Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Name: Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Author: Marsilio Ficino

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook V · Chapter 5 · §§ 3–6

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Latin Page · Branch 17 of 191

Book V · Chapter 5 · §§ 3–6

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Latin

p. 28

Corpus materiam habet et formam ut sui causas, efficientem etiam atque finem; qualitas formam non habet ut formalem causam. Ipsa enim forma quaedam est. Forma vero nulla, quantum est forma, formatur; efficitur tamen ab aliquo qualitas et ad finem quendam ab agente dirigitur, atque etiam a materia pendet ut causa, siquidem ex praegnante materiae alvo talis fetus in lucem educitur et cum ipsa extenditur atque dividitur. Quapropter qualitas gradu uno superat corpus, quod aliquo modo per se dicitur, cum non formetur ab alio.

At cur non etiam essentia tertia, quae qualitate sublimior est, uno saltem gradu superet qualitatem, sicut qualitas uno superat corpus? Superat certe. Sed quomodo? Non eo quod haec essentia efficiente careat aut fine, cum hoc Deo soli conveniat. Non hoc etiam, quod essentia haec formam sui causam non habet; idem namque possidet qualitas. Solum ex eo restat ut superet, quod a materia non dependet, quod minime convenit qualitati. Ita oportet a quattuor oppositis in quattuor opposita per tria et duo gradatim procedere, ut sicut super quattuor corporis causas in tres causas qualitatis ascendimus, ita super tres causas qualitatis in duas essentiae tertiae causas ascendamus.

Quapropter essentia haec solum efficientem et finalem habebit causam; formam vero et materiam non habebit. Denique angelus uno hanc essentiam superat, quoniam angelus neque a materia dependet neque ad materiam inclinatur, cum a Deo proxime occupetur. Essentia tertia, licet a materia non dependeat, tamen a Deo facta longinquior et propinqua materiae ad eam quodammodo inclinatur; ob quam inclinationem anima nuncupatur. Et licet inclinetur, non tamen ab ipsa dependet, quod multis rationibus demonstravimus.

Prima est quam assignavimus.

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book V

p. 29

Body has matter and form as its causes, as well as an efficient cause and an end. Quality does not have form as a formal cause, since it is itself a kind of form. No form, insofar as it is form, is itself formed. Quality is nevertheless produced by something and directed by its agent toward some end; it also depends upon matter as a cause, since such an offspring is brought forth into the light from the pregnant womb of matter and is extended and divided together with matter. Quality therefore stands one degree above body because it is said, in a certain sense, to exist through itself, since it is not formed by another.

Why, then, should the third essence, which stands higher than quality, not likewise surpass quality by at least one degree, just as quality surpasses body by one? It certainly does. But how? Not because this essence lacks an efficient cause or an end; that belongs to God alone. Nor because this essence does not have form as its cause, for quality possesses that same exemption. It remains that the third essence surpasses quality solely because it does not depend upon matter, a freedom that quality certainly does not possess. We must therefore advance by degrees from four opposed terms to their four opposites, passing through three and two: just as we rose above body's four causes to quality's three, so we must rise above quality's three causes to the third essence's two.

Consequently, this essence will have only an efficient and a final cause; it will have neither form nor matter as a cause. Finally, the angel surpasses this essence by one degree, since an angel neither depends upon matter nor inclines toward it, being held most immediately by God. The third essence, although it does not depend upon matter, was made farther from God and nearer to matter and therefore inclines toward matter in a certain way. Because of this inclination it is called soul. Yet although it inclines toward matter, it does not depend upon it, as we have shown by many arguments.

The first is the argument we have already given.

41.Ut causa is construed with a materia pendet: quality depends upon matter as a cause. Siquidem then supplies the image that explains this dependence.

42.The pregnant-womb and birth-into-light imagery is retained, together with the material extension and division of quality.

43.The rhetorical question, immediate answer, and second question are preserved before the exclusions are considered in Ficino's order.

44.The compressed a quattuor oppositis in quattuor opposita describes the graded ascent from four causal dependencies toward their opposites; the explicit four-to-three-to-two sequence controls the English.

45.‘As a cause’ is supplied after form and matter from the governing causal sequence; Ficino is not denying that the third essence is itself form.

46.The distinction between inclination toward matter and dependence upon matter is repeated rather than varied away; it grounds the name anima without compromising the proof.

47.Assignavimus refers back to the argument already set out against the soul's dependence upon matter; the concise source unit remains concise in English.

About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.