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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook VIII · Chapter 4 · § 1

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Facing Pages · Branch 161 of 191

Book VIII · Chapter 4 · § 1

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Latin

p. 316

Quarta ratio. Species conceptioque intelligibilis suscipi non potest a corpore.

Id sentiunt Graeci omnes Platonici. Idem possumus ita Platonicorum Arabum sententia confirmare. Intellectus rem aliquam, puta hominem, non intelligit nisi formam quandam universalem hominum significatricem adipiscatur, quam intelligibilem formam et speciem nominant. Hanc adeptus, quid sit hominis natura ita iudicat: homo est animal rationale. Iudicium hoc tum conceptus et conceptio mentis vocatur, tum rei cognoscendae ratio et definitio, quam etiam solemus scientiam appellare. Si intellectus a corporis latitudine protendatur, tam forma intelligibilis quam conceptio latitudini corporis adhaerebit. In hac ipsa latitudine duo considerantur, punctum scilicet et extensio latitudinis. Igitur formae illius conceptionisque sedes erit vel solum punctum aliquod corporis vel extensio. At vero si neutrum concedi debet, ut demonstrabimus, sequitur ut intellectus in corpore minime protendatur. Ostendamus prius punctum sedem talem esse non posse. Primum quidem animadvertendum est punctum non existere per se ipsum, sed esse mensurae corporis sic affixum ut semper eius sit terminus. Si pro natura sua rem capit, certe numquam accipit nisi terminum aliquem magnitudinis alicuius quae in illa corporis mensura suscipiatur, cuius terminus est punctum. Ita ut sicut corporalis mensura suscipit rei advenientis magnitudinem, sic talis mensurae terminus terminum suscipiat magnitudinis. Quare quicquid puncto corporis suscipi dicitur non est a magnitudine liberum. Ideo si formae intelligibilis receptaculum sit punctum, fieri non poterit quin ea species divisibilis sit et terminum suum in puncto corporis habeat, reliquas vero partes in corporis latitudine. Eam tamen indivisibilem esse probabimus in sequentibus.

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VIII

p. 317

Fourth argument. Neither an intelligible form nor an intelligible conception can be received by a body.

All the Greek Platonists hold this view. We can also confirm it from the teaching of the Arab Platonists. The intellect does not understand a thing—for example, a human being—unless it acquires a universal form signifying human beings, which they call an intelligible form and species. Once it has acquired this form, it judges what human nature is: a human being is a rational animal. This judgment is called both a concept and conception of the mind, and also an account and definition of the thing to be known, which we are accustomed to call knowledge. If the intellect extended across the breadth of a body, both the intelligible form and the conception would adhere to that bodily breadth. Within such breadth two things must be considered: a point and the extension of the breadth. The seat of that form and conception will therefore be either a single point of the body or its extension. But if neither can be granted, as we shall demonstrate, it follows that the intellect is not extended within a body at all. Let us first show that a point cannot be such a seat. We must observe at the outset that a point does not exist by itself, but is so bound to the measure of a body that it is always that measure’s limit. If by its nature it receives a thing, it certainly receives nothing except some limit of a magnitude received within that bodily measure, the point being the magnitude’s limit. Thus, just as bodily measure receives the magnitude of the thing that enters it, the limit of that measure receives the limit of the magnitude. Whatever is said to be received at a bodily point is therefore not free from magnitude. Consequently, if a point were the receptacle of an intelligible form, that species could not fail to be divisible: it would have its limit in the bodily point and its remaining parts throughout the breadth of the body. Yet in what follows we shall prove it to be indivisible.

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About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.