Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation
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English Page · Branch 172 of 191
Book VIII · Chapter 5 · § 1
Latin
p. 338Quinta ratio. Si mens est corpus, tangendo intelligit et currendo.
Si mens est corpus aut forma diffusa per corporis magnitudinem, duo quaedam in se habet, ut alias indicavimus: punctum videlicet et latitudinem. Atque eisdem condicionibus mancipatur quibus et corpus. Ideo non aliter res intelligendas comprehendet quam tangendo illas, seque per illas amplificando, et instar corporis transcurrendo. Aut igitur tangere dicetur puncto solum ut intelligat, aut sola latitudine, aut utrisque. Si solo utitur puncto et ad cognoscendum indiget tactu, rerum magnitudines non cognoscet; quippe per punctum puncta attingit, non magnitudines. Atqui etiam si attingeret, numquam tamen totus aut totas eas agnosceret. Nam puncta in eo sunt infinita, infinita quoque in magnitudine. Illorum omnium cumulus est intellectus; horum quodammodo cumulus est magnitudo. Infinita pertransire non licet. Ergo neque mens ipsa tota intelliget umquam, neque totam intelliget magnitudinem. Igitur non solo utitur puncto. Num sola utitur latitudine ad tangendum? Nequaquam. Sola namque illa cognosceret quae latitudine ipsa tanguntur. Haec vero ea sunt tantum quae et ipsa latitudine distenduntur. Nunc autem praeter haec alia multa cognoscimus. Confugient ad hoc nonnulli, ut mentem confiteantur ambobus uti ad cognoscendum: puncto quidem ad simplicia, ad alia latitudine. Verisimile istud apparet, non tamen est verum. Primo quidem per punctum simplicia illa attinget solum quae corpori applicantur ut punctum; formas vero solutas aut numeros non attinget. Deinde per latitudinem suam percurret totam cognoscendi corporis magnitudinem, ut intelligat totum. Non potest autem latitudo aliqua totum aliquod transcurrere spatium magnitudinis, nisi qualibet sui parte in longum quamlibet spatii illius percurrat partem. Ergo mens singulas ipsius partes cuique parti corporis cognoscendi discurrendo per ordinem admovebit; admovendo cognoscet. Admovebit autem partes quodammodo infinitas. Tot enim partes mens habebit, si latitudo corporalis extiterit. Itaque brevi tempore quasi innumerabiliter quamlibet illius corporis portionem intelliget, et ipsum corpus secundum particulas paene infinitas innumerabiliter cognitas, infinitis, ut ita loquar, vicibus innumere apprehendet.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VIII
p. 339Fifth argument. If the mind is a body, it understands by touching things and by traversing them.
If the mind is a body, or a form diffused throughout the magnitude of a body, it contains two things within itself, as we have shown elsewhere: a point and breadth. It is bound by the same conditions as the body. It will therefore apprehend things to be understood only by touching them, enlarging itself through them, and traversing them as a body does. It must accordingly be said to touch in order to understand either with a point alone, with breadth alone, or with both. If it uses only a point and needs contact in order to know, it will not know the magnitudes of things, since through a point it reaches points, not magnitudes. Even if it did reach magnitudes, the mind as a whole would never know them in their entirety. For the points within it are infinite, and those within a magnitude are likewise infinite. The intellect is the aggregate of all the former, while magnitude is in a certain way the aggregate of the latter. But an infinity cannot be traversed. The whole mind will therefore never understand, nor will it understand a whole magnitude. Thus it does not use a point alone. Does it then use breadth alone in order to touch? By no means. It would know only those things which are touched by breadth itself, and these are only things which are themselves extended in breadth. Yet we know many other things besides these. Some will seek refuge in the claim that the mind uses both point and breadth in knowing: the point for simple things and breadth for everything else. This appears plausible, but it is not true. Through a point the mind would reach only simple things that can be applied to a body as a point can; it would not reach separate forms or numbers. Then, through its breadth, it would have to run across the whole magnitude of the body to be known in order to understand it as a whole. But no breadth can traverse an entire space of magnitude unless each part of that breadth, stretched lengthwise, runs across each part of the space. The mind will therefore move each of its parts in succession toward each part of the body to be known, and it will know by moving toward it. Yet it will be moving parts that are in a sense infinite, for that is how many parts the mind will have if it possesses bodily breadth. In a brief time, then, it will understand each portion of the body in an almost innumerable fashion, and it will grasp the body itself, in its nearly infinite particles known innumerably, an infinite number of times, so to speak, and without number.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II · Book VIII · VIII.5.1
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.
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- public-domain-base-witnessFlorence 1482 editio princeps — Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
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- late-control-and-ocr-aidParis 1641 Opera printing — Internet Archive