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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook VII · Chapter 7 · § 1

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Facing Pages · Branch 134 of 191

Book VII · Chapter 7 · § 1

Book Mode

Latin

p. 262

Septima ratio. Rationes propriae per naturalem et sensitivam animae vim quod anima non sit forma dividua, quia qualitatis opus unum est.

Et si superioribus rationibus non modo animam corpus non esse probavimus, verum etiam neque sparsam per corpora formam, tamen propriis argumentationibus secundam hanc partem ostendendam fore putamus. Atque, ut commodius hac de re loquamur, formam talem, ut diximus alias, tum qualitatem tum affectionem corporis Platonicorum more vocabimus. Si anima esset qualitas corporalis, vel esset simplex qualitas vel complexio vel forma istis astricta. Simplex esse non potest. Quaelibet enim simplex qualitas aut forma illam sequens, ut alias declaravimus, unum quiddam facit dumtaxat, ad opposita non extenditur; anima plurima et contraria. Neque etiam erit complexio aut forma sequens complexionem, quoniam in hac semper una quaedam prae ceteris qualitas dominatur, cuius operatio ante alias viget in corpore. Anima nulli qualitati, nulli proprio motui est astricta.

262

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VII

p. 263

Seventh argument. Arguments drawn specifically from the soul's natural and sensitive power show that the soul is not a divisible form, since a quality has a single operation.

Although the preceding arguments have proved not only that the soul is not a body but also that it is not a form dispersed through bodies, we think this second conclusion must still be demonstrated by arguments proper to it. To speak more conveniently about the matter, following the Platonists we shall call a form of this kind, as we have said elsewhere, both a quality and an affection of body. If the soul were a bodily quality, it would have to be either a simple quality, a bodily constitution, or a form bound to one of these. It cannot be simple. Every simple quality, or every form that follows such a quality, produces only one kind of effect, as we have shown elsewhere, and does not extend to opposites; the soul produces many and contrary effects. Nor will it be a constitution or a form that follows a constitution, since in every constitution one quality always dominates the rest and its operation prevails over the others in the body. The soul is bound to no quality and to no motion proper to any one quality.

263

About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.