DiotimosReading Desk

Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition

Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

Explore the Lexicon
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook V · Chapter 4 · §§ 7–9

Swipe or use the arrow keys.

Latin Page · Branch 14 of 191

Book V · Chapter 4 · §§ 7–9

Book Mode

Latin

p. 22

Ubi apparet appetitum naturalem ad bonum, videlicet ad vitam, ad esse atque similia, non ad contraria dirigi, quia a summo bono, ut diximus, omnibus sequentibus est insertus. Unde enim sunt, inde moventur et illuc feruntur omnia. Igitur omnis omnium appetitio operatioque a bono exoriens tendit reflectiturque in bonum.

Quin etiam qui materiam funditus tollit e medio nequit novum opus suum alicubi stabilire, cessante formarum omnium generabilium fundamento. Ita et perderetur illa et novi nihil generaretur. Id enim quod denuo faciendum est, si eget materia, iam fieri non poterit illa sublata. Si non eget materia, ab ea liberum est. Quod est a materia liberum eamque supereminet ab auctore suo seorsum a materia procreatur. Itaque ipsius auctor, dum ipsum agit, quoniam fabricat ipsum ab illa longe semotum, nullam ex hoc illi violentiam infert, neque in ipsius generatione illam ullo modo movet, qua non indiget opus conficiendum. Igitur quod novam rem gignit, qualiscumque ea sit, sive materiae indiga sive aliena ab illa, materiam non perducit in nihilum.

An forte in aliquid aliud commutabit, ita ut pars una supersit materiae, pars vero perierit? Minime. Simplex enim illa est, quia neque ex materia et forma componitur, cum sit prima informisque potentia, neque certam quandam partium congeriem ad suam existentiam exigit, cum naturali origine praecedat quantitatis dimensiones. Praeterea si illa ita mutetur, ut expleta mutatione supersit aliquid, quid istud erit? Materiane? Si materia, nondum in aliud permutata videtur, cum supersit. Si quantitas aut qualitas, absurdum id quidem, quia non possunt haec absque illa manere. Si forma quaedam supersit materiam supereminens, quid opus erat materiam perdere, ut forma haec alienissima fieret, quae nullo modo ex ea fit et longe procul ab illa producitur?

22

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book V

p. 23

Here it is evident that natural desire is directed toward the good—toward life, being, and like things—not toward their contraries, because, as we have said, the supreme good has implanted it in all things that follow after it. For from the source from which all things have their being, they are moved, and toward that source they are borne. Thus every desire and every activity of all things, arising from the good, tend and turn back toward the good.

Moreover, whoever wholly removes matter from the midst cannot establish his new work anywhere, once the foundation of all generable forms has ceased to exist. Matter would thus be destroyed, and nothing new would be generated. For if what is to be made anew requires matter, it can no longer be made once matter has been removed. If it does not require matter, it is free from matter; and whatever is free from matter and rises above it is brought forth by its maker apart from matter. Consequently, while its maker brings it into being—fashioning it far removed from matter—he does matter no violence by doing so; nor in producing it does he in any way move the matter that the work does not require for its completion. Hence whatever generates a new thing, whatever sort it may be, whether it needs matter or is independent of it, does not reduce matter to nothing.

Or perhaps it will change matter into something else, so that one part of matter survives while another perishes? By no means. Matter is simple: it is not composed of matter and form, since it is the first and formless potency; nor does it require a particular assemblage of parts for its existence, since by its natural origin it precedes the dimensions of quantity. Moreover, if matter were so changed that something remained when the change was complete, what would that thing be? Matter? If matter, then while it survives, it does not appear to have been changed into something else. Quantity or quality? That too is absurd, since neither can remain without matter. Suppose that what survived were some form rising above matter. What need was there to destroy matter in order that this wholly alien form might arise—a form that is in no way made from matter and is produced far apart from it?

23

About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.