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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook VII · Chapter 4 · § 1

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Facing Pages · Branch 125 of 191

Book VII · Chapter 4 · § 1

Book Mode

Latin

p. 244

Quarta ratio. Si sensus dividuus sit, in eo imago sensibilis dividetur.

Esto, si vis, intimus ille visus corporea mole distentus. Quid inde sequatur, attende. Cum coloris externi capit concipitve imaginem, suo modo accipit atque corporeo. Imago huiusmodi per partes huius visus dividitur, et alia pars visus aliam coloris aspicit partem; nec erit in nobis aliquid quod totum colorem visibilem comprehendat. Oportet tamen unam rei unius comprehensionem ab uno fieri comprehendente. Ac si dixeris unum ipsum comprehendens esse formam quandam totius compositi, cunctis communem partibus, quaeremus numquid dividua sit, unde quaestio redibit eadem; an individua, unde comprehensionem in vi individua collocabimus. Oportet igitur sensum esse magnitudinis corporalis expertem, praesertim quia, si magnus sit, parvis non congruet neque sentiet illa totus, sed pars eius ipsa quae parvis aequatur. Si parvus, magna non capiet; si medius, non quadrabit extremis. At tu, si vis sensibilem colorem una cum sensu partiri, quonam pacto distribues? An aequalem aequali aptabis? Sed non potes. Non enim aequalis est sensus rei cuilibet sentiendae. In quot autem partes utrumque distribues? Num in quasdam partes numero quidem terminatas et naturali ordine minimas? Quod si feceris, non invenies unam rei unius comprehensionem.

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VII

p. 245

Fourth argument. If the faculty of sensation is divisible, the sensible image within it will be divided.

Grant, if you wish, that this inward sight is extended through bodily bulk. Consider what follows. When it receives or conceives the image of an external color, it receives that image in its own bodily manner. Such an image is divided among the parts of this sight: one part of sight beholds one part of the color, another beholds another, and there will be nothing in us that comprehends the whole visible color. Yet one comprehension of one thing must be made by one comprehending power. If you say that this one comprehending power is a form of the whole composite, common to all its parts, we shall ask whether that form is divisible, in which case the same question returns, or indivisible, in which case we shall have placed comprehension in an indivisible power. Sensation must therefore be free of bodily magnitude, especially because, if it were large, it would not be suited to small objects, nor would the whole of it sense them, but only the part equal to their size. If it were small, it would not contain large objects; if of a middle size, it would fit neither extreme. But suppose you wish to divide a sensible color together with the faculty of sensation: how will you distribute them? Will you fit an equal portion of one to an equal portion of the other? You cannot, for the faculty of sensation is not equal in size to every object sensed. Into how many parts, then, will you divide each? Into a determinate number of parts that are smallest by nature? If you do so, you will not find one comprehension of one thing.

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About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.