Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

2Is this one power indivisible, or is it divided into several parts like a body? Imagine that it is either an indivisible point called a, or a line drawn from a to b. If you say it is a line from a to b—a line a–b—I shall ask you the following. Whenever the soul is to compare a color with a voice by means of such a line, both objects must touch the line. Does the color reach only the endpoint a and not pass on to b, while the voice touches only the endpoint b and does not cross to a? Or do both color and voice reach both endpoints at once, a as well as b? If you grant the first alternative, so that only one object reaches each endpoint of the line, the two endpoints will plainly be two powers distinct from one another. Each will recognize what belongs to it and remain ignorant of the other object. The mind will therefore make the comparison through neither power. But if you grant that both objects converge upon both endpoints, so that the power of each endpoint perceives both, one of the two powers is sufficient and the other is idle, since the pair accomplish no more than either one alone. Indeed, the two powers will both be indivisible. We are thus compelled to confess that the soul's one power by which it distinguishes many things is not divisible. This power, the mistress of the senses, is therefore neither a body nor a quality diffused through a body. If a power of the soul is of this kind, what prevents the soul itself from being such? Unless, perhaps, you suppose that the power of a substance is nobler than the substance to which it belongs.