Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Name: Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Author: Marsilio Ficino

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook VIII · Chapter 2 · § 8

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English Page · Branch 155 of 191

Book VIII · Chapter 2 · § 8

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Latin

p. 304

Quo fit ut de ipsa veritate rerum—quid sit, qua ratione constet inveniaturque, quid ipsi sit propinquius quidve remotius—non sensus ullus, immo sola ratio iudicet, et tunc potissimum quando sese a sensuum corporumque fallacia sevocat. Est ergo veritas incorporea. Talis est autem maxime veritas et scientia divinorum, qua praecipue animus oblectatur et alitur. Quo igitur modo animus potest corporalis esse, qui corporalibus cibis offenditur, spiritalibus alitur, quandoquidem veritate omni, praesertim divinarum rerum veritate, delectatur, alitur, augetur? Aut quo pacto mortalis erit, si veritate pascitur immortali, cum neque corruptibilis venter cibum incorruptibilem cupiat aut capiat, neque cibus incorruptibilis in corpus transeat corruptibile? Sane si immortalis est veritas, atque est continuus animi cibus, ut certe est, sive ipsa convertatur in animum sive animum in se ipsam convertat, eum efficit immortalem. Quoniam vero, dum familiari hoc vescitur cibo, ea voluptate perfunditur quae neque molestiam habet admixtam neque in fastidium vertitur vel dolorem, constat mentem neque fatigari umquam, neque turbari contrarii alicuius occursu, neque in contrarium aliquid posse corrumpi. Rursus, quia menti nihil natura optabilius est quam veritas, veritas autem per separationem quandam a rebus mortalibus comparatur, nihil menti, qua ratione mens est, magis est naturale familiareque quam a mortalibus segregari. Ex eo vero quod maxime naturale est non remissio vitae sequitur, sed intensio. Quapropter tunc vivet mens praecipue cum hinc abierit. Hanc vero argumentationem nostram argumentatione quadam Olympiodori Platonici confirmare possumus, quam partim Pythagoricis, partim Platonicis mysteriis a Phaedone Gorgiaque acceptis sic ille contexuit. Mens naturali veritatis aviditate continue tum se a corpore, tum formas a materia separat, cupitque ita atque conatur separata vivere, quamvis quotidie in contrarium corpus sensusque detorqueant. Separatam vero illam a caduco corpore vitam naturaliter appetit, tamquam naturaliter, id est revera, bonam, praesertim cum vita sit omnino dedita veritati atque bonitati. Vita eiusmodi si bona est, ergo et possibilis est. Quod enim impossibile est, idem quoque inutile; bonum vero inutile non est dicendum. Item, si impotentia ad malum pertinet, ad bonum potentia pertinet. Ergo bonum omne natura sua possibile est. Hinc efficitur ut naturalis appetitio boni sit possessionis possibilis appetitio. Ac si etiam quod apparet bonum est possibile, certe et ipsum revera bonum potentissimum est, et vera bona vere beneque quaerentibus possibilia sunt.

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VIII

p. 305

Consequently, no sense but reason alone judges what the truth of things is, by what principle it is constituted and discovered, and what lies nearer or farther from it; reason judges most fully when it withdraws from the deceit of senses and bodies. Truth, then, is incorporeal. Above all, truth and knowledge of divine things are of this kind; in such knowledge the soul chiefly delights and is nourished. How, then, can the soul be bodily when bodily food offends it and spiritual food nourishes it, since every truth—and above all the truth of divine things—delights, nourishes, and enlarges it? Or how can it be mortal if it feeds on immortal truth, when a corruptible stomach can neither desire nor contain incorruptible food, and incorruptible food cannot pass into a corruptible body? Certainly, if immortal truth is the soul’s continual food, as it surely is, whether truth is converted into the soul or converts the soul into itself, it makes the soul immortal. Moreover, while the mind feeds upon this familiar food, it is filled with pleasure unmixed with distress and turning neither to disgust nor pain. It is therefore evident that the mind is never wearied or disturbed by the encounter with any contrary and cannot be corrupted into anything contrary. Again, since nothing is more desirable to the mind by nature than truth, whereas truth is gained through a certain separation from mortal things, nothing is more natural or congenial to the mind, insofar as it is mind, than separation from mortal things. What is most natural brings not a weakening of life but its intensification. The mind, therefore, will live most fully when it has departed hence. We can confirm our argument by one that the Platonist Olympiodorus wove from mysteries partly Pythagorean, partly Platonic, received from the Phaedo and the Gorgias. In its natural hunger for truth, the mind continually separates itself from body and forms from matter; it desires and strives to live thus apart, though every day body and senses wrench it in the opposite direction. It naturally desires this life apart from the perishable body, regarding it as naturally—that is, truly—good, especially as such a life is wholly devoted to truth and goodness. If such a life is good, it is also possible. The impossible is also useless; but the good cannot be called useless. Again, if impotence belongs to evil, power belongs to good. Every good, therefore, is possible by nature. It follows that natural desire for good is desire for a possible possession. And if even what merely appears good is possible, surely the truly good itself is supremely powerful, and true goods are possible for those who seek them truly and well.

About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.