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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook VIII · Chapter 2 · § 7

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Latin Page · Branch 154 of 191

Book VIII · Chapter 2 · § 7

Latin

p. 302

Veritas autem non est corporea; alioquin rebus incorporeis non inesset. Nunc autem inest Deo, angelisque et numeris, quae et incorporalia sunt et vera. Et quoniam incorporalia tanto veriora sunt corporibus quanto puriora firmioraque sunt, fit ut veritas in illis sit potius quam corporibus. Atqui, quod maius est, non est proprie veritas in corporibus. In his enim duo sunt, materia et forma. Non est veritas in materia; nam per eam nihil vere in specie aliqua rerum est: non homo revera per eam aliquid est, non equus, et reliqua. Neque tamen in forma corporis iacet veritas, cum vera forma non sit cuius virtus inficitur in materia. Testantur hoc et mathematici, qui veras figuras in corporibus non reperiunt. Verus quippe circulus locatus in vero plano assidue volvitur; hoc fieri ratio cogit, cum circulus ille planum tangat in puncto, in puncto autem corpus quiescere nequeat. Nemo haec in corporibus vidit umquam. Non insunt igitur verae figurae corporibus, quia forte neque vera principia figurarum, saltem quantum spectat ad sensum, qualia sunt puncta, lineae, superficies. Ratio quidem ostendit verum punctum longitudine carere debere, veram lineam latitudine, superficiem veram profunditate. Talia vero in materia nusquam sensu reperiuntur. Cum ergo alicubi sit veritas et a corporibus sensuque absit, est procul dubio in spiritibus. Est igitur incorporea. Idem ex eo patet, quia ibi maxime consistit veritas ubi scientia. Haec vero in rationibus rerum universalibus revera versatur, ceu cum quis cognoscit quid bonitas ipsa sit, quid iustitia, singulis bonis et iustis actionibus officiisque communis, atque similia. Rationes vero huiusmodi incorporales sunt, quoniam in nullo particulari corpore concluduntur, sed sunt ad multa communes. Ratio corporis vel circuli tota in minimo corpore vel circulo sicut in maximo reperitur; ratio longitudinis vel latitudinis vel profunditatis tota in minima linea, superficie, altitudine, sicut in maxima. Denique ratio quantitatis ipsius tota adaequatur toti rei cuiuslibet quantitati. Quapropter rationes corporis, figurae, dimensionis atque ipsius etiam quantitatis corporales et extensae non sunt; multo minus rationes aliae corporales et extensae esse possunt. Praeterea rationes rerum immutabiles sunt, nam aliter se habere non possunt; omnia vero corporalia mutabilia sunt. Quapropter scientia, cum in his versetur, est incorporea; igitur et veritas incorporea.

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VIII

p. 303

Truth, however, is not bodily; otherwise it would not be present in incorporeal things. Yet it is present in God, in angels, and in numbers, all of which are both incorporeal and true. And since incorporeal things are truer than bodies in proportion as they are purer and more stable, truth exists in them more fully than it does in bodies. More than this, truth does not properly exist in bodies at all. Bodies consist of two things, matter and form. Truth does not lie in matter, for through matter nothing truly belongs to any species of things: matter does not make anything truly a man, a horse, or any other determinate thing. Nor does truth lie in a bodily form, since no form whose power is tainted in matter is a true form. Mathematicians also bear witness to this, for they do not find true figures in bodies. A true circle placed upon a true plane would roll continually. Reason requires this, since such a circle touches the plane at one point, while a body cannot rest upon a point. No one has ever seen such things in bodies. True figures are therefore not present in bodies, perhaps because even the true principles of figures—at least so far as sense is concerned—are not present there: points, lines, and surfaces. Reason shows that a true point must lack length, a true line breadth, and a true surface depth. Nowhere in matter are such things found by sense. Since truth exists somewhere, yet is absent from bodies and sensation, it is without doubt in spirits. Truth is therefore incorporeal. The same conclusion is evident from this: truth resides most fully where knowledge resides. Knowledge is truly concerned with the universal principles of things, as when someone knows what goodness itself is or what justice is—the justice common to particular good and just actions and duties—and with similar things. Principles of this kind are incorporeal, since they are enclosed in no particular body but are common to many. The principle of body or circle is found whole in the smallest body or circle just as in the largest. The principle of length, breadth, or depth is entire in the smallest line, surface, or depth just as in the greatest. Finally, the principle of quantity itself corresponds as a whole to the entire quantity of any given thing. Therefore, the principles of body, figure, dimension, and even quantity itself are not bodily or extended; much less can other principles be bodily and extended. Moreover, the principles of things are immutable, for they cannot be otherwise, whereas all bodily things are mutable. Since knowledge is concerned with these principles, it is incorporeal; therefore truth too is incorporeal.

303

About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.