Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation
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Latin Page · Branch 149 of 191
Book VIII · Chapter 1 · § 5
Latin
p. 292Meminisse vero oportet intellectum non universalem modo naturam, sed particularem quoque cognoscere; alioquin non posset utramque invicem comparare, cognoscere insuper vires infra se omnes actusque ipsarum, quando omnes comparat ad se ipsum. Prius tamen universalem quam particularem naturam ab ipso cognosci paene omnes consentiunt. Siquidem pro natura formae intelligibilis in primis agit. Ea vero cum abstractione quadam concipiatur, absoluta est; unde naturam in primis refert universalem. Quam quidem vim a virtute intellectus in quo et a quo est adipiscitur, quasi intellectus ipse sit absolutus. A simulacro vero quod in phantasia est particulare solum repraesentatur. Quod quidem particulare ab intellectu solum secundo quodam actu atque reflexo prospici, tum Platonici tum Peripatetici plurimum arbitrantur, quatenus intellectus, postquam subito rectaque via per speciem universalem intuitus est, inde discursu quodam per actum speciemque in simulacrum, quo incitante species concepta fuerat, sese reflectens, particulare iam prospicit. Ideo motus ad incorporea absolutaque maxime naturalis est menti, quandoquidem primo, subito, recte ad ipsa se confert, ubi apparet intelligendi virtutem esse prorsus incorporealem. Si ergo per opera nutriendi, atque idem per opera sentiendi, quorum prima in corpore fiunt, secunda per corpus et circa corpora, ostendimus animam non esse divisam in corpore, quanto magis putandum est idem quoque per opera intelligendi patere, atque illud insuper: animam scilicet neque ducere originem a materia neque esse mortalem? Siquidem ipsa per se intelligendi opus exsequitur, in quo materiam relinquit omnino atque ad incorporales ascendit et perpetuas rationes. Age itaque videamus qua via possimus quod quaerimus per opera et effectus intelligentiae invenire.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VIII
p. 293We must remember, however, that intellect knows not only universal nature but particular nature as well; otherwise it could not compare the two with one another. It also knows all the powers below itself and their acts, since it compares them all with itself. Almost everyone agrees, nevertheless, that intellect knows universal nature before particular nature. For it acts first in accordance with the nature of intelligible form. Because such a form is conceived through an act of abstraction, it is absolute, and therefore represents universal nature first. It acquires this power from the efficacy of the intellect in which and from which it exists, as though intellect itself were absolute. By contrast, the image in phantasy represents the particular alone. Both Platonists and Peripatetics commonly hold that intellect sees this particular only by a second and reflexive act. After it has suddenly and directly beheld the universal form, it turns back through a certain discursive movement, by way of act and form, toward the image whose prompting occasioned the form’s conception; only then does it behold the particular. The movement toward incorporeal and absolute realities is therefore supremely natural to the mind, since first, suddenly, and directly it carries itself toward them. Here it becomes evident that the power of understanding is wholly incorporeal. If, through the operations of nutrition and likewise through those of sensation—the former taking place in the body, the latter through and about the body—we have shown that the soul is not divided in the body, how much more must the same truth become evident through the operations of understanding? And this further truth as well: that the soul neither derives its origin from matter nor is mortal. For the soul performs the work of understanding by itself; in that work it entirely leaves matter behind and ascends to incorporeal and eternal principles. Let us therefore now see by what path we can discover what we seek from the operations and effects of intelligence.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II · Book VIII · VIII.1.5
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.
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- public-domain-base-witnessFlorence 1482 editio princeps — Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
- collating-witness-cc-by-4.0Paris 1559 printing — Universidad Complutense de Madrid
- late-control-and-ocr-aidParis 1641 Opera printing — Internet Archive