Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation
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English Page · Branch 114 of 191
Book VI · Chapter 13 · §§ 1–4
Latin
p. 222Decima ratio: anima non crescit ad corporis huius augmentum.
Si anima corpus est, implet certe corpus istud quod vides solidum, ut vivat totum; et ipsa tenue atque agile corpus est, quod animi celeritas indicat. Quare si corpus animalis partiaris in membra, sicut frusta omnia corporis corpora sunt, ita corpuscula illa quae in membris sectis supersunt sunt animae. Praesertim cum anima unius sit tota naturae, ut diversa coniungat. Vivent igitur, movebuntur et sentient ad tempus brachia et crura a corpore separata.
Et anima quae in reliquo restat corpore, quae saepe brachiis et cruribus amputatis vivit ibi decennium, multo erit minor quam antea. Ideo pusillanimis erit, hebes, obliviosa. Immo etiam sic argumentemur.
Si anima corpus est, manifesti huius corporis magnitudinem quantitate sua penitus aequans, crescente ipso crescet, decrescente decrescet. In vasto corpore magnificentior erit et divinior animus. Atque in eodem homine, quando adolescente corpore adolescet et anima, oportebit ut per adiunctionem corporis sibi similis adolescat. Alimentum huiusmodi vivitne in se antequam ab anima capiatur, an non? Si non vivit, quonam pacto vitam animae praestat et auget, quod et vita caret, et antequam vitam animae mutuet, oportet ipsum vitam ab anima mutuari? Si vivit, iam habet animam.
Novae igitur quotidie animae a nobis hauriuntur ad nostrae huius animae nutrimentum. Transit autem semper alimonia in eius naturam quod alitur. Itaque multae quotidie animae a natura perdentur, ut una servetur anima, quod bonitas naturae non patitur.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VI
p. 223Tenth argument: the soul does not increase with the growth of this body.
If the soul is a body, it certainly fills the solid body you see so that the whole may live; and the soul itself is a subtle and agile body, as the swiftness of the soul indicates. Therefore, if you divide an animal's body into its members, then, just as all the severed pieces of the body are bodies, so the little bodies that remain in the severed members are souls—especially since the whole soul is of a single nature, so that it may bind diverse things together. Arms and legs separated from the body will therefore live, move, and feel for a time.
And the soul that remains in the rest of the body—often living there for ten years after the arms and legs have been amputated—will be much smaller than before. It will therefore be small-souled, dull, and forgetful. Indeed, let us argue further in this way.
If the soul is a body, fully matching by its own quantity the magnitude of this visible body, it will grow as the body grows and diminish as the body diminishes. In a vast body the soul will be more magnificent and more divine. And when, in the same human being, the soul grows as the body matures, it will have to grow by the addition of a body like itself. Does food of this kind live in itself before it is taken up by the soul, or not? If it does not live, how can what lacks life bestow life on the soul and increase it? Before it could lend life to the soul, it would itself have to borrow life from the soul. If it lives, it already has a soul.
Every day, then, new souls are drawn into us to nourish this soul of ours. For nourishment always passes into the nature of what is nourished. Many souls will therefore be destroyed by nature each day so that one soul may be preserved—something the goodness of nature does not permit.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II · Book VI · VI.13.1–VI.13.4
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.
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- public-domain-base-witnessFlorence 1482 editio princeps — Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
- collating-witness-cc-by-4.0Paris 1559 printing — Universidad Complutense de Madrid
- late-control-and-ocr-aidParis 1641 Opera printing — Internet Archive