, certe perfectior est si rerum privationes, defectus et mala discernit quam si ignorat. Quae ergo in se ipsis mala sunt et noxia, in mente fiunt bona atque salubria. Multum abest ut ea natura a malis noxiisque rebus interimatur, quae ita mala convertit in bona, ut ipsi bona sint omnia.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VIII
p. 361If the mind itself were something corporeal, therefore, it would be made altogether such as the bodies it understands. It would become water when it understood water, and fire when it understood fire; and because it understands heat and cold together, it would become contraries at once. In fact, however, it receives the forms of all things without being cast down from its own state; indeed, it advances by receiving them. Hence it is apparent that intellect is not corporeal. It is also apparent that it is not mortal. For it receives whatever it receives according to the mode in which it exists, and its being is purely intellectual. It therefore receives nothing except by understanding. Through reception of this kind it not only does not fail but actually advances. Thus it receives nothing from outside that can change and destroy it; and, what is more, it gains so much in receiving every form that it seems to gain even from evils. If it becomes more perfect in proportion as it knows more things, it is surely more perfect when it discerns the privations, defects, and evils of things than when it is ignorant of them. Things that are evil and harmful in themselves thus become good and wholesome in the mind. So far is this nature from being destroyed by evil and harmful things that it converts evils into goods, with the result that all things become good for it.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II · Book VIII · VIII.13.2
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.
- PDF editionComplete Volume II — PDF
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- public-domain-base-witnessFlorence 1482 editio princeps — Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
- collating-witness-cc-by-4.0Paris 1559 printing — Universidad Complutense de Madrid
- late-control-and-ocr-aidParis 1641 Opera printing — Internet Archive