Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Third argument. Because the soul's virtue is indivisible, it cannot be a quality of a body.

1What is indivisible cannot be a quality of a body. For if it is assumed to be a quality of a body, we shall ask whether it touches some divisible part of the body or some indivisible point of it. If the first is granted, a quality of this kind will certainly be divisible, since it touches in a divisible manner; thus, the quality of the divisible thing will not be indivisible, but what belongs to something divisible will itself be divisible. If the second is granted, that quality will surely be a quality only of the point it touches, not of the body. Hence, what is indivisible will never be a quality of a body. Now the indivisible virtue of the human soul is a quality. Therefore the soul is not a body. This demonstration should be deemed sufficient if we establish its two claims more plainly: that virtue is a quality of the soul, and that virtue itself is indivisible. The first is perfectly evident to everyone, since by the presence of virtue the soul becomes such and such in character and is called wise, prudent, just, courageous, and temperate. Virtue, moreover, can be absent from the soul while the soul remains; such is the condition of qualities. The second claim—that virtue is indivisible—we establish as follows. There are two kinds of virtue: some reside in the intellect, while others reside in appetite, whether rational or irrational. The former are called contemplative virtues, the latter moral virtues. The contemplative virtues are acquired through contemplation and, once acquired, are exercised in contemplation. The moral virtues are acquired through conduct and custom and, once acquired, consist in character and the practice of deeds. The first kind comprises wisdom concerning divine things, knowledge of natural things, prudence in civil affairs, and skill in human works. The second comprises justice, which renders to each what is his own; courage, which removes from us the obstacle of fear so that we are readier for honorable deeds; and temperance, which repels the softness of desire, the other obstacle to honorable deeds. These are Plato’s descriptions of the virtues. If there were any bodily magnitude in these virtues, the larger a person was, the wiser and more just he could become, and men small in body could neither surpass nor equal large men in virtue. Again, knowledge of the largest bodies would be wider and clearer than knowledge of smaller ones. Yet we know many things whose magnitude we cannot equal. The whole soul perceives a large thing just as fully and in just the same manner as it perceives a small one.