Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Name: Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Author: Marsilio Ficino

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook VIII · Chapter 4 · §§ 6–7

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Latin Page · Branch 166 of 191

Book VIII · Chapter 4 · §§ 6–7

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Latin

p. 326

Si enim figmento mentis id fiat, erramus, non discimus. Si autem situ, ita ut genus in parte mentis dextra sit, differentia in sinistra, sane quia licet menti communia haec resolvere, illa mens dividet. Per hanc ipsam divisionem modo corporeo secabuntur, et dimidium generis unum in parte dimidia dextrae partis relinquetur, dimidium alterum relinquetur in altera. Idem accidet differentiae. Licebit partiri iterum. Hinc dilaniatio sequetur, non resolutio, et dum communia discerptemus scientiam disperdemus. Quod si per divisionem non lacerentur communia illa, sed genus in quavis sui parte supersit integrum, et similiter differentia, iam non erunt amplius corporalia, quia certa quantitate non indigent; ac etiam innumerabilia genera totidemque differentias qui ita secabit inveniet. Atque horum multitudo non natura constabit, sed mentis machinatione nascetur.

Forsitan Epicurei, ut has obiectiones devitent, non dabunt amplius speciem illam intelligibilem ex genere differentiaque componi, sed partibus aliis. Nos autem quaeremus numquid speciei pars, qualiscumque illa sit, a tota specie differat necne. Si non differat, sane neque pars erit illa quae a toto non differt, sed erit totum; neque species illa erit composita, si nihilo differt a partibus, quia sic partium caret diversitate. Ergo differre speciei partem a specie fatebuntur. Nos autem ab illis quomodo differat sciscitabimur. Si non tamquam genus differentiave a specie, ut ostendimus, num saltem tamquam a specie species, ceu a colore figura? Sed hoc admitti non potest. Non est enim species talis intra speciem; non continetur sub colore figura. Pars tamen intra totum est et continetur ab illo.

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VIII

p. 327

If this union is made by a fiction of the mind, we are in error rather than learning. If it is made by spatial arrangement, with genus in the right side of the mind and difference in the left, then, since the mind may resolve these universals, it will divide them. By this very division they will be cut in a bodily manner: one half of the genus will remain in one half of the mind’s right part, and the other half in the other half; the same will happen to the difference. They may then be divided again. The result will be mangling, not analysis; while we tear the universals apart, we shall scatter knowledge itself. But if division does not mutilate these universals—if the genus remains whole in each of its parts, and the difference likewise—they are no longer bodily, because they require no determinate quantity. Moreover, whoever divides in this fashion will discover innumerable genera and an equal number of differences. Their multitude will not be established by nature, but will arise from the mind’s contrivance.

Perhaps, to escape these objections, the Epicureans will no longer grant that the intelligible species is composed of genus and difference, but will say that it has other parts. We shall then ask whether a part of the species, whatever it may be, differs from the whole species or not. If it does not differ, what does not differ from the whole will certainly not be a part but the whole itself; nor will the species be composite if it differs in no respect from its parts, for it will then lack any diversity of parts. They will therefore admit that a part of the species differs from the species. We in turn shall ask how it differs. If it differs not as genus or difference differs from a species, as we have shown, does it at least differ as one species differs from another—as figure, for example, differs from color? This too cannot be admitted. A species of that kind is not within another species: figure is not contained under color. A part, however, is within the whole and contained by it.

About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.