Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation
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Facing Pages · Branch 148 of 191
Book VIII · Chapter 1 · § 4
Latin
p. 290Non tamen talis argumentatio necessaria est, ut intellectus rationes rerum communes attingat; immo sicut phantasia suapte natura de rebus iudicat singulatim, ita intellectus vi naturali statim absque ulla discursione, simul ac depicta est singularis imago illa Platonis in phantasia, subito, inquam, dimisso certo hoc homine, humanam illam communem omnibus tum naturam tum ideam excogitat. Picta illa pulchritudine et bonitate, illico universalem pulchritudinis et bonitatis cogitat naturam rationemque in nulla certa materia, nullo proprio situ vel tempore positam, sed vel in omni materia vel absolutam a materia in se ipsa simpliciter subsistentem. Quapropter sensus circa corpora versatur, imaginatio circa simulacra corporum, phantasia circa singulas simulacrorum intentiones, intellectus circa singularum intentionum naturas communes ac rationes penitus incorporeas.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VIII
p. 291No argument of this kind, however, is necessary for the intellect to attain the common principles of things. Just as phantasy by its own nature judges things singly, so intellect by its natural power acts immediately and without any discursive reasoning. As soon as that singular image of Plato is painted in phantasy, it suddenly—I say—sets aside this determinate man and conceives both the human nature common to all and its Idea. Once that beauty and goodness have been depicted, intellect immediately conceives the universal nature and principle of beauty and goodness, placed in no determinate matter, position, or time, but either present in all matter or, released from matter, subsisting simply in itself. Thus sensation is occupied with bodies, imagination with images of bodies, phantasy with the particular intentions of those images, and intellect with the common natures of those particular intentions and with wholly incorporeal principles.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II · Book VIII · VIII.1.4
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.
- PDF editionComplete Volume II — PDF
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- public-domain-base-witnessFlorence 1482 editio princeps — Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
- collating-witness-cc-by-4.0Paris 1559 printing — Universidad Complutense de Madrid
- late-control-and-ocr-aidParis 1641 Opera printing — Internet Archive