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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook VII · Chapter 6 · § 1

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Latin Page · Branch 131 of 191

Book VII · Chapter 6 · § 1

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Latin

p. 256

Sexta ratio. Anima non necessario patitur sentiendo.

Anima ipsa, ut vera philosophia docet, cum sit purissima, crasso huic et terreno corpori ab ea longe distanti non aliter quam per tenuissimum quoddam lucidissimumque corpusculum copulatur, quem spiritum appellamus, a cordis calore genitum ex parte sanguinis tenuissima, diffusum inde per universum corpus. Huic anima sibi cognatissimo facile se insinuans, primo quidem per hunc totum se fundit spiritum, deinde hoc medio per corpus penitus universum; vitam primum huic praestat et motum, facitque vitalem; perque hunc regit movetque corpus; et quicquid a corpore in hunc spiritum permanat, anima ipsi praesens continuo percipit, quam perceptionem sensum cognominamus. Deinde hanc perceptionem animadvertit et iudicat, quam animadversionem phantasiam esse volumus. Quorsum haec? Quando secat medicus cutem corporis extimam, frangitur caro, dissolvitur et contrahitur spiritus. Sentit haec omnia tactus, qui per omnia membra universalis est animae sensus; iudicat haec et condolet phantasia. Quomodo potest discindi caro quin spiritus illi suffusus partim cum soluta carne solvatur, partim etiam in se ipsum fugiens contrahatur? Quo etiam pacto solutio et contractio spiritus latere suam animam poterit? Ac si non latet, cur non moleste ferat anima operis sui perniciem? Spiritus quidem et corpus opus est animae. Opus vero proprium omnia diligunt. In carne quidem est passio, cruciatus in spiritu, sensus in tactu, compassio et condolentia, ut ita loquar, in phantasia.

256

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VII

p. 257

Sixth argument. The soul is not necessarily acted upon in sensing.

The soul itself, as true philosophy teaches, is utterly pure. It can be joined to this gross and earthly body, which is far removed from it, only through an exceedingly subtle and luminous little body that we call the spirit. This spirit is generated by the heart's heat from the subtlest part of the blood and is diffused from there throughout the whole body. The soul readily insinuates itself into this spirit, which is most akin to it: first it pours itself throughout the spirit, then through this medium throughout the entire body. It first gives the spirit life and motion and makes it living; through the spirit it rules and moves the body; and whatever passes from the body into the spirit is continuously perceived by the soul present to it. We call this perception sensation. The soul then attends to and judges the perception, and this act of attention we call imagination. What is the purpose of this account? When a physician cuts the outer skin of the body, the flesh is broken and the spirit is loosened and contracted. Touch, the soul's universal sense extending through every member, senses all these events; imagination judges them and shares their pain. How can the flesh be severed without the spirit infused through it being partly loosened with the opened flesh and partly contracted as it retreats into itself? And how could the loosening and contraction of the spirit escape its soul? If it does not escape the soul, why should the soul not grieve over the destruction of its own work? Spirit and body are the soul's work, and all things love what is properly their own work. In the flesh there is bodily affection; in the spirit, torment; in touch, sensation; and in imagination, shared suffering and shared pain, so to speak.

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About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.