Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation
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English Page · Branch 157 of 191
Book VIII · Chapter 3 · §§ 2–4
Latin
p. 308Summatim vero quid aliud speculativa virtus est nisi claritas intellectus? Quid aliud moralis nisi fervor stabilis appetitus ab intellectus claritate succensus? Claritas illa non paulatim fit, licet ad eam pedetentim perveniamus. Sicut post longam per vestigia multa investigationem subito lepus aspicitur, ita quisque in se ipso animadvertit, post diuturnam indaginem, se momento quid verum sit ea de re quam quaesiverit intueri.
Subito veritatis lumen, ut Plato inquit, effulget in animo, non subito excussum a rebus, sed longa quadam discussione ut ex lapide saepius colliso scintilla. Similiter diuturna consuetudine iuventus ad mores disponitur, donec paululum quod ad accendendum stabilem illum rationalemque appetitus ardorem deficit; nondum sufficienter accenditur, nondum virtus moralis habetur; saepius inspirando subito tandem flagrat aestus appetitus sufficiens ad virtutem. Quid plura? Verso ad solem speculo, in speculo lumen momento refulget; supposita illi speculo lana, statim ut parata est, in ipsa ignis accenditur. Quare et repentinus splendor in speculo fit et repentinus ignis in lana. Non aliter subita in intellectu claritas veritatis, subita inde in appetitu flagrantia.
Resume iterum hoc pacto. Virtus speculativa est quaedam cognitio veritatis. Si gradatim constetur, pars nunc quidem habebitur, pars deficiet et quaeretur. Quatenus pars veritatis habebitur, sciemus quidem; quatenus pars deerit, etiam nesciemus. Ita eandem rem et sciemus simul et nesciemus, quod ne ebrius quidem aliquis somniaret.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VIII
p. 309In sum, what is contemplative virtue other than the clarity of intellect? And what is moral virtue other than the steady ardor of appetite kindled by the clarity of intellect? This clarity does not arise by degrees, although we reach it little by little. Just as, after a long search through many tracks, the hare is suddenly sighted, so each of us observes within himself that after prolonged investigation he sees in a moment what is true concerning the matter he has been seeking.
As Plato says, the light of truth suddenly flashes forth in the soul. It is not suddenly struck from things, but is brought forth by a long process of inquiry, as a spark is struck from a stone repeatedly beaten. In the same way, long habituation disposes a young person toward moral character. So long as the little that is needed to kindle that stable and rational ardor of appetite is still lacking, it is not yet sufficiently kindled and moral virtue is not yet possessed. Yet by blowing upon it again and again, at last the heat of appetite sufficient for virtue suddenly bursts into flame. Why say more? Turn a mirror toward the sun, and light flashes in the mirror in an instant; place wool beneath that mirror, and as soon as it is prepared, fire is kindled in the wool. Thus the splendor in the mirror arises suddenly, and so does the fire in the wool. In just this way, the clarity of truth suddenly arises in the intellect and from it a sudden flame in appetite.
Let us take up the point once more in this way. Contemplative virtue is a certain knowledge of truth. If it were constituted by degrees, one part would now be possessed while another was still lacking and being sought. To the extent that part of the truth was possessed, we would know; to the extent that part was lacking, we would not know. We would thus know and not know the same thing at the same time—a thing that not even a drunken man would dream.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II · Book VIII · VIII.3.2–VIII.3.4
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.
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- public-domain-base-witnessFlorence 1482 editio princeps — Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
- collating-witness-cc-by-4.0Paris 1559 printing — Universidad Complutense de Madrid
- late-control-and-ocr-aidParis 1641 Opera printing — Internet Archive