Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation
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Facing Pages · Branch 142 of 191
Book VII · Chapter 14 · § 1
Latin
p. 278Decimaquarta ratio. Quae magis concinit, magis est harmonia.
Harmonia ita in plurium concentu consistit, ut magis concinentibus fidibus magis sit harmonia, minus concinentibus vero minus. Anima nequissimi hominis minime concinit secum ipsa. Dissentit enim a ratione sensus. Pugnant quoque invicem appetitus. Anima probi hominis concinit undique. Si anima sit harmonia, anima probi viri quae concinit magis, magis est harmonia, igitur et anima magis. Anima vita quaedam est. Ergo et magis vita. Vivacior itaque, audentior et robustior erit probi viri anima quam latronis. Neque concoquet cibum latronis anima perinde ut iusti viri, neque generabit prolem, neque corporis membra sustinebit vibrabitque, neque acute inveniet, firmiter reminiscetur, loquetur eleganter, aggredietur audacter, neque diu spirabit, et reliqua.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VII
p. 279Fourteenth argument. The greater a thing's concord, the more fully it is a harmony.
Harmony consists in the concord of many things in such a way that the more fully the strings accord, the more harmony there is, and the less they accord, the less harmony there is. The soul of a thoroughly wicked man is least in accord with itself: sensation dissents from reason, and the appetites also fight one another. The soul of a good man accords in every respect. If the soul is harmony, then the soul of the good man, which accords more fully, is more harmony and therefore more soul. The soul is a kind of life; it is therefore also more life. Thus the good man's soul will be more lively, daring, and robust than the robber's. The robber's soul will not digest food as well as the just man's soul, nor generate offspring, nor support the body's members and set them in motion; nor will it display acuity in discovery, remember firmly, speak elegantly, undertake things boldly, or breathe for long—and so forth.
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Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II · Book VII · VII.14.1
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.
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- public-domain-base-witnessFlorence 1482 editio princeps — Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
- collating-witness-cc-by-4.0Paris 1559 printing — Universidad Complutense de Madrid
- late-control-and-ocr-aidParis 1641 Opera printing — Internet Archive